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ABSTRACT	
This	dissertation	seeks	traces	of	enfolding	corporeal	paths	within	the	ontological,	epistemological,	ethical	abyss	separating	“Human”	and	“Animal.”	The	“question	of	the	animal,”	as	it	is	often	called,	is	currently	en	vogue	within	a	larger	ecological	movement	in	the	humanities.	I	seek	to	extend	this	engagement	with	“animality”	beyond	rhetoric,	literature,	and	philosophy	by	enfolding	the	sciences	and	arts	as	well	for	a	deeper	understanding	of	humans	as	animals	and	therefore,	I	argue,	as	rhetorical	life.	This	path	of	the	HumAnimal	emerges	with	a	diffractive	reading	of	new	material	feminism,	evolutionary	biology,	contemporary	art	practices,	and	visual	rhetorics,	and	in	doing	so,	theorizes	a	definition	of	rhetoric	that	is	prior	to	intention,	consciousness,	and	mind.	I	argue	that	rhetoric	is	instead	present	at	the	origins,	struggles,	and	flourishings	of	life	itself.	Rhetoric	becomes	a	process,	a	movement,	and	a	biological	becoming	that	emerges	in	nonlinear	and	discontinuous	ways,	illuminating	the	dark	abyssal	waters	in	which	humanimals	and	animals	are	mutually	and	materially	enfolded.	Given	the	ethical	implications	of	our	entanglements	with	the	world,	this	dissertation	further	argues	for	a	different	way	of	looking	with	animals	in	visual	culture.	The	representationalist	looking	that	places	animals	at	a	distance	and	visually	grasps	them	is	demonstrated	with	contemporary	examples	of	viral	memes	as	well	as	the	destructive	human-animal	interactions	practiced	for	capturing	selfies	and	“cute”	photographs.	These	animals	are	but	objects	grasped	by	human	eyes	across	a	staggering	ontological	divide.	I	turn	to	Heidegger’s	Parmenides	to	theorize	
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an	encountering,	being-enabling	look	for	animals	in	visual	culture	that	ontologically	entangles	humanimals	and	animals	in	the	looking	relation.	Such	an	encountering	look	simultaneously	brings	forth	an	awareness	of	one’s	own	being	such	that	the	abyssal	requisites	for	self	and	other,	subject	and	object,	human	and	animal	are	compromised.	An	encountering	look	is	essentially	a	phenomenological	awareness	of	entanglement.	These	alternative	practices	of	looking	become	the	basis	for	a	HumAnimal	rhetorics	and	pedagogy.	
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CHAPTER	ONE	HUMANIMAL	
	.	.	.the	re-visioning	of	our	relationship	with	animals	does	not	simply	involve	understanding	animal	life	beyond	its	biological	or	ethological	functioning,	but	also	entails	risking	the	human.	 —Giovanni	Aloi,	Art	&	Animals	xxi		“Humans”	are	emergent	phenomena	like	all	other	physical	systems.”		—Karen	Barad,	Meeting	the	Universe	Halfway	338	
Figure	1.	Swan	Abdominal	X-Ray	of	foreign	bodies	
(pictured	in	white).	Kathy	van	Buer,	DVM;	26	Jul	2007.	
Photograph.	
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In	the	summer	of	2007	I	was	shadowing	a	local	wildlife	and	small	animal	Veterinarian	when	a	young	Trumpeter	Swan	was	brought	into	the	clinic.	His	regal,	feathered	body	was	a	unique	sight	amongst	the	rows	of	caged	pets,	squirming	and	yipping	away,	awaiting	surgery.	This	beloved	visitor	to	a	private	area	pond	in	Illinois	had	become	increasingly	lethargic.	Dr.	Van	Buer	noted	that	he	was	underweight,	“very	weak	and	depressed	.	.	.	sick,	not	walking	well,	not	molting	yet”	and	had	a	swelling	“on	the	neck	area”	(van	Buer).	He	was	transported	by	the	Iowa	Department	of	Natural	Resources	to	another	wildlife	veterinarian,	and	I	only	learned	later	of	the	fatal	bright	white	discs	on	his	abdominal	x-rays.	This	swan	had	ingested	various	discarded	remnants	of	everyday	human	life.	(Lead	toxicity	from	a	coin	is	thought	to	have	been	the	specific	cause	of	his	slow	and	painful	decline).	Our	material	entanglements	with	animals,	with	all	of	life,	are	folded	within	these	soft,	permeable	tissues	of	being—often	unseen	and,	therefore,	unacknowledged.	It	is	this	circulating	engagement	of	our	organic	and	inorganic	beings	and	processes	that	puts	the	typical	opposition	of	the	transcendent	“Human”	and	savage	“Animal”	into	question.	The	abdominal	radiographs,	depicting	the	swan	body	in	greys	and	blacks	amidst	ghostly	skeletal	structures,	offer	a	haunting	trace	of	these	material	entanglements	and	the	dark,	unseen	depths	in	which	we	are	all	simultaneously	enfolded.		This	dissertation	project	explores	the	undecideable,	abyssal	depths	between	terms	like	“Life”	and	“Death”	and	“Human”	and	“Animal,”	terms	that	have	been	taken	as	self-evident	in	Western	philosophy	and	rhetoric.	What	follows	will	be	an	attempt	
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to	entangle	rhetoric	and	rhetorical	studies	with	a	transcorporeal1	disease	of	the	human	as	HumAnimal2:	of	the	human	as	always	already	animal,	as	matter,	and	as	
rhetorical	life.	In	contrast	to	the	transcendent,	disembodied	thinking-therefore-being	subject,	“humanimal”	indicates	an	enfolding	material	biological	reality—an	agential	reality3—in	which	we	are	always	creatively	becoming.		
The	Human|Animal	Abyss	We	do	not	speak	of	the	air	between	our	body	and	nearby	tree,	but	rather	speak	of	the	empty	space	between	us.	It	is	empty.	Just	an	absence	of	stuff,	without	feeling	or	meaning.	A	void.	David	Abram	“The	Commonwealth	of	Breath”	302		What	fantasy	of	distance	is	this?	Karen	Barad	Meeting	the	Universe	Halfway	396	In	“Domesticating	Animal	Theory,”	John	Muckelbauer	jokingly	refers	to	“animality”	as	“the	new	fall	line	of	theory	ware”	emerging	within	a	larger	ecological	movement	in	the	humanities	(97).	It	is	indeed	difficult	to	distill	the	practical	exigencies	for	considering	animals	and	the	larger	nonhuman	world	anew	within	all	fields.	After	all,	we	are	living	in	an	era	now	ominously	referred	to	as	the	“Anthropocene”	in	which	practices	of	human	exceptionalism	are	realizing	devastation	on	a	massive	scale,	perhaps	even	propelling	us	toward	a	sixth	massive	global	extinction4.	As	one	example,	a	risk	assessment	published	in	PNAS	(Proceedings	of	the	National	
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Academy	of	Sciences	of	the	United	States	of	America)	in	September	2015	predicts	that,	based	on	studies	in	the	fifty-year	span	between	1962	and	20125,	plastic	ingestion	is	expected	in	90	percent	of	seabird	species	like	the	Trumpeter	Swan	and	will	likely	“reach	99%	of	all	species	by	2050”	(Wilcox	et	al.).	Anthropocentrism	and	its	resulting	blind	actions	of	consumption	and	degradation	have	permanently	altered	the	composition	of	reality.	The	“fantasy	of	distance”	between	human	and	animal	must	be	traced	to	illuminate	the	very	real	material	entanglements	and	corporeal	folds	of	these	two	ontological	and	epistemological	shores.	In	History	and	Its	Limits:	Human,	Animal	Violence,	Dominick	LaCapra	examines	the	persistence	in	Western	culture	for	seeking	a	decisive	criterion	that	separates	human	and	animal	and	justifies	human	exceptionalism.	These	diverse	criteria	have	ranged	from	soul,	spirit	and	nobility	to	language	and	even	laughter	(157).	Although	many	of	the	behavioral	and	biological	“golden”	criteria	have	been	largely	disproven	over	time,	LaCapra	remarks	that	the	“bewildering	heterogeneity	of	seemingly	endless	criteria	used	to	arrive	at	the	same	conclusive	divide	attests	to	the	force	of	the	desire	for	that	divide	or	radical	separation”	(157).	Precisely	what	is	at	stake	in	so	desperately	desiring	the	“conceptual	Grand	Canyon	that	divides	into	two	the	deceptively	massive	categories	of	human	and	animal”	(150)?	Without	
something	upon	which	to	base	a	clean	and	easy	cut	between	two	inherently	radically	opposed	terms,	the	systematic	treatment	of	animals	upon	which	the	expectations	of	a	certain	quality	of	everyday	life	depends—in	fact	an	entire	ideology	of	human	exceptionalism	and	animal	consumption—is	suddenly	in	jeopardy:	
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any	attempted	justification	of	a	given	treatment	of	animals	(for	example,	killing	and	eating	or	experimenting	on	them)	has	to	be	based	on	considerations	that	are	typically	controversial	and	debatable,	involving	problematic	normative	judgments,	that	do	not	have	the	logical,	ethical,	or	religious	force—and	conscience-calming	function—of	a	decisive	criterion	or	clear-cut	divide	in	which	much	importance	is	obviously	invested.	(150)	The	abyssal	divide	between	human	and	animal	puts	this	ideology	at	ease.	It	is	a	convenient	rhetorical	cut.	In	“The	Commonwealth	of	Breath”	quoted	above,	David	Abram	describes	this	apparent	void	of	emptiness	that	opens	between	human	and	animal	or	the	more	general	concept	of	nature	as	“a	perfect	place	to	throw	whatever	we	hope	to	a-void.	.	.	the	perfect	dump	site	for	the	unwanted	by-products	of	our	industries.	.	.”	(302).	I	will	explore	these	ethical	implications	further	in	this	chapter	and	throughout	the	dissertation	as	a	whole	by	attempting	to	trace	this	decisive	cut	and	the	abyssal	space	it	opens.		In	The	Animal	That	Therefore	I	Am,	Derrida	seeks	to	complicate	a	clean	human/animal	distinction	in	Western	philosophy.	As	Derrida	suggests,	while	the	question	of	whether	difference	exists	between	human	and	animal	is	not	debatable:		The	discussion	is	worth	undertaking	once	it	is	a	matter	of	determining	the	number,	form,	sense,	or	structure,	the	foliated	consistency,	of	this	abyssal	limit,	these	edges,	this	plural	and	repeatedly	folding	frontier.	The	discussion	becomes	interesting	once,	instead	of	asking	whether	or	not	there	is	a	limit	that	produces	a	discontinuity,	one	attempts	to	think	what	a	limit	becomes	
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once	it	is	abyssal,	once	the	frontier	no	longer	forms	a	single	indivisible	line	but	more	than	one	internally	divided	line;	once,	as	a	result,	it	can	no	longer	be	traced,	objectified,	or	counted	as	single	and	indivisible.	What	are	the	edges	of	a	limit	that	grows	and	multiplies	by	feeding	on	an	abyss?	(30-31)		For	Derrida,	human	and	animal	exist	as	“relations…	at	once	intertwined	and	abyssal,	and	they	can	never	be	totally	objectified”	(31).	If	we	attempt	to	think	this	abyssal	space	and	its	“foliated	consistency,”	its	“plural	and	repeatedly	folding	frontier,”	we	may	find	ourselves	very	far	out	to	sea,	plunging	into	the	dark	depths	of	the	abyssal	plains	in	the	ocean—the	deepest	places	on	our	planet,	with	nearly	bottomless	depths	we	presume	to	think	and	understand	though	they	have	barely	been	explored.	These	are	spaces	far	from	our	view	where	sunlight	does	not	penetrate,	but	they	are	simultaneously	fertile,	sustaining	life	and	the	entanglements	of	life6.	These	abyssal	cuts	in	the	Earth	are	extreme	spaces,	formed	by	magma	that	rises	with	the	spreading	of	difference	within	the	ocean	floor,	leaving	benthos	organisms—those	that	live	in	the	deepest	of	darknesses—without	solid	ground.	And	yet	the	inability	to	think	with	the	complexity	of	a	“plural	and	repeatedly	folding	frontier”	and	its	entangled	biological	materiality	persists,	allowing	justification	for	“all	manner	of	atrocities”	(Derrida	26),	including,	as	Derrida	reminds	us,	the	staggering	rate	at	which	(nonhuman)	animals	suffer	and	are	killed	each	year	in	the	euphemistic	“Concentrated	Animal	Feeding	Operations”	(CAFOs)	and	other	factory	farming	practices	(the	number	of	these	annual	animal	deaths	is	in	the	billions,	surpassing	even	the	global	human	population7).		Myths	and	legends	of	monstrous,	
		 7	
unrecognizable	creatures	arise	from	the	Earth’s	dark	abyssal	waters;	perhaps	the	humanimal	can	be	amongst	them.		
Rhetorical	(Hum)Animals	Speech	would	not	have	evolved	among	human	beings	unless	rhetoric	already	existed.	In	fact,	rhetoric	is	manifest	in	all	animal	life	and	existed	long	before	the	evolution	of	human	beings.	George	Kennedy	“A	Hoot	in	the	Dark:	The	Evolution	of	General	Rhetoric”	4	The	abyssal	rupture	between	“Human”	and	“Animal”	understandably	haunts	rhetoric	and	rhetorical	studies	today.	As	Diane	Davis	points	out	in	“Autozoography:	Notes	Toward	a	Rhetoricity	of	the	Living,”	rhetorical	studies	has	been	a	discipline	that,	“despite	everything,”	traditionally	presumes	the	human	with	relatively	no	question	(535).	George	Kennedy	in	“A	Hoot	in	the	Dark:	The	Evolution	of	General	Rhetoric”	and	then	later	in	Comparative	Rhetoric	was	among	the	first	to	suggest	a	rhetoric	prior	to	speech	and	intent,	located	“in	biological	evolution”	(4).	Kennedy	claims	rhetoric	as	even	present	at	a	quantum	level—at	the	very	impulse	of	communicative	energy.	At	the	time	of	“A	Hoot”	in	1992,	this	suggestion	of	an	evolutionary	animal	(and	more	generally	nonhuman)	rhetoric	caught	most	by	surprise	and	it	was	nearly	twenty	years	later	before	other	rhetoricians	began	reexamining	this	suggestion	more	seriously8.		Since	this	reemergence,	rhetoric	has	expanded	its	anthropocentric	limits	significantly.	Rhetoric	has	now	been	theorized	as	complex,	embodied,	adaptive,	preoriginary,	ambient,	strange,	and	perhaps	even	
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possible	within	animals	as	well9.	But	there	is	still	much	to	be	said	for	animal	rhetorics.	I	wish	to	expand	upon	what	Kennedy	began	with	“A	Hoot”	with	a	diffractive	reading10	of	evolutionary	biology	and	new	material	feminism	in	theorizing	a	definition	of	rhetoric	as	prior	to	intention,	consciousness,	and	mind.	I	argue	that	rhetoric	is	instead	present	at	the	origins,	struggles,	and	flourishings	of	life	itself.	Rhetoric	becomes	a	process,	a	movement,	and	a	biological	becoming	that	emerges	in	nonlinear	and	discontinuous	ways,	illuminating	the	dark	abyssal	waters	in	which	human	and	animal	are	materially	enfolded	in	what	Karen	Barad	refers	to	as	the	“extraordinary	liveliness	of	the	world”	(Meeting	91).	Beginning	again	with	“A	Hoot	in	the	Dark,”	Kennedy	forms	a	number	of	theses	in	order	to	arrive	at	a	genus	of	universal	qualities	of	rhetoric.	He	bases	these	postulations	on	his	claim	that	rhetoric	is	“a	form	of	energy”	that	exists	“in	physical	actions,	facial	expressions,	gestures,	and	signs	generally”	(4).	The	first	thesis,	that	rhetoric	is	prior	to	speech,	is	given	with	several	examples	of	animal	behavior:	lions	or	wolves	in	a	pack,	or	“society,”	may	warn	of	an	approaching	intruder;	males	of	the	same	species	may	vocalize	and	posture	in	“signs	of	intent”	for	defending	or	overthrowing	alpha	rank;	crows	engage	in	a	number	of	vocal	calls	that	resemble	epideictic	rhetoric	(4-5).	In	each	case,	“energy	has	been	transmitted	by	a	sign”	(4).	This	idea	of	rhetoric	as	transmission	of	energy	becomes	the	crux	for	all	theses	that	follow.	Given	that	signs	(and	the	energy	used	to	create	them)	can	produce	meaning	without	intention,	Kennedy	suggests	rhetoric	itself	is	prior	to	intent,	which	further	allows	for	rhetoric	as	present	simply	in	the	physical	characteristics	themselves,	as	in	
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the	color	and	aroma	of	plants	that	attract	pollinators	(10).	In	each	of	these	cases	of	rhetoric	as	the	fundamental	energy	of	communication,	it	becomes	clear	that	rhetoric	is	implicitly	aligned	with	biological	evolution	and	adaptation	(Theses	IV	and	V	including	rhetoric’s	function	as	survival	of	the	fittest	and	its	evolution	through	selective	variation).	What	naturally	follows	is	an	emphasis	on	the	rhetorical	canon	of	delivery,	or,	at	its	most	primitive,	“physical	motion	in	response	to	some	exigence”	(12),	though	all	canons	are	suggested	to	be	“phenomena	of	nature	and	prior	to	speech”	(14).			Given	the	time	of	their	publication,	it	is	not	surprising	that	Kennedy’s	radical	divergences	from	classical	definitions	of	rhetoric	were	met	with	surprise,	skepticism,	and	even	scrutiny11.	Indeed,	Kennedy	even	goes	as	far	as	to	suggest	that,	as	“an	energy	existing	in	life”	and	therefore	necessarily	prior	to	life	itself,	rhetoric	may	be	a	“special	case	of	the	energy	of	all	physics	as	known	from	subatomic	particles”	(13).	Extending	rhetoric	to	include	animals,	and—more	generally—biological	life,	was	quite	the	turn,	but	suggesting	it	may	exist	on	a	quantum	level?	How	were	serious	rhetoricians	to	respond?		Research	Professor	of	anthropology	Jo	Liska	was	amongst	the	first	to	seriously	engage	Kennedy’s	general	theory	of	rhetoric	with	an	article	in	Philosophy	
and	Rhetoric	the	following	year.	While	emphatically	disagreeing	with	Kennedy’s	theory	for	its	lack	of	“distinguishing	characteristics”	from	any	behavior	of	any	living	organism	(32)	and	its	apparent	presence	in	the	genetic	code	itself	(34),	Liska	does	provide	a	more	nuanced	approach	by	suggesting	a	precise	point	in	communication	
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where	rhetoric	appears.	(Another	rhetorical	cut).	She	identifies	this	point	of	evolutionary	appearance	on	a	continuum	of	animal	signs	between	real	(in	a	physical,	biological	sense)	“symptoms”	and	arbitrary	“symbols”	in	the	realm	of	“semblances”	(34).	Semblances	designate	when	a	sign	is	of	social	significance	and	its	modality	voluntarily	controlled	(34-35).	Her	resulting	definition	for	rhetoric	becomes	a	“MANIPULATION	of	signs	in	the	service	of	social	influence”	(34,	her	emphasis),	which	maintains	the	inclusion	of	animals	within	rhetoric—still	quite	a	revolutionary	theoretical	event	for	rhetorical	studies—but	eliminates	what	she	argues	is	the	unhelpful	grand	generality	suggested	by	Kennedy.		Following	Liska’s	critical	engagement	of	Kennedy’s	general	theory	in	1993,	Alex	Parrish’s	2015	Adaptive	Rhetoric:	Evolution,	Culture,	and	the	Art	of	Persuasion	is	the	next	to	revisit	Kennedy’s	theory	with	additional	insights	from	evolutionary	biology.	Relying	upon	cognitive	science	and	behavioral	ecology,	Parrish	establishes	a	more	thorough	“biocultural	paradigm”	for	investigating	the	origins	and	forces	of	rhetoric.	He	argues:	“To	better	understand	the	art	of	persuasion,	rhetoricians	need	to	closely	examine	both	cultural	and	biological	influences	on	human	behavior,	which	requires	us	to	locate	the	evolved	mind	as	the	production	point	of	behavior	and	the	nexus	where	culture	and	evolution	meet”	(2).	Mind	and	behavior	are	critical	points	of	qualification	when	arguing	for	this	adaptive	rhetoric,	for	Parrish	seeks	to	extend	the	classical	understanding	of	rhetoric	as	a	discursive,	situated,	and	intentional	art	to	animals	with	scientifically	supported	abilities	to	engage	in	discursive,	situated,	intentional	behaviors.	Therefore,	such	qualifying	animals	must	demonstrate,	among	
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other	things,	1)	theory	of	mind	as	well	as	2)	rhetorical	intention.	That	is,	can	a	particular	animal	judge	that	a	fellow	animal	has	a	mind	that	can	be	persuaded?	And	does	this	animal	engage	in	an	intentional	behavior	in	order	to	persuade?	These	factors	are,	indeed,	the	most	compelling	in	an	argument	for	extending	rhetoric	to	certain	animals,	but	Abram	notes	how	“mind—or	consciousness,	or	awareness—is	a	strangely	amorphous	and	mercurial	phenomenon,	one	that	is	mighty	tough	to	pin	down”	(302).	The	vague	somewhere	of	mind	proves	to	be	quite	tough,	indeed,	to	locate.	Parrish	argues	for	mind,	following	Daniel	Dennett	and	other	cognitive	scientists12,	by	focusing	on	observable	behavior.	There	is	a	variety	of	striking	animal	behaviors	that	make	it	difficult	to	argue	against	an	adaptive	animal	rhetoric,	even	in	rhetoric’s	most	classically	understood	capacity	as	an	intentional	art	of	discourse.	The	argument	that	Kanzi	the	bonobo,	who	communicates	and	invents	communications	with	lexigrams,	and	Alex	the	African	gray	parrot,	who	interrupts	other	birds	to	tell	them	to	speak	more	clearly	and	answers	incorrectly	at	well-known	tasks	when	he	becomes	bored,	are	capable	of	rhetorical	behavior	is	compelling13.	These	are	complex,	“minded,”	emotional	animals.	To	ignore	these	clearly	intelligent	beings	capable	of	thought,	emotion,	and	intention	as	rhetorical	agents	is	simply	to	engage	in	human	exceptionalism	with	little	biological	or	scientific	basis.	But	what	becomes	further	excluded	in	the	argument	for	qualifications	like	theory	of	mind	and	intentional	behavior?		Parrish’s	example	of	the	cut	that	must	be	made	in	theorizing	a	clear	definition	of	animal	rhetoric	is	presented	with	the	peacock.	Peacocks	may	have	
		 12	
large,	brightly	colored	tails	that	participate	in	the	persuasion	of	a	peahen	for	mating,	but	these	feathers	are	not	rhetorical	until	they	are	intentionally	put	into	action	with	a	characteristic	mating	behavior.	In	other	words,	the	tail	itself	is	not	rhetorical	until	it	is	intentionally	displayed	for	that	purpose.	But	I	propose	that	it	is	precisely	here,	in	this	complex	evolutionary	movement,	which	shapes	phenotypes	with	the	dynamic	materiality	of	genes,	of	ecologies,	of	peahen	bodies	and	choices,	of	a	temporal	emergence	in	which	these	varied	and	diverse	factors	become	entangled	and	changed,	that	we	can	witness	a	creative	becoming	of	rhetoric.	It	is	in	the	formation,	the	continuous	becomings	of	bodies	as	they	inter	and	intra-act,	that	we	see	a	dynamic,	adaptive	but	also	performative	rhetoric	of	agential	matter.	To	view	these	physical	traits	of	biological	bodies	as	static	and	immutable	as	they	appear	to	our	eyes,	then,	is	deceiving.	These	morphologies	and	physiologies	bear	visible	traces	of	the	movement	of	rhetoric	“in”	evolution,	as	Kennedy	suggests,	and	therefore	within	the	fleshy	contours	and	material	folds	of	biological—rhetorical—life.	Chapter	2	will	expand	upon	this	claim	of	evolutionary	rhetorical	bodies	in	much	greater	detail.		
Entangled	Materialities	.	.	.the	body	[is]	the	threshold	or	borderline	concept	that	hovers	perilously	and	undecidably	at	the	pivotal	point	of	binary	pairs.	Elizabeth	Grosz	Volatile	Bodies:	Toward	a	Corporeal	Feminism	22			
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Perhaps	we	need	a	new	term	to	designate	the	hybrid	creatures	that	we	must	learn	to	think	of,	a	‘humanimal’	form	predicated	on	the	refusal	of	the	human/animal	binary.	 WJT	Mitchell	Animal	Rites	xiii-xiv		Referring	to	our	human	animal	beings	as	the	awkward	mouthful	humanimal	causes	pause	and	recalls	our	entangled	biological	materiality,	indicating	the	inherent	difficulty	in	distinguishing	between	subject-object	positions	of	self/other,	nature/culture,	and	of	course	human/animal.	Humanimal	also	inherits	its	hybridity	from	a	number	of	similar	ambitious	terms,	such	as	Donna	Haraway’s	well-known	“natureculture”	and	Wendy	Wheeler’s	“bodymind”	(which	I	contextualize	further	below).	As	Jane	Bennett	describes	in	Vibrant	Matter,	that	which	is	frequently	referred	to	as	the	object	of	exteriority,	the	environment,	“is	actually	inside	human	minds	and	bodies”	in	such	a	way	that	we	are	“inextricably	bound”	ontologically,	epistemologically	and	ethically	with	all	of	matter	(116).	Suddenly	our	presumed	human	form,	delineated	by	a	smooth	and	constant	exteriority	of	skin	and	flesh	that	holds	the	world—Nature	or	the	environment—at	bay,	is	plunged	back	into	the	dark	and	nascent	unknowability	in	which	it	first	forms.	Limbs	become	almost	indiscernible	as	we	strain	to	make	out	budding	contours:	the	hands	and	face	that	appear	so	distinctive—implicitly	defining	this	species	by	appearance	alone	and	holding	it	aloft	in	a	hierarchical	organization	of	being—are	here	acutely	alien	(acutely	animal)	in	appearance.	Life	divides	and	folds	upon	itself	while	being	further	enfolded	within	life.	The	humanimal	exists	within	the	mysterious	darkness	of	these	
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originary	depths,	and	within	these	depths	are	still	further	depths	of	increasing	micro-material	entanglements.	This	entangled	biological	materiality	is	frequently	the	topic	within	new	materialism	theories,	particularly	within	new	material	feminisms	and	ecocriticism,	which	finds	traction	from	recent	scientific	insights	for	“the	materiality	of	the	body	as	itself	an	active,	sometimes	recalcitrant,	force”	(Alaimo	and	Hekman	4).	New	material	feminisms	are	especially	appropriate	for	theorizing	a	HumAnimal	rhetorics,	since	this	particular	trajectory	of	thought	is	not	preoccupied	with	extending	privileged	human	abilities	to	the	nonhuman	realm	but	rather	with	questioning	the	very	contours	of	the	human	itself.	In	this	sense,	new	material	feminisms	align	with	the	posthumanist	theorists	like	Cary	Wolfe	and	Donna	Haraway,	who	are	reaching	beyond	humanism	rather	than	beyond	the	embodied	material	human14.		In	Meeting	the	Universe	Halfway:	Quantum	Physics	and	the	Entanglement	of	
Matter	and	Meaning,	Karen	Barad’s	philosophy-physics,	with	its	“agential	realism”	and	diffractive	methodology,	has	made	fertile	new	material	feminism	by	revealing	the	nature	of	nature	with	the	phenomenon	of	quantum	entanglement.	Diffraction,	she	insists,	is	a	more	appropriate	methodology	for	investigating	reality	than	reflexivity	or	the	optical	metaphor	of	reflection,	which	presumes	a	decisive	cut—an	abyssal	space,	if	you	will—between	image	and	reality	and,	according	to	Haraway,	“only	displaces	the	same	elsewhere”	and	instigates	preoccupation	and	concern	over	“copy	and	original	and	the	search	for	the	authentic	and	really	real”	(qtd	in	Barad	71).	Reflection,	this	mere	displacement	of	“the	same	elsewhere,”	which	relies	on	the	
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appearance	of	an	original	copy,	inherently	gives	rise	to	the	importance	of	
representing	the	original.	Is	the	representational	image	a	satisfactory	likeness	to	the	real	qualities	it	stands	in	for?	This	cut,	gap,	abyss	can	here	again	be	seen	to	clearly	divide	between	individual	beings	and	objects.	A	bodily	boundary	is	presumed	to	clearly	separate	interior	and	exterior	ontologies15.	Haraway	originally	conceives	of	the	methodology	of	diffraction	in	
Modest_Witness,	which	Barad	quotes	at	length:	What	we	need	is	to	make	a	difference	in	material-semiotic	apparatuses,	to	diffract	the	rays	of	technoscience	so	that	we	get	more	promising	interference	patterns	on	the	recording	films	of	our	lives	and	bodies.	Diffraction	is	an	optical	metaphor	for	the	effort	to	make	a	difference	in	the	world.	.	.	.	Diffraction	is	a	narrative,	graphic,	psychological,	spiritual,	and	political	technology	for	making	consequential	meanings.	(Barad	71)	Diffraction,	Barad	explains	more	fully,	is	a	real	physical,	quantum	phenomenon	most	readily	understood,	perhaps,	by	wave	patterns	that	create	overlaps	and	superpositions—essentially	“ontologically	indeterminate	states”—inherent	to	the	wave-particle	paradox	that	has	made	“the	downfall	of	classical	metaphysics	explicit”	(265,	72).	The	special	“weird”	quality	of	quantum	phenomena,	this	wave-particle	paradox,	which	throws	classic	Newtonian	physics	into	an	uproar	is	entanglement—and	it	is	not	something	anyone	can	witness	by	standing	outside,	at	a	distance	(this	is	especially	significant	in	terms	of	scientific	measurement	and	observation).	We	are	each	enfolded	within	these	ontological	states,	co-creating	reality	as	we	participate	in	
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it.	Entanglement	denies	the	idea	of	static,	unchanging	individuals	or	states:	“What	often	appears	as	separate	entities	(and	separate	sets	of	concerns)	with	sharp	edges	does	not	actually	entail	a	relation	of	absolute	exteriority	at	all”	(93).	Rather,	the	most	primary	ontological	unit	on	a	quantum	level	is	this	entangled	phenomenon	and	its	“dynamic	relationality	to	the	other”	(93,	her	emphasis).	Furthermore,	while	diffraction	is	useful	in	its	attunement	to	difference,	these	diffractive	apparatuses	“highlight,	exhibit,	and	make	evident	the	entangled	structure	of	the	changing	and	contingent	ontology	of	the	world,	including	the	ontology	of	knowing,”	for,	as	Barad	explains,	diffraction	“is	itself	an	entangled	phenomenon”	(73).	In	other	words,	quantum	entanglement	and	the	physical	phenomenon	of	diffraction	illustrate	a	reality	in	which	all	of	matter—organic	and	inorganic	alike—are	ontologically	interwoven.			 Entanglement,	as	Barad	explains,	is	a	performative	practice	of	creating	reality	that	provides	an	alternative	philosophical	framework.	Barad’s	philosophy-physics	is	an	“ontoepistemological”	framework	for	conceptualizing	reality	that	denies	discrete	states	of	being	and	knowing:	“A	performative	understanding	of	scientific	practices,	for	example,	takes	account	of	the	fact	that	knowing	does	not	come	from	standing	at	a	distance	and	representing	but	rather	from	a	direct	material	
engagement	with	the	world”	(43;	49,	her	emphasis).	Representation,	on	the	other	hand,	and	the	abyssal	spaces	thus	created	does	not	account	for	these	material-discursive	entangled	practices	of	being,	knowing,	and	becoming	(53).	Clearly	this	performativity,	which	includes	“being	attentive	to	the	iterative	production	of	
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boundaries,	the	material-discursive	nature	of	boundary-drawing	practices,	the	constitutive	exclusions	that	are	enacted,	and	questions	of	accountability	and	responsibility	for	the	reconfigurings	of	which	we	are	a	part”	is	the	methodology	needed	to	theorize	the	abyssal	entanglements	of	the	humanimal	(93).	For	this	is	a	methodology	of	theorizing	“exteriority	within”	and	the	discursive	practices	that	are	“the	material	conditions	for	making	meaning”	(93;	335).	Barad’s	unique	perspective	as	a	quantum	physicist	and	her	resulting	account	of	a	realism	that	reveals	a	radical	return	to	the	“nature	of	nature”	has	inspired	a	number	of	theorists	within	new	material	feminisms.	In	“Natural	Convers(at)ions:	Or,	What	if	Culture	Was	Really	Nature	All	Along?”	Vicki	Kirby	succinctly	captures	the	issue	of	the	human/animal,	nature/culture,	mind/body	constellation	of	oppositions	that	constitutes	the	general	concern	of	many	of	these	feminist	theorists:		The	most	important	[assumption]	is	the	assertion	that	humanness	is	profoundly	unnatural.	The	abstracting	technology	of	language,	intelligence,	and	creative	invention	is	separated	from	the	body	of	the	material	world,	indeed,	from	the	material	body	of	human	animality.	[…]	If	we	translate	the	separation	of	culture	from	nature	into	the	mind/body	split,	it	seems	that	Cartesian	subject	can	admit	that	s/he	has	a	body	(that	attaches	to	the	self),	and	yet	s/he	is	somehow	able	to	sustain	the	belief	that	s/he	is	not	this	body.	This	denial	is	necessary	because	to	contest	the	latter	and	all	its	possible	consequences	would	at	least	suggest	that	it	might	be	in	the	nature	of	the	
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biological	body	to	argue,	to	reinvent,	and	rewrite	itself—to	cogitate.	(220-221,	her	emphasis)	An	emphasis	on	the	body	as	active	and	inseparable	from	mind	also	finds	overwhelming	support	from	the	biological	sciences.	An	article	published	in	
Perspectives	on	Psychological	Science	titled	“Humans	as	Superorganisms:	How	Microbes,	Viruses,	Imprinted	Genes,	and	Other	Selfish	Entities	Shape	Our	Behavior”	seeks	to	even	extend	this	awareness	of	corporeal	agency	to	practitioners	within	psychology,	citing	gut	microbes,	viral	DNA,	and	epigenetic	heritability	as	affecting	behavior	(Kramer	and	Bressan).	Recent	scholarship	within	the	burgeoning	subfield	of	biosemiotics	similarly	complicates	any	distinction	between	mind/body	or	mind/matter	with	some	scholars	even	claiming	body	is	itself	synonymous	with	mind16	to	such	an	extent	that	Wendy	Wheeler	fuses	the	two	into	bodymind	(The	
Whole	18).	Given	the	difficulty	thus	inherent	in	“locating	the	evolved	mind	as	the	production	point	of	behavior,”	as	Parrish	suggests	must	be	done	for	a	deeper	understanding	of	rhetoric’s	biocultural	influences,	it	is	understandable	how	locating	conscious	intent	may	be	similarly	problematic.	Indeed,	in	“Natural	Play,	Natural	Metaphor	and	Natural	Stories:	Biosemiotic	Realism,”	Wheeler	argues	that	the	theoretical	claims	of	biosemiotics—“that	all	life.	.	.	is	semiotic	and	interpretive”—necessitates	that	we	“radically.	.	.	reconsider	what	we	might	mean	when	we	talk	about	mind,	consciousness,	and	intentionality”	(69).		This	troubling	issue	inherent	to	locating	animal	minds	(and	thus	intentionality)	is	illustrated	by	a	species	of	brittlestar,	which	Barad	also	discusses	in	
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Meeting	the	Universe	Halfway	(26).	The	brittlestar,	scientific	name	Ophiocoma	
wendtii,	is	an	invertebrate	related	to	starfish.	This	remarkable	organism	has	no	brain	and	no	apparent	eyes,	yet	it	is	able	to	flee	from	predators	in	a	dark	oceanic	environment.	The	truly	stunning	nature	of	this	scientific	discovery	lies	in	thousands	of	dome-shaped	crystals	covering	its	body	that	optimize	and	focus	light	onto	its	diffuse	nervous	system,	ultimately	creating	an	embodied	compound	eye	with	a	360-degree	view	of	its	surroundings	(369-371).	According	to	Barad,	“Brittlestars	challenge	not	only	disembodied	epistemologies	but	also	traditional,	and	indeed	many	nontraditional,	notions	of	embodiment.	Bodies	are	not	situated	in	the	world;	they	are	part	of	the	world”	(376).	For	Barad,	the	brittlestar	is	an	apt	example	of	her	agential	realist	philosophy	and	the	onto-epistemo-ethical	entanglements	implied:	“Parts	of	the	world	are	always	intra-acting	with	other	parts	of	the	world,	and	it	is	through	specific	intra-actions	that	a	differential	sense	of	being—with	boundaries,	properties,	cause	and	effect—is	enacted	in	the	ongoing	ebb	and	flow	of	agency”	(338).	The	brittlestar’s	extraordinary	compound	eye	and	ability	to	drop	endangered	limbs	when	attacked—its	limb	waving	in	prolonged	distraction	as	the	brittlestar	makes	its	escape—suggests	an	inherent	difficulty	connected	with	imposing	categorical	distinctions.	Indeed,	the	brittlestar’s	ability	to	drop	limbs	in	“ongoing	reconfigurings	of	its	bodily	boundaries.	.	.	through	which	the	agential	cut	between	‘self’	and	‘other’	(e.g.,	‘surrounding	environment’)	is	differentially	enacted”	(376)	suggests	an	ability	Diane	Davis	identifies	as	the	primary	criterion	with	which	rhetorical	studies	bestows	upon	the	human	the	exclusive	right	of	the	rhetorically	
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able:	the	ability	of	marking	“I.”	Davis	explains:	“Rhetorical	acts	are	held	to	be	distinctive	human	acts	inasmuch	as	they’re	grounded	not	so	much	in	the	power	to	speak	(certain	birds	can	do	that)	but	in	a	more	originary	capability	of	self-reflexivity”	(535).	Davis	goes	on	to	argue	that	this	ability	is	not	simply	situated	with	humans	but	is	a	“preoriginary	rhetoricity”	that	exists	as	“the	very	condition	for	the	identity	and	functioning	of	any	living	being”	(546).			 Haraway	approaches	this	necessary	relationality	of	being	from	a	biological	stance	in	When	Species	Meet	when	she	rather	poetically	states:	“To	be	one	is	to	become	with	many”	(4).	Citing	Lynn	Margulis	and	Dorion	Sagan’s	Acquiring	
Genomes,	Haraway	describes	the	vast	ontological	complexity	of	being	and	becoming,	which	is	never	a	fixed	nor	individual	state,	but	rather	exists	as	ongoing	acts	of	symbiosis—of	enfolding	mutual	relationships	between	organisms.	“The	creative	
force	of	symbiosis”	also	explains	the	most	predominant	theory	of	the	origin	of	biological	metabolic	life17	(Haraway	31,	my	emphasis).	Echoing	Barad,	Haraway	says	of	this	emergence	of	life:	“It	is	turtles	all	the	way	down;	the	partners	do	not	preexist	their	constitutive	intra-action	at	every	folded	layer	of	time	and	space.	These	are	the	contagions	and	infections	that	wound	the	primary	narcissism	of	those	who	still	dream	of	human	exceptionalism”	(32).	These	mutual	complex	entanglements	between	shores	are	essentially	questions	of	the	origin(s)	and	definition	of	life,	to	which	I	will	return	more	fully	in	Chapter	2.			 Ecocriticism	is	an	additional	area	of	theoretical	inquiry	that	has	enfolded	new	materialism	theories	to	strengthen	ecological	postmodernism’s	goal	for	the	
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“reenchantment	of	nature”	and	its	ethical	implications	(Oppermann	23,	35).	In	“Oceanic	Origins,	Plastic	Activism,	New	Materialism	at	Sea,”	Stacy	Alaimo	explains	how	the	burgeoning	field	of	material	ecocriticism,	“by	definition,	focuses	on	material	agencies	as	part	of	a	wider	environmental	ethos	that	values	ecosystems,	biodiversity,	and	nonhuman	life”	(193).	Material	ecocriticism	is	further	concerned	with	the	stories	and	narratives	that	arguably	arise	from	such	“creative	force[s]”	as	Margulis	and	Sagan	describe—this	agential	realism	Barad	refers	to.	Serpil	Oppermann	explains:	“This	creativity	can	be	interpreted	as	a	form	of	narrative	transmitted	through	the	interchanges	of	organic	and	inorganic	matter,	the	continuity	of	human	and	nonhuman	forces,	and	the	interplay	of	bodily	natures,	all	forming	active	composites”	(21).	The	meaning	created	in	onto-epistemological	entanglements	of	phenomena	is	taken	further	by	material	ecocriticism	to	indicate	“storied	matter”	in	which	“microscopic	and	macroscopic	and	even	cosmic	bodies	display	eloquence”	(29;	28,	her	emphasis).	Oppermann	refers	to	the	simultaneous	particle-wave	ontology	of	photons	as	well	as	the	remarkable	behavior	of	various	bacteria	as	illustrating	an	inherent	narrative	to	all	of	nature.	These	materially-embedded	theories	reveal	how	“every	living	creature,	from	humans	to	fungi”	can	be	thought	of	as	“tell[ing]	evolutionary	stories	of	co-existence,	interdependence,	adaptation	and	hybridization,	extinctions	and	survivals”	with	a	“formative,	enactive	power”	(Iovino	and	Oppermann	7).	In	other	words,	the	main	objective	of	ecocriticism	in	seeing	nature	as	composed	of	texts	“conveying	the	signs	and	meanings	expressed	by	material	forces”	(Iovino	“Bodies”	98)—whether	to	be	
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encountered	by	humanimals	or	other	bodyminds—is	similar	to	my	current	project.	However,	in	the	following	chapter	I	intend	to	show	how	a	HumAnimal	rhetorics	is	more	capable	of	explaining	a	“preoriginary”	creative	force	that	propels	this	entangled	becoming	of	“storied”	matter	by	considering	anew	the	embodied	persuasion	of	parasitism,	sexual	selection,	and	the	spontaneous	order	of	life’s	evolving	complexity.		By	theorizing	the	world	and	our	intra-actions	as	new	material	feminisms	and	ecocriticism	do,	the	“anthropocentric	models	of	knowledge	that	describe	nature	either	as	a	lifeless	mechanism	or	as	a	mere	textual	construct”	and	their	resultant	objectification,	oppression,	and	commoditization	of	“nature”	and	the	“environment”	are	abandoned	(Oppermann	23).	The	alternative	framework	of,	perhaps,	diffraction	and	its	implicit	material	entanglements	implicate	an	ethical	responsibility	to	how	meaning	is	created.			
Why	HumAnimal	Rhetorics?:	Becoming-With	Plastic		I	thought	of	the	humpback	in	the	dump.	The	whale	as	landfill.	It	was	a	metaphor,	and	then	it	wasn’t.	 Rebecca	Giggs	“Whale	Fall”		Choked	to	death	on	our	waste,	the	mythical	albatross	calls	upon	us	to	recognize	that	our	greatest	challenge	lies	not	out	there,	but	in	here.	Chris	Jordan	Midway:	Message	from	the	Gyre	
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A	HumAnimal	rhetorics	read	across	new	material	feminisms	and	ecocriticism	as	well	as	evolutionary	biology	theorizes	our	ethical	rhetorical	relations	with	animals	and	the	“nonhuman”	world	of	which	we	are,	indeed,	very	much	a	part.	While	new	materialism	is	not	new	within	rhetorical	studies,	a	HumAnimal	rhetorics	uniquely	theorizes	rhetorical	life	as	well	as	the	ethical	implications	that	spring	from	its	entanglements.		In	“Deep	Ambivalence	and	Wild	Objects:	Toward	a	Strange	Environmental	Rhetoric,”	Nathaniel	Rivers	remarks	on	how	“environmentalism	is	the	issue	for	all	time:	no	other	issue	could	be	more	pressing.	No	issue	could	matter	more”	(426,	his	emphasis).	Rivers	conjures	a	strain	of	new	materialism	to	argue	for	a	“deep	ambivalence”	and	“strange	rhetoric”	in	approaching	this	most	important	of	issues,	though	he	cites	philosopher	Graham	Harman	and	political	theorist	Jane	Bennett.	The	difference	in	our	choice	of	theorists	is	significant.	Harman	works	within	speculative	realism,	referring	to	his	particular	flavor	as	“Object	Oriented	Ontology”	(OOO),	while	Bennett	examines	how	agency,	or	“thing	power,”	is	created	in	relations	of	objects.	As	Rivers	explains,	“the	relationship	between	speculative	realisms	such	as	OOO	and	new	materialism	has	yet	to	be	fully	articulated”	(429).	While	both	these	theorists	work	to	overcome	anthropocentrism	and	in	that	sense	can	be	used	in	arguing	for	an	ethical	stance	toward	the	environment,	they	may	not	be	the	best	choices	within	the	larger	umbrella	term	of	new	materialism.	In	“Oceanic	Origins,”	Alaimo	argues	that	the	philosophies	and	analyses	arising	from	both	these	theorists	are	problematic	for	an	environmental	ethics:	“.	.	.Barad’s	agential	realism	and	my	trans-corporeality	
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diverge—in	ways	that	are	significant	for	environmentalism—from	thing	theory,	thing	power,	object-oriented	ontologies,	and	speculative	realism”	(203).	This	is	due	to	the	primary	focus	of	the	listed	philosophies	on	“encounters	with	discrete	objects”	and	“bodies,	things,	and	objects	as	separate	entities”	(195).	Alaimo	cites	Gay	Hawkins’s	“Plastic	Materialities”	in	which	Hawkins	uses	Bennett’s	“thing	power”	to	argue	in	favor	of	the	“affective	intensities”	and	“differential	agency”	of	plastic	bags	that	are	denied	in	activisms	otherwise	thwarting	their	use	(194).	Hawkins’	stance	is	essentially	one	in	favor	of	considering	an	autonomy	and	individual	agency	of	plastic	bags	and	against	any	activism	that	frames	them	as	“destructive	matter”	that	must	be	eliminated	(qtd	in	Alaimo	194).	Theories	like	Alaimo’s,	on	the	other	hand,	“instead	trac[e]	how	the	(post)human	is	always	already	part	of	intra-active	networks	and	systems	that	are	simultaneously	material,	discursive,	economic,	ecological,	and	biopolitical”	(195).	In	other	words,	“.	.	.	discrete	entities	such	as	plastic	bottle	caps	are,	in	a	sense,	already	part	of	who	we	are,	as	human	diets	ontologically	entangle	us	with	the	plastic	seas”	(198).	And	Alaimo	uses	Barad’s	language	of	intra-action,	the	significance	of	which	I	argue	above.		What	is	perhaps	the	most	significant	difference	in	using	theories	stemming	from	Barad’s	philosophy-physics	is	her	explanation	of	entangled	phenomena	as	the	most	primary	units	of	being.	With	examples	from	experiments	within	quantum	mechanics—most	notably	experiments	illustrating	Niels	Bohr’s	theory	of	indeterminacy—it	is	clear	that	“objects”	have	no	discrete,	static,	continuous	characteristics	(whether	withdrawn	or	not):		
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.	.	.	devices	don’t	disclose	preexisting	values	but	rather.	.	.	it	is	the	specific	material	configuration	that	gives	definition	to	the	notion	of	the	property	in	question,	enacts	a	cut	between	the	‘object’	and	the	‘measuring	instrument,’	and	produces	determinate	values	for	the	corresponding	measured	quantity.	.	.	the	specific	nature	of	the	material	arrangement	of	the	apparatus	is	responsible	for	the	specifics	of	the	enactment	of	the	cut.	(264)	Barad	may	be	referring	specifically	to	scientific	experiments	here,	but	as	she	explains	elsewhere,	such	material-discursive	practices	similarly	explain	all	agential	cuts	and	the	phenomena	(and	values	or	characteristics)	thus	created.	Practices,	in	this	case	particularly	entanglements	with	animals	and	the	environment,	are	responsible	for	the	composition	of	reality18.	For	Barad,	the	constitutive	nature	of	material-discursive	practices	like	rhetoric—in	which	beings	literally	come	to	be—implicates	an	ethical	responsibility:	Ethicality	is	part	of	the	fabric	of	the	world;	the	call	to	respond	and	be	responsible	is	part	of	what	is.	There	is	no	spatial-temporal	domain	that	is	excluded	from	the	ethicality	of	what	matters.	Questions	of	responsibility	and	accountability	present	themselves	with	every	possibility;	each	moment	is	alive	with	different	possibilities	for	the	world’s	becoming	and	different	reconfigurings	of	what	may	yet	be	possible.	(182)	 	
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Such	is	the	exigency	of	theorizing	a	materially	entangled	rhetoric	with	what	Barad	refers	to	as	an	onto-epistemo-ethical	framework	for	encountering	the	world:	for	“each	moment	is	alive”	with	these	possibilities	of	becoming.	Given	Barad’s	agential	realist	account	of	how	meaning	and	reality	are	created	with	“specific	material	performances	of	the	world”	(335),	it	is	clear	that	nothing	short	of	real	(hum)animal	beings	are	at	stake	in	these	relations.	How	we	look,	how	we	interact,	how	we	engage	with	animals	creates	our	shared	realities.	And,	critically	for	a	HumAnimal	rhetorics,	this	reality	is	becoming	increasingly	composed	of	(and	contaminated	by)	the	careless	waste	of	anthropocentrism.	Plastic	has	become	“a	key	geological	indicator	of	the	Anthropocene,”	distinct	from	the	Holocene	era	with	startling	changes	in	geological	composition	and	sedimentation	(Zalasiewicz	et	al.,	Waters	et	al.).	The	swan	narrative	that	opens	this	
Figure	2.	Photograph	of	plastic	stomach	contents	in	decomposing	
albatross.	Chris	Jordan;	Midway:	Message	from	the	Gyre;	Web.	Jul	
2014.	
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chapter	is	not	an	isolated	incident.	Microplastics	are	now	increasingly	dispersed	in	the	ocean	by	ingestion	and	secretion,	passing	through	organisms	in	a	shared	materiality	of	humanimal	waste.	Reporting	for	National	Geographic,	Isabelle	Groc	explains	how	marine	deaths	due	to	discarded	debris	are	escalating	at	a	startling	rate.	Even	small	pieces	of	plastic	or	trash	can	be	fatal	if	they	are	mistaken	for	food	and	ingested.	Alaimo	further	explains:	It	is	well	known	that	plastic	bags	look	like	jellyfish	in	the	water,	confusing	turtles	and	other	creatures.	.	.	Their	resemblance	to	food	means	that	plastic	bits,	the	plastic	bags,	the	plastic	objects	beckon,	entice,	and	deceive	birds,	turtles,	fish,	and	sea	mammals.	Vivid	examples	of	animals	occupied	by	plastics	reveal	the	unfortunate	results.	(“Oceanic”	199)	In	2014	biologists	made	a	startling	discovery	when	they	investigated	the	death	of	a	young	sei	whale	that	had	washed	up	in	the	Chesapeake	Bay:	“a	necropsy	revealed	the	animal	had	swallowed	a	shard	of	rigid,	black	plastic	that	lacerated	its	stomach,	preventing	it	from	feeding”	(Groc).	This	“long	and	painful	decline”	of	another	being	arose	from	something	as	simple	as	the	broken	plastic	of	someone’s	CD	case	(Susan	Barco	qtd	in	Groc).	It’s	hard	to	comprehend;	this	death	was	preventable.	Alaimo	provides	similar	examples;	surely,	such	examples	seem	endless	in	their	horror	of	humanimal	recklessness.	But	if	the	ocean	and	its	inhabitants	are	“out	there,”	and	I	am	securely	in	the	“in	here”	of	my	individual	body	with	“an	empty	space	between	us”—a	massive	void	or	abyss	separating	our	well-beings—then	creating	and	carelessly	disposing	of	garbage	does	little	to	affect	me;	then	“environmentalism	[is]	
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a	merely	elective	and	external	enterprise”	(Abram	302;	Alaimo	“Oceanic”	187).	Rather,	new	material	theories,	including	those	within	ecocriticism	such	as	Alaimo’s	trans-corporeality,	can	be	used	to	change	the	framework	in	which	we	begin	to	think	of	being.	Alaimo:	“It	is	my	hope	that	trans-corporeality—in	theory,	literature,	film,	activism,	and	daily	life—is	a	mode	of	ecomaterialism	that	will	discourage	citizens,	consumers,	and	embodied	humans	from	taking	refuge	in	fantasies	of	transcendence	and	imperviousness”	(187).	In	Chapters	4	and	5	of	this	dissertation,	I	suggest	how	this	may	be	done	with	HumAnimal	rhetorics	in	visual	culture	and	pedagogy.	Chris	Jordan’s	photographic	series	Midway:	Message	from	the	Gyre	offers	examples	of	the	devastation	created	in	the	wake	of	such	“fantasies	of	transcendence.”	Jordan	photographs	the	phenomenon	on	the	Midway	Atoll	islands	of	young	albatrosses	dying	from	plastic	waste	ingestion.	As	the	organic	material	of	their	bodies	decays,	the	shocking	quantity	of	this	plastic	waste	is	revealed	in	an	unconcealed	crypt	within	their	abdomens.	Jordan	explains	how	“nesting	chicks	are	fed	lethal	quantities	of	plastic	by	their	parents,	who	mistake	the	floating	trash	for	food	as	they	forage	over	the	vast	polluted	Pacific	Ocean.”	The	fact	that	massive	quantities	of	plastic	exist	in	the	ocean	is	devastating,	but	combined	with	the	image	of	these	infants’	deaths	at	the	unknowing,	caring	beak	of	albatross	parents	attempting	to	feed	them	is	a	tragedy	truly	difficult	to	stomach.	And,	as	Jordan	argues,	these	images	entangle	our	own	humanimal	bodies	in	a	shared	material	becoming-with	plastic:	“Like	the	albatross,	we.	.	.	find	ourselves	lacking	the	ability	to	discern	anymore	what	is	nourishing	from	what	is	toxic.”		
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	 In	the	lyrical	narrative	essay	“Whale	Fall,”	to	which	I	will	return	more	fully	in	Chapter	4,	Rebecca	Giggs	explains	how	the	waste	and	toxins	circulating	in	our	environments	do,	indeed,	affect	humanimals:	“[Greenland’s	Inuit]	women may	occupy	some	of	the	most	isolated	and	deindustrialized	regions	in	the	world,	but	sustaining	themselves	on	whales	had	made	their	bodies	into	sites	of	concentrated	contamination”	(Giggs).	Testing	revealed	that	these	Inuit	women	all	had	alarming	levels	of	mercury	and	other	toxins	despite	their	relatively	waste-free	lifestyles.	In	
Bodily	Natures:	Science,	Environment,	and	the	Material	Self,	Alaimo	traces	this	widespread	“traffic	in	toxins”	via	the	unique	genre	of	material	memoirs	(18).	By	combining	autobiography	with	science	writing	and	scientific	testing,	these	memoirs	create	a	startling	image	of	the	self	as	“unrecognizable”	in	its	“vast,	coextensive	materiality”	(23-24).	More	projects	like	material	memoirs—where	theory	meets	praxis—are	needed	for	this	cultivation	of	our	coextensive	materialities	and	the	resulting	unclear	borders	of	self.	For	it	is	here	that	we	construct	with	skin	and	walls	and	doors,	with	rooms	and	routines,	the	fabric	of	everyday	life.		 A	kind	of	material	memoir	similarly	entangles	itself	within	the	pages	of	this	dissertation,	its	fleshy	contours	unfolding	with	each	chapter.	Now	it	takes	me	back	to	the	floor	of	another	vet	office,	this	time	with	an	animal	I	knew	intimately,	having	shared	my	home	with	her	for	twelve	years.	Meadow,	“my”	“dog”	(how	true	are	either	of	these	words	that	I	use	to	attempt	describing	a	being	so	dear?),	was	born	and	died	on	the	floor.	And	it	is	floors	in	particular	to	which	I	return	when	thinking	about	life,	punctuated	as	it	is	by	births	and	deaths.	These	are	the	events	of	
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significance	that	illuminate	the	thresholds	of	our	existence—the	interstices,	abyssal	gaps,	liminal	undecidabilities—and	haunt	the	boundaries	of	what	we	presume	to	know.	They	haunt	the	human.	For	it	is	on	floors	that	the	contents	of	our	corporeal	bodies	tend	to	spill,	despite	how	much	we	may	wish	to	keep	them	hidden	within—to	keep	them	from	complicating	with	their	filth	the	clean	definitions	and	concepts	we	have	sewn	up	in	our	skin.	And	it	is	with	our	feet	on	human-made	floors	that	we	imagine	solid	ground,	when	we	have	yet	to	find	ourselves	fallen	against	the	porous	earth	and	its	organic	contents	of	which	we	are	ourselves	formed.	In	“Regarding	the	Dead,”	Michelle	Ballif	argues	that	“regarding	the	dead,	guarding	them,	mourning	them,	is	the	ethical	relation	that	makes	any	rhetorical	address	possible”	(455).	And	so	it	is	with	the	flow	of	these	bodily	contents	and	the	spectres	they	contain	that	I	wish	to	trace	the	foliated	contours	and	make	fertile	the	permeable	material	membranes	of	a	HumAnimal	rhetorics.				 	
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CHAPTER	TWO	RHETORICAL	BECOMINGS:	SEX,	SYMBIOSIS,	AND	SPONTANEOUS	ORGANIZATION	
	
What	follows	is	not	a	dissection.	Rhetoric	will	not	be	bound	and	flayed,	cut	and	drained	
of	its	life	force	in	a	sacrificial	attempt	at	understanding	its	processes.	I	want	to	see	it	
living.	I	want	to	feel	its	breath.	Perhaps	this	is	the	most	important	distinction	to	make	
as	I	conjure	a	HumAnimal	haunting	of	rhetoric	from	dark,	abyssal	depths,	because	
these	depths	are	fertile.	I	am	following	this	HumAnimal	rhetorics	like	I	follow	my	fetal	
bud	of	a	tail—unable	to	grasp	it	while	catching	an	always	fleeting	glimpse.	This	
glimpse	of	a	movement,	a	flurry	or	flourish,	disappearing	into	the	dark—the	dark	that	
Figure	3.	Illustration	of	labyrinthine	vaginas.	Menno	
Schilthuizen;	Nature’s	Nether	Regions;	New	York:	Penguin,	
2014;	Print.	
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is	behind	me,	underneath	me,	inside	me—is	all	that	I	can	seek.	I	want	it	living,	so	I	
must	follow	and	conjure	the	dead.		 Intelligibility	is	not	an	inherent	characteristic	of	humans	but	a	feature	of	the	world	in	its	differential	becoming.	The	world	articulates	itself	differently.	Karen	Barad	Meeting	the	Universe	Halfway	335		At	the	edge	of	the	jungle	was	a	seam,	a	dense	shedding	of	light	green	ribbons	of	bark.	A	place	where	things	previously	separated	moved	together	in	a	wet	pivot.	I	stood	and	walked	towards	it	in	a	dream.	 Bhanu	Kapil	Humanimal	6	Perhaps	evolution,	as	a	gradient	against	which	to	read	rhetorical	studies,	is	a	surprising	choice.	In	the	introduction	to	Alex	Parrish’s	Adaptive	Rhetoric:	Evolution,	
Culture,	and	the	Art	of	Persuasion,	Parrish	addresses	the	surprise	and	misunderstanding	he	faced	explaining	a	project	that	incorporates	biological	influences	on	persuasion.	To	thwart	similar	charges	of	“biological	reductionism”	or	determinism,	it	is	worthwhile	to	take	a	moment	to	explain	this	perhaps	unusual	choice	in	the	current	project.	The	methodology	of	diffraction,	described	in	the	previous	chapter,	explains	how	this	alternative	optical	metaphor	is	beneficial	for	discovering	productive	differences—“differences	that	make	a	difference”—between	and	within	(as	superpositions)	forms	of	knowledge.	Evolutionary	biology	has	been	chosen	as	one	of	these	productive	forms	of	knowledge	for	several	reasons.	First,	as	
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Viriginia	Morell	explains	in	Animal	Wise:	The	Thoughts	and	Emotions	of	Our	Fellow	
Creatures,	Darwin’s	theory	of	evolution	in	On	the	Origin	of	Species	“presented	a	solution	to	[the]	impasse”	between	“philosophers	and	theologians	who	saw	humans	as	the	product	of	a	special	creation	and	therefore	completely	separate	from	other	animals”	on	one	side	and	“thinkers	who	argued	that	there	were	sufficient	similarities	between	people	and	animals”	on	the	other	(10).	Darwin’s	evolutionary	biology	submits	compelling	evidence	that	humans	are	also	animals,	thus	collapsing,	in	quite	a	revolutionary	fashion,	the	massive	gulf	between	what	was	(and	still	often	is)	passionately	viewed	as	two	radically	different	categories	of	beings.	In	other	words,	evolution	traces	the	entanglement	of	biological	life.	In	“Darwin	and	Feminism,”	Elizabeth	Grosz	confirms	this	when	she	outlines	seven	benefits	for	feminism	in	engaging	with	evolutionary	theory,	one	being	that	evolution	allows	“a	way	of	reconceptualizing	the	relations	between	the	natural	and	the	social,	between	the	biological	and	the	cultural,	outside	the	dichotomous	structure	in	which	these	terms	are	currently	enmeshed”	(43).	Outside	this	dichotomous	structure,	Darwin	has	no	problem	describing	the	intelligence	and	emotions	of	animals	on	a	continuum	with	the	evolution	of	humans,	particularly	in	The	Expression	of	Emotions	in	Man	and	
Animals.		In	“Beyond	the	Human/Non-Human	Animal	Dichotomoy:	The	Philosophical	Problem	of	Human	Animality,”	Felice	Cimatti	calls	human	animality	“a	goal	for	the	philosophy	of	the	future,”	particularly	due	to	its	“theoretical	and	practical	consequences	[that]	extend	themselves	to	economics,	ecology,	and	ethics.”	Couze	
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Venn	reaches	a	similar	conclusion	in	“Individuation,	Relationality,	Affect:	Rethinking	the	Human	in	Relation	to	the	Living”:		the	new	problematic	of	life	enjoins	us	to	rethink	the	standpoint	of	singularity	rather	than	the	individual,	and	of	relationality	as	a	principle	of	enabling	us	to	think	self-other,	human-animal,	nature-culture	and	human-world	in	terms	of	compossibility	and	complex	becoming—with	important	implications	regarding	responsibility	for	the	other	.	.	.	(142)	I	believe	that	understanding	the	complexity	of	biological	life	and	its	variety	of	brilliant	and	bizarre	entanglements	is	essential	to	making	any	judgments	about	the	ontological	status	of	living	beings,	and	judgments	are	what	motivate	the	meanings	we	receive	and	create.	Judgments	lay	the	groundwork	for	the	everyday	choices	that	are	taken	as	a	given	and	are	no	longer	closely	evaluated	for	their	justifications.	Reality	is	created	and	changed	based	on	these	judgments.	Evolution	and	its	various	mechanisms	and	processes	in	which	radical	variations	exist	and	intertwine	provide	the	best	way	of	seeing	this	entangled	complexity	of	biological	bodies	to	get	an	understanding	of	our	shared	humanimal	materiality.	New	material	feminists	and	ecocritics	like	Haraway,	Grosz,	Alaimo,	and	Iovino	have	returned	to	bodies	(and	their	inherent	biology)	as	dynamic	and	changing	matter	rather	than	determinant,	static,	and	immutable.	These	theories	emphasize	relationality,	engagements,	and	entangled	performances	of	materiality	rather	than	individuals	and	their	“separately	determined	properties”	(Barad	
Meeting	55).	Indeed,	Barad	argues	that	static	qualities	of	an	individual	do	not	exist	
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even	at	the	most	fundamental	level	of	reality.	In	other	words,	realism	does	not	have	to	be	“saddled	with	essentialism,”	as	many	assume	(55).	Rather,	in	Barad’s	words,	“experimenting	and	theorizing	are	dynamic	practices	that	play	a	constitutive	role	in	the	production	of	objects	and	subjects	and	matter	and	meaning”	(56).	These	entangled	phenomena,	in	which	reality	and	its	characteristics	are	created,	are	agential	cuts	that	simultaneously	exclude	as	they	entangle,	and	“these	exclusions	foreclose	determinism”	(Barad	“Matter”).	Grosz	remarks	on	this	point	as	well,	explaining	how	evolution	“signals	an	open-ended	becoming,	a	mode	of	potentially	infinite	transformation”	(“Darwin”	25).	Rather	than	indicating	an	inherent	determinism	in	our	very	real	biological	materialities,	evolution	“offers	a	subtle	and	complex	critique	of	both	essentialism	and	teleology”	with	a	“genesis	of	the	new	from	the	play	of	repetition	and	difference	within	the	old”	(28,	29,	her	emphasis).	Ontologically	speaking,	our	cells	continuously	regenerate;	genes	are	in	dynamic	relations	with	material	environments,	viruses,	toxins,	and	nutrients;	the	matter	we	take	in	and	expel,	that	circulates	inside	and	outside,	forms	and	reforms	our	own	material	compositions.	A	return	to	evolutionary	biology,	read	with	Barad’s	agential	realism,	is	not	synonymous	with	biological	determinism.	Rather,	it	is	an	acknowledgement	of	our	complex	materiality,	which	we	share	with	all	of	biological	life—indeed,	all	of	the	universe.			 Before	embarking	on	this	chase	in	which	a	sketch	of	HumAnimal	rhetorics	is	attempted,	let	me	pause	to	provide	a	quick	sketch	of	evolution	and	how	it	complements	new	materialism.	Most	are	probably	familiar	with	Darwin’s	definition	
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of	evolution—essentially	descent	with	modification	via	natural	selection—but	perhaps	it	would	be	beneficial	to	illuminate	some	of	the	more	misunderstood	aspects.	Often,	in	realizing	that	evolution	entails	heritable	traits,	a	very	linear	or	hierarchical	image	of	various	animal	forms	is	brought	to	mind.	However,	evolution	
is	neither	linear	nor	hierarchical;	it	is	divergent.	Nor	is	it	progressive	or	goal-oriented.	Even	as	evolution	manifests	novel	forms,	it	cannot	reach	for	a	more	perfect	organism	or	a	more	perfect	trait	of	an	organism.	Selection	can	only	work	with	the	stuff	of	life	that	already	exists.	Evolution	is	also	conservative,	such	that	genes	and	characteristics	are	often	found	engaging	in	multiple	roles	and	across	multiple	species.	For	this	reason,	as	Morell	explains,	given	that	we	share	similar	cognitive	structures	and	chemical	signals	with	vertebrates	in	particular,	it	is	most	assuredly	the	case	that	animals	experience	similar	emotions	and	cognitive	states	just	as	Darwin	imagined.	Perhaps	even	more	amazingly,	evolution	is	also	convergent.	That	is,	one	trait	may	evolve	multiple	times	in	different	species	that	are	not	at	all	closely	related.	A	common	example	of	convergent	evolution	is	the	eye,	which	has	evolved	separately	and	differently	in	many	species.	One	of	my	favorite	examples	of	convergent	evolution	is	the	act	of	play	and	problem	solving	in	cephalopods.	Cephalopods	like	octopuses	and	squids	are	invertebrates	whose	most	recent	common	ancestor	with	vertebrates	like	ourselves	existed	about	600	million	years	ago.	And	yet,	these	remarkable	creatures	with	doughnut-shaped	brains	that	“surround	the[ir]	esophagus”	have	“surprisingly	vertebrate-like	behaviors”	(Vitti	396).	Octopus	and	cuttlefish	have	been	shown	to	succeed	in	associative	learning,	use	
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tools,	and	possibly	even	learn	by	observation—an	impressive	array	of	abilities	in	animals	so	radically	different	from	us	in	terms	of	evolution	(396).			 Evolution	and	its	various	mechanisms	are	unique,	because	they	allow	us	to	see	the	histories	and	the	complexities	of	how	life	is	interwoven.	Individuals	and	populations	of	individuals	are	condensations	of	this	process,	forming	entangled	Umwelten1.	Evolution	is	an	enactment	between	and	within	species	and	their	environments;	it	is	an	entangled	ontological	performance	of	becoming.	Characteristics	we	are	able	to	witness	around	us	have	emerged	out	of	this	very	real	process	of	matter-ing,	and	the	examples	of	our	material	entanglements	with	all	of	life	are	as	remarkable	as	they	are	vast	and	numerous.	We	are	riddled	with	microorganisms	throughout	our	bodies	such	that	we	would	not	survive	without	them.	The	toxins	in	our	bodies	tell	stories	about	where	we	were	born	and	where	we	have	been.	Mothers	have	been	found	to	retain	DNA	in	their	bodies	from	their	children	long	after	giving	birth.	We	are	composed	of	multitudes.	These	material	entanglements,	in	which	life	is	born	in	foliated	patterns	of	difference,	blooming	out	and	folding	back	upon	itself,	are	traced	with	evolution.	And	while	selection	processes	are	essentially	“mindless,”	I	intend	to	show	how	rhetoric	manifests	itself	in	these	movements	of	life.		
An	Adaptive	Rhetoric	The	new	is	the	generation	of	a	productive	monstrosity,	the	deformation	and	transformation	of	prevailing	models	and	norms,	so	that	what	has	been	
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unrecognized	in	the	past	and	present,	as	well	as	what	deformations	the	present	can	sustain,	will	elaborate	themselves	in	the	future.	Elizabeth	Grosz	“Darwin	and	Feminism”	43	Parrish’s	Adaptive	Rhetoric	is	significant;	for	it	is	the	first	book-length	project	to	argue	for	the	rhetorical	abilities	of	animals,	and	he	does	so	with	evolution.	Upon	reading	Parrish’s	account	of	an	adaptive	rhetoric—one	with	first	principles	and	prescriptive	limits	within	which	an	“adequate”	definition	of	rhetoric	is	sought—it	is	clear	that	there	is	not	one	way	to	theorize	rhetoric	against	the	gradient	of	evolutionary	biology.	An	example	of	the	differences	between	Parrish’s	adaptive	rhetoric	and	my	HumAnimal	rhetorics	is	given	in	a	question	Parrish	asks	while	closely	examining	the	specimen	of	rhetoric	with	his	adaptive	lens.	Essentially,	he	asks,	if	we	consider	rhetoric	as	adaptive—that	is,	evolutionarily	advantageous—then	“what	does	rhetoric	replace	that	was	less	effective	for	the	creatures	that	did	not	practice	rhetoric?”	(44,	my	emphasis).	Here	rhetoric	is	a	possession	or	characteristic	added	into	the	toolbox	of	fitness,	whereas	I	argue	that	rhetoric	is	inscribed	within	the	movement	and	enactment	of	evolution	itself.	Parrish’s	suggestion	is	a	good	one:	the	costs	of	rhetorical	behavior	are	likely	significantly	less	for	animals	who	use	it	to	avoid	physical	confrontation.	This	adaptive	theory	recalls	Wayne	Booth’s	claim	that	“good	rhetoric	is	our	only,	or	at	least	our	main,	alternative	to	war”	(241,	his	emphasis).	Adaptive	rhetoric,	in	this	instance,	separates	direct	embodied	relationality,	though	its	success	and	effects	are	often	most	certainly	physical.	
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Other	possible	reasons	for	the	evolution	of	a	behavioral	rhetoric	in	animals,	as	outlined	by	Parrish,	include	common	uses	in	humans:	to	“enhance	cooperation	within	a	group,”	as	“a	method	for	convincing	potential	mates	to	breed,”	as	a	“gossip	function”	in	social	groups,	or	as	a	way	of	“establish[ing]	prestige	or	political	power	in	a	group”	(46).	This	emphasis	on	adaptive	behavior	is	Parrish’s	attempt	to	find	“solid	ground”	from	which	to	develop	a	more	adequate	definition	for	rhetoric	(in	contrast	to	Kennedy)	within	a	biocultural	paradigm	(46).	The	working	definition	formulated,	admittedly	with	further	nuance	throughout	the	book,	tests	out	this	solid	ground:	“It	may	be	safe	to	say	that	rhetoric	is	the	intentional	communicative	act	of	an	animal	whose	purpose	is	to	inform,	or	to	manipulate	the	behavior	of,	one	or	more	members	of	a	real	or	imagined	category	of	hearers	called	‘audience’”	(48).	The	equivalent	of	audience	in	the	animal	domain	of	persuasion	is	further	developed	with	evolutionary	psychology’s	“theory	of	mind,”	which	names	the	“ability	to	attribute	beliefs	to	other	minds”	(104).	In	other	words,	theory	of	mind	is	an	exclusive	mental	capacity	of	some	animals	to	theorize	that	other	animals	have	mental	states	and	can	
be	persuaded.	This,	being	adaptive,	obviously	also	applies	to	human	animals	as	well.		Theory	of	mind	is	an	interesting	concept	within	evolutionary	psychology,	and	there	are	many	animals	that	arguably	demonstrate	this	ability,	not	least	of	which	are	dolphins	and	elephants—two	species	among	others	who	can	recognize	themselves	as	individuals—as	self—in	mirror	tests.	The	scrub	jay’s	food	caching	and	re-caching	behavior	is	a	striking	(possible)	example	of	theory	of	mind	in	corvids.	Scrub	jays	seem	to	anticipate	the	likely	thieving	behavior	of	other	jays	and	will	return	to	and	
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rebury	food	stashes	they	previously	buried	when	in	the	presence	of	other	jays.	Behavior	like	this,	which	seems	to	demonstrate	knowledge	of	an	other’s	thoughts,	is	compelling;	but	the	problem	I	see	is	what	gets	lost	when	something	like	theory	of	mind,	an	admittedly	significant	concept,	is	selected	as	a	threshold	for	definitions.	Here	is	the	new	line	that	has	been	drawn:	theory	of	mind.	It	does	not	separate	humans	and	animals,	but	it	separates	the	“haves”	of	rhetorical	ability	from	the	“have-nots.”	For	example,	a	study	published	about	scrub	jays’	caching	behavior	in	2012	persuasively	argues	that	such	“sophisticated	social	cognition”	as	theory	of	mind	is	not	a	necessary	prerequisite	for	food	re-caching,	citing	mere	stress	(from	conditions	such	as	“poor	habitat	quality”	and	“light	body	weight”)	as	another	possibility	(van	der	Vaart	et	al.).	What,	then,	are	we	to	make	of	the	scrub	jays’	rhetorical	abilities,	given	Parrish’s	definition?	This	study,	which	argues	against	theory	of	mind	in	scrub	jays,	can	also	be	imagined	to	severely	limit	the	rhetorical	behaviors	within	the	human	species2.	Perhaps	true	rhetorical	behaviors	(those	limited	to	intention	and	theory	of	mind)	would	be	limited	based	on	the	contexts	in	which	they	occur	(those	contexts	initiated	by	stress	being	excluded),	but	then	who	decides	the	status	of	a	behavior’s	intentionality	and	theory-of-mind	enactment?	Often	we	are	unaware	of	even	our	own	intentions.		Cuts	and	definitions	are	a	necessary	part	of	making	sense	of	the	world.	Indeed,	according	to	Barad,	such	cuts	constitute	the	fundamental	units	of	reality	from	which	we	cannot	be	disentangled.	And	these	decisions	have	important	ethical	implications;	Barad	describes	an	agential	realism	in	which	“ethicality	is	part	of	the	
		 41	
fabric	of	the	world”	(Meeting	182).	In	What	is	Posthumanism?,	Cary	Wolfe	examines	how	Daniel	Dennett’s	functionalist	approach	to	theorizing	mind	in	humans	and	animals	leads	Dennett	to	the	conclusion	that	only	some	beings	with	specific	capacities	can	be	said	to	suffer	(even	some	humans	are	excluded	from	this).	Such	a	conclusion	about	who	can	suffer	obviously	has	important	ethical	implications	and	illustrates	how	careful	we	need	to	be	when	making	cuts	and	exclusions.	It	is	worthwhile	to	investigate	the	assumptions	responsible	for	these	exclusions,	since	they	do	have	such	a	grounding	effect	on	how	we	interpret	reality	and	make	meaning.	Parrish	does	a	great	job	of	demonstrating	a	careful	and	thorough	reading	of	rhetoric	as	adaptive.	Intention	and	theory	of	mind	are	well	supported	with	scientific	study	and	well	theorized	as	applicable	to	rhetoric	in	the	capacity	in	which	Parrish	frames	it.	I	simply	wish	to	suggest	that	these	clean	distinctions	are	actually	uneasy	lines	within	which	much	more	entangled	rhetorical	relationalities	are	at	work.	Parrish’s	adaptive	rhetoric	describes	a	behavioral	ability.	A	HumAnimal	rhetorics	reaches	for	more.	Just	as	there	is	not	one	theory	of	evolution,	there	is	not	one	theory	of	rhetoric,	and	issues	with	intention	and	mind	are	not	new	to	rhetorical	studies.	In	
Ambient	Rhetoric:	The	Attunements	of	Rhetorical	Being,	Thomas	Rickert	sums	up	my	position	when	he	describes	a	definition	of	rhetoric	without	prescribed	borders	that	can	encompass	narrower	versions	“without	in	any	way	being	limited	to	[them]”	(35).	Rickert’s	flavor	of	rhetoric	informs	a	HumAnimal	rhetorics	as	well:	
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Instead	of	being	only	the	most	conscious,	willed	aspects	of	motivated	discursive	production,	rhetoric	reveals	and	constitutes	the	informational	environment	within	which	we	flourish,	even	as	it	works	in	and	through	both	the	existent	informational	situation	and	the	local	material	environs.	Rhetoric	is	thereby	the	emergent	result	of	many	complexly	interacting	agents	dynamically	attuned	and	exposed	to	one	another,	an	attunement	that	may	be	as	competitive	as	it	is	cooperative	as	long	as	it	maintains	an	ecological	relation	or	connectedness	to	the	world	round-about.	This	is	a	rhetoric	dispersed,	embodied,	and	embedded,	one	no	longer	mired	in	subjectivism	and	all	the	epistemological	and	ethical	problems	that	ensue	therefrom.	(34)	An	ambient	rhetoric	“dispersed,	embodied,	and	embedded”	is	“itself	ontological”	(xv).	More	restrictive	definitions,	which	presume	intent	as	a	(human	or	animal)	requirement,	“no	longer	suffice	to	determine	what	is	rhetoric	and	what	is	not”	(36).	The	“nebulous	concept”	of	mind	as	the	origin	of	rhetoric	similarly	betrays	the	extent	to	which	minds	are	embodied	and	dispersed	(and	entangled)	in	the	world	(40-43).	An	ambient	rhetoric,	as	an	ongoing	“disclosure	of	the	world”	in	which	things	simultaneously	withdraw	as	they	are	unconcealed	to	us	in	attunement,	has	much	in	common	with	Barad’s	agential	cuts	of	reality	that	create	entangled	phenomena.	Exclusions	of	the	world	(or	universe)	apply	both	when	we	are	attuned	and	entangled;	but	the	crucial	common	factor	they	share	is	the	ongoing,	dynamic	movement	in	which	new	attunements	and	entanglements	are	possible.	Reality	can	be	realigned	or	reconfigured	with	both.	While	Rickert	opens	rhetoric	to	the	
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possibilities	beyond	life	itself,	stating	that	rhetoric	is	not	“only	evolutionary”	(xiv),	a	HumAnimal	rhetorics	more	thoroughly	traces	what	it	might	mean	to	have	a	rhetoric	that	is	evolutionary,	something	that	has	yet	to	be	properly	conceived	and	is	urgently	needed.		In	Adaptive	Rhetoric,	Parrish	owns	up	to	how	his	definition	discriminates	in	favor	of	intention	and	animal	life,	explaining	that	these	discriminations	arise	from	a	view	that	“rhetoric	is	in	many	ways	a	matter	of	competing	and	cooperating	interests”	(51).	A	HumAnimal	rhetorics	obviously	also	favors	life,	and	initially	this	may	be	surprising	considering	this	project’s	influence	from	Barad’s	quantum	entanglement;	clearly,	life	is	not	a	prerequisite	for	such	entanglements	(quite	the	contrary,	as	I	will	soon	attempt	to	show	with	Kauffman’s	theory	of	life’s	origins).	But,	as	I	do	not	imagine	rhetoric	confined	by	intention	or	animal	life,	the	reasons	for	staying	awhile	with	this	HumAnimal	rhetorics	are	given	in	the	exigencies	outlined	in	the	previous	chapter	and	the	ethical	fabric	in	which	rhetoric	is	woven.	In	“Regarding	the	Dead,”	Michelle	Ballif	explains	that	this	address	between	the	self	and	other—an	address	that	is	always	already	a	mourning	for	the	death	of	the	other—is	what	constitutes	rhetoric	as	“an	ethical	rather	than	epistemological	enterprise”	(466).	I	believe	Parrish	is	similarly	motivated	by	these	exigencies	and	the	ethical	nature	of	rhetoric,	although	an	accounting	of	mind,	intention,	and—slipping	further	down	this	problematic	slope,	as	Dennett’s	discriminations	further	illustrate—abilities	of	suffering	limits	the	scope	of	what	kinds	of	life	matter	to	rhetorical	studies.	A	HumAnimal	rhetorics,	while	admittedly	preoccupied	with	the	animal	realm,	extends	
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to	all	life	and,	further,	to	all	matter.	These	material	entanglements	also	exist	within	the	(agential)	reality	of	competing	and	cooperating	interests	or	forces—perhaps	better	theorized	as	intra-actions—because	competition	and	cooperation	often	create	the	circumstances	in	which	selection	acts.	Following	Barad’s	intra-action	of	quantum	entanglements	that	create	reality	and	the	“preoriginary	rhetoricity”	that	allows	for	the	self	and	other	of	these	life-giving	and	life-sustaining	intra-actions,	let	us	return	again	to	Kennedy	and	the	suggestion	that	rhetoric	exists	“in	biological	evolution”	rather	than	behaviors	arising	from	the	mind.	As	explained	above,	evolution	is	unique	in	that	it	allows	us	at	times	to	trace	the	dynamic	material	intra-actions	of	bodies	and	biological	phenomena.	However,	I	wish	to	be	clear	that	I	am	not	claiming	rhetoric	is	encoded	in	the	materiality	of	our	DNA,	as	Liska	charges	Kennedy	of	doing.	That	would	be	quite	a	reductionist	view.	Rather,	as	Davis	states,	“This	rhetoricity	cannot	be	innate	because	it	cannot	not	be	relational”	(548,	her	emphasis).	The	similar	relationality	of	an	evolutionary	rhetoric	is	inherent	to	the	dynamic	movement	of	DNA	and	its	emergences.	A	HumAnimal	rhetorics	also	recalls	the	continual	flow	of	permeable	materialities	and	differential	becomings	that	make	any	apparent	bounded	“self”	a	multitude	of	potential	enfolded	relations,	hence	Haraway’s	claim:	“To	be	one	is	to	become	with	many.”	Symbiotic	relationalities	are	continually	occurring	within	any	one	“individual.”	These	include	everything	from	relatively	benign	whale	barnacles	to	beneficial	humanimal	intestinal	bacteria	to	the	truly	horrific	examples	of	parasitism,	such	as	the	crab	parasite	Sacculina,	which	turns	its	host	into	what	Carl	Zimmer	calls	
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a	“walking	corpse”—truly	a	foil	of	any	easy	distinction	between	life	and	death	for	the	unfortunate	crab	(Parasite	159).	The	list	of	our	material	mutliplicities	is	endless.			 In	this	attempt	to	theorize	a	HumAnimal	rhetorics	that	is	“in”	biological	evolution—that	is	entangled,	enfolded,	invaginated	in	the	becoming	and	enactment	of	life	itself—I	will	trace	its	movements	in	the	select	entanglements	of	sex	and	symbiosis—relationalities	that	do	much	to	confuse	any	distinctions	between	behaviors	and	bodies.	I	will	then	consider	how	these	movements	of	life’s	mysterious	persuasion	implicate	rhetoric’s	influence	in	the	very	origins	of	life	by	looking	into	Stuart	Kauffman’s	theory	of	complexity,	emergence,	and	spontaneous	organization	in	biological	organisms.	What	follows	is	not	a	post-mortem.	I	do	not	seek	to	remove	and	classify	the	components	of	rhetoric	once	and	for	all,	but	rather	provide	a	sketch	that	furiously	chases	while	it	draws.			
Sex	 Sensation	is	neither	in	the	world	nor	in	the	subject	but	is	the	relation	of	unfolding	of	the	one	for	the	other	through	a	body	created	at	their	interface.	Elizabeth	Grosz	Chaos,	Territory,	Art	72	Perhaps	the	most	appropriate	area	for	seeking	to	trace	these	dynamic	rhetorical	becomings	in	our	entangled	materiality	is	in	the	movement	of	DNA.	This	is	where	the	magic	happens,	so	to	speak,	as	the	very	earliest	form	of	this	process	is	responsible	for	life’s	origins3.	In	Nature’s	Nether	Regions,	Menno	Schilthuizen	offers	examples	of	the	stunning	diversity	that	exists	to	exchange	genetic	information	in	
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every	biological	organism,	from	bacteria,	which	swap	DNA	amongst	themselves	or	get	stray	bits	from	their	environment	and	then	reproduce	asexually	by	budding	off	little	clones	of	themselves,	to	corals	that	“release	their	eggs	and	sperm	into	the	waters	and	hope	for	the	best”	(10).	Schilthuizen	explains	how	the	evolutionary	reason	for	the	more	familiar	(and	often	more	complex)	sexual	reproduction	is	still	a	bit	of	mystery,	as	cloning	oneself	is	far	more	efficient.	Even	creatures	we	would	more	commonly	imagine	fitting	within	the	vague	and	general	category	of	“Animal,”	like	some	lizards	and	sharks,	reproduce	without	(the	common	notion	of)	sex.	The	theory	that	sexual	reproduction	originated	as	a	way	of	“outsmarting	parasites”	or	of	“purg[ing].	.	.	DNA	of	harmful	mutations”	illustrates	the	unpredictability	and	complexity	of	this	differential	entangled	becoming	(11).	This	“evolutionary	play”	of	sexual	reproduction	makes	genitalia	in	particular	“the	best	body	parts	to	illustrate	the	power	of	evolution”	(5)4.	One	striking	example	for	witnessing	this	fascinating	material	relationality	of	sexual	reproduction	(in	a	form	with	which	we	are	most	familiar)	is	in	the	genital	evolution	of	ducks.	In	2009	the	rather	strange	and	unexpected	morphologies	of	duck	genitalia	made	a	big	splash	in	popular	culture.	Ed	Young	explains	Yale	researcher	Patricia	Brennan’s	study	of	this	extraordinary	duck	sexual	reproduction	in	National	
Geographic:		Many	ducks	form	bonds	between	males	and	females	that	last	for	a	whole	mating	season.	But	rival	males	often	violently	force	themselves	onto	females.	To	gain	the	edge	in	these	conflicts,	drakes	have	evolved	large	corkscrew	
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phalluses,	lined	with	ridges	and	backward-pointing	spines,	which	allow	them	to	deposit	their	sperm	further	into	a	female	than	their	rivals.	(Young	“Ballistic”)	While	these	“corkscrew”	duck	penises	are	indeed	strange,	the	duck	vaginas	that	have	co-evolved	with	them	are	even	more	interesting,	and	this	is	the	focus	of	Brennan’s	research5.	As	“organic	chastity	belts,”	duck	vaginas	are	described	as	coiling	clockwise	(in	the	opposite	direction	of	the	penis)	and	being	something	like	a	maze—with	dead	ends	and	twists	and	turns—in	order	to	make	successful	fertilization	more	difficult	for	the	aggressive	rival	ducks	(Young	“Ballistic”).	Indeed,	Schilthuizen	explains	the	results	of	Brennan	et	al.’s	research	on	sixteen	duck	species,	“which	showed	that	the	complexity	of	penis	and	vagina	went	hand	in	hand:	whenever	the	penis	was	large	and	curly,	so	was	the	vagina,”	and	“the	species	in	which	rape	was	rife	were	also	the	ones	with	the	most	complex	genitalia”	(128).	The	evolution	of	duck	genitalia	is	truly	a	story	of	at	least	“competing	and	cooperating	interests”	such	as	those	Parrish	describes	as	central	to	his	bias	for	intention,	although	the	ducks’	interests	are	also	manifesting	morphologically	rather	than	purely	behaviorally.	
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	Female	behavior	also	works	in	concert	with	the	convoluted	morphology	of	her	genitalia:	if	sex	with	a	particular	drake	is	unwanted,	she	does	not	do	him	any	favors	in	navigating	her	labyrinthine	vagina	as	she	does	in	consensual	encounters.	If	a	female	wishes	to	engage	in	a	sexual	encounter,	she	will	“strike	a	pose	that	signals	her	receptiveness,	keeping	her	body	level	and	lifting	her	tail	feathers	high”	while	further	“repeatedly	contract[ing]	the	walls	of	her	genital	tract,	relaxing	them	for	long	enough	for	favoured	suitors	to	achieve	full	penetration”	(Young	“Ballistic”).	In	contrast,	and	perhaps	more	pointedly,	Schilthuizen	further	explains:	“by	flexing	the	muscles	in	her	vagina	wall,	the	female	would	be	able	to	block	a	rapist	male	from	properly	inflating	his	countercoiled	penis	into	her	vagina”	(128).	The	co-evolution	in	this,	what	Carl	Zimmer	calls,	“war	of	the	sexes”	in	ducks	is	an	extraordinary	example	of	the	difficulty	in	drawing	a	line	between	intentional	behavior	and	physiology	(“In	
Figure	4.	Duck	Penile	and	Vaginal	Morphologies;		
Richard	Prum;	Web.		
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Ducks”).	The	female	duck’s	behavior	in	thwarting	or	helping	her	suitors	cannot	be	severed	from	the	contours	and	contractions	of	her	vagina.	The	gradual	co-evolution	of	both	male	and	female	ducks’	bodyminds	is	a	delicate	and	complex	movement	of	entangled	persuasion.			 If	we	continue	to	look	into	the	bizarre	sexual	entanglements	manifested	in	animal	bodyminds	as	condensations	of	evolutionary	enactments,	there	is	much	to	see.		Sperm	is	particularly	fascinating,	as	it	has	been	found	to	contain	a	surprising	number	of	proteins	in	large	quantities.	In	a	creature	as	small	as	the	banana	fly,	an	amazing	133	seminal	proteins	have	been	found	that	apparently	have	a	dramatic	effect	on	females	in	“a	kind	of	neuropsychological	manipulation”	by	“hijack[ing]	a	female’s	hormonal	system	by	shutting	down	her	sex	drive”	(Schilthuizen	146).	These	recently	inseminated	female	banana	flies	also	“begin	exuding	a	scent	that	render	them	unattractive”	(146).	The	“antiaphrodisiac”	effects	of	banana	fly	semen	occur	after	one	of	its	proteins	passes	through	the	vaginal	wall	and	into	her	bloodstream	where	it	catches	a	ride	to	her	brain,	thus	causing	her	both	to	be	uninterested	in	other	males	and,	presumably,	uninteresting	to	other	males	as	well	(146).	When	proteins	are	not	small	enough	to	pass	through	the	vaginal	wall	of	a	species	so	easily,	they	may	achieve	passage	via	traumatic	penetration	through	the	wall	by	a	male’s	penis	or	actual	corrosion	of	the	wall	by	proteins,	as	occurs	in	a	species	of	bedbug	and	the	common	house	fly,	respectively	(131,	147).	Humanimals	are	not	exempt	from	this	startling	behavior,	as	sperm	cells	have	been	found	floating	around	outside	of	expected	areas	as	well,	even	exiting	one	fallopian	tube	into	the	
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abdominal	cavity	and	entering	another	tube	through	a	“back	entrance”	(134).	How	these	wandering	sperm	cells	may	affect	women	in	ways	other	than	fertilization	is	not	fully	understood,	though	past	studies	suggest	that	women	who	have	unprotected	sex	have	fewer	symptoms	of	depression	and,	while	pregnant,	also	are	less	likely	to	develop	preeclampsia	(147-148).	Humanimal	male	sperm	cells	have	also	been	found	to	contain	surprising	hormone	compounds	that	both	stimulate	ovulation	processes	and	also	maintain	pregnancy.	Scientists	theorize	these	seminal	compounds	may	be	a	“counter-strategy	to	concealed	ovulation	in	women,”	a	matter	to	which	I	will	return	shortly	(Motluk).	Perhaps	even	more	fascinating	than	sperm	and	its	mysterious	components	is	how	female	bodyminds	react	to	the	sperm	or	to	sex	itself,	from	full	out	rejection	of	sperm	to	sperm	uptake	and	(short	or	long-term)	storage	to	the	developmental	processes	of	young	and	all	the	strange	divergences	in	between.	A	seemingly	strange	and	rather	gruesome	example	of	female	mating	behavior	is	demonstrated	in	
Tidarren	spiders	who	snack	on	their	mates	following	sex	(or,	perhaps	more	appropriately,	during	sex,	as	the	male’s	pedipalp	continues	to	“actively	pump	sperm	into	her	for	several	hours”	following	his	death)	(Schilthuizen	139).	Preying	mantis	females	are	similar	perpetrators;	during	sex,	the	female	bites	off	the	head	of	the	male	and	eventually	eats	his	whole	body	(National	Geographic).	In	mammals,	including	humans,	females	have	been	found	to	retain	sperm	much	more	successfully	following	an	orgasm	(than	if	no	orgasm	is	achieved),	which	seems	to	create	a	low	pressure	vacuum	in	the	uterus	(Schilthuizen	79).	Some	female	species,	including	
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humans,	have	been	found	to	expel	some	or	all	of	a	sperm	“deposit”	in	a	behavior	known	as	“flowback,”	or	“sperm	dumping,”	while	others	may	hang	onto	sperm	for	from	several	months,	as	is	the	case	with	some	bats	who	keep	hibernating	sperm	in	their	vaginas	until	a	warm	spring	arrives,	to	several	years,	as	occurs	in	species	as	different	as	snakes	and	ants	(60;	82-83).	Females	like	various	insects	with	“sperm	pouches”	and	turtles	with	“countless	miniscule	sperm-harboring	tubes	all	along	their	oviduct”	can	even	store	sperm	from	multiple	males	for	future	use	(83).	These	are	examples	of	what	William	G.	Eberhard,	behavioral	ecologist	and	senior	staff	scientist	at	the	Smithsonian,	has	coined	as	“cryptic	female	choice.”	The	forms	cryptic	female	choice	can	take—like	the	“Bruce	Effect”	of	induced	abortion	in	pregnant	mice	when	a	new	male	is	smelled	or	touched,	or	in	pregnant	geladas	when	a	new	male	becomes	alpha—are	staggering	in	diversity	and	can	be	enacted	at	any	stage	of	mating	(87).		The	chemical	communication	that	enfolds	bodies	and	behaviors	in	this	process	of	evolutionary	becoming	is	complex	and	mysterious.	Even	in	humanimals,	the	processes	are	not	completely	understood.	An	intriguing	example	of	the	degree	to	which	chemical	communication	can	influence	something	like	attraction	is	demonstrated	in	a	scientific	article	in	the	journal	Evolution	and	Human	Behavior	titled	“Ovulatory	Cycle	Effects	on	Tip	Earnings	By	Lap	Dancers:	Economic	Evidence	of	Estrus?”	The	title	pretty	much	says	it	all.	As	the	authors	explain,	it	has	been	theorized	that	estrus	was	lost	at	some	point	in	humanimal	evolution.	Estrus,	or	“increased	female	sexual	receptivity,	proceptivity,	selectivity,	and	attractiveness”	
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immediately	preceding	ovulation	during	which	time	a	female	is	most	likely	to	conceive	(often	colloquially	referred	to	as	“heat”	or	“rut”),	has	been	found	in	most	mammals,	including	in	our	closest	of	evolutionary	relatives,	primates	(375).	Little	evidence	indicates	its	presence	in	female	humanimals,	perhaps,	as	scientists	have	speculated,	to	“hide”	ovulation.	Hidden	ovulation,	it	is	thought,	may	be	evolutionarily	advantageous	if	it	encourages	mates	to	stick	around	longer	(in	chemical	ignorance),	thus	providing	all	of	the	wonderful	male	attributes	for	longer	periods	of	time,	such	as	“male	provisioning	and	paternal	care	in	long-term	pair-bonded	relationships”	(375).	Hidden	ovulation	would	also	help	to	explain	the	likewise	hidden	“counter-strategy”	of	humanimal	sperm	pumping	ovulation-inducing	hormones	into	women	(as	stated	above,	those	compounds	that	stimulate	ovulation	and	help	maintain	pregnancy	are	considered	evidence	of	such	a	counter-strategy).	However,	Geoffrey	Miller	et	al.	have	uncovered	support	for	subtle	indications	of	estrus	in	normally	ovulating	women	(well,	at	least	subtler	than	“bright	red	swollen	behinds”	in	female	chimps	[Motluk])	in	comparison	to	women	using	hormonal	contraceptives.	In	this	provocative	study,	researchers	measured	the	direct	effect	of	perceived	female	attractiveness	on	the	performers’	nightly	earnings	and	plotted	this	across	menstrual	cycle	schedules.	Lap	dancers	are	particularly	appropriate	for	a	study	of	this	kind,	as	the	researchers	explain,	because	of	the	intimate	multi-sensory	contact	between	the	women	and	men:	In	each	lap	dance	.	.	.	the	topless	female	dancer	sits	on	the	man’s	lap,	either	facing	away	from	him	(to	display	her	buttocks,	back,	and	hair)	or	facing	him	
		 53	
(either	leaning	back	to	display	her	breasts,	and	to	make	conversation	and	eye	contact,	or	leaning	forward	to	whisper	in	his	ear).	Lap	dances	typically	entail	intense	rhythmic	contact	between	the	female	pelvis	and	the	clothed	male	penis.	(376-377)	For	those	otherwise	unfamiliar	with	lap	dances,	the	description	of	this	sexually-charged	activity	sounds	much	like	a	mating	ritual	one	would	expect	to	find	in	other	animals.	Clearly	any	kind	of	unregistered	chemical	persuasion,	if	it	exists,	could	be	picked	up	by	males	in	such	an	intensely	intimate	scenario,	which	lasts	anywhere	from	three	minutes	to	over	an	hour.	Lap	dancers	are	also	quite	appropriate	for	this	study,	as	their	pay	provides	direct	measure	of	perceived	attraction.	Results	of	the	study	clearly	indicate	that	some	type	of	estrus-induced	persuasion	probably	exists.	Not	only	did	women	in	the	estrus	phase	of	their	cycle	earn	significantly	more	tips	per	shift	(“about	US$90	more	than	during	the	luteal	phase	and	about	US$170	more	than	during	the	menstrual	phase”),	normally	cycling	women	made	more	overall	than	non-cycling	women	who	were	taking	some	form	of	chemical	contraception	(379).	Therefore,	estrus	in	humanimals	may	exist	with	subtle	persuasive	cues	about	when	fertilization	is	most	likely	to	occur.	This	does	not	mean	that	estrus	is	not	hidden—as	the	authors	point	out,	the	chemical	suasion	was	not	clear	enough	to	more	severely	delimit	dancer	tips	who	were	not	in	estrus	(379).	Rather,	estrus	(as	revealed	through	subtle	ways	that	leave	men	relatively	unaware	of	their	increased	attraction)	can	still	be	considered	hidden,	because	its	slight	presence	likely	maintains	the	long-term	advantages	that	are	theorized.			
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The	wide	variety	of	genitalia,	performances,	and	chemical	communications	of	mating	are	attributed	to	the	high	stakes	of	this	reproductive	process,	but	there	also	seems	to	be	something	more	happening	here.	In	other	words,	perhaps	sexual	selection	should	not	be	reduced	to	function	only.	Why	do	species	of	beetle	that	otherwise	look	very	much	the	same	have	such	radical	differences	in	penile	morphology	to	the	extent	that	it	is	often	the	easiest	route	to	identification?	The	same	is	true	for	bumblebees	and	various	other	insects.	This	pattern	of	incredible	biodiversity	is	“pervasive	throughout	the	animal	kingdom”	(Schilthuizen	32).	The	otherwise	conservative	nature	of	evolution	makes	this	multiplicity	of	difference	very	interesting	indeed,	and	it	often	comes	at	quite	a	high	evolutionary	cost.		In	Chaos,	Territory,	Art:	Deleuze	and	the	Framing	of	the	Earth,	Grosz	argues	that	this	unique	process	of	sexual	selection	has	much	more	going	on	than	the	otherwise	functional	aspects	of	natural	selection.	She	focuses	on	the	excesses	that	often	manifest	for	the	sole	sake	of	sexuality	despite	the	inherent	costs	“of	becoming	more	visible	or	audible,	more	noticeable	to	predators	as	well	as	suitors”	(68).	In	contrast	to	Freud,	who	suggests	that	art	is	the	result	of	displaced	sexual	impulses	“through	representation,”	Grosz	argues	that:	sexuality	itself	needs	to	function	artistically	to	be	adequately	sexual,	adequately	creative,	that	sexuality	(as	neither	drive	nor	instinct	but	rather	the	alignment	of	bodies	and	practices	with	other	bodies	or	with	parts	of	one’s	own	body)	needs	to	harness	excessiveness	and	invention	to	function	at	all.	(64-65)	
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The	reasons	for	female	choice	(e.g.,	why	are	brighter	reds	in	males	more	attractive	in	cardinals?)	still	remains	“a	bit	of	a	mystery,”	according	to	Schilthuizen,	who	explains	that	prior	debate	about	whether	females	just	willy-nilly	prefer	certain	characteristics	or	are	actually	attracted	to	good	genes	(a	brighter	red	means	better	genes)	is	less	of	a	controversy	now,	because	“the	genes	that	females	go	for	are	always	good”	(50).	Grosz’s	argument	that	“art	is	of	the	animal”	and	works	“for	the	sake	of	sensation	itself”	(Chaos	62)	aligns	with	the	sensory	drive	theory	of	sexual	selection	in	explaining	an	alternative	reason	for	female	choice.	The	sensory	drive	theory	argues	that	anything	that	stimulates	the	senses,	ranges	of	which	“have	been	optimized	for	[a	given]	species’	habitat	and	way	of	life,”	will	induce	a	positive	female	response	(Schilthuizen	52).	In	other	words,	“stimulation	equals	liking”	(53).	Schilthuizen	describes	several	studies	in	which	artificial	additions	to	a	male’s	appearance	had	noticeable	effects	on	whether	females	deemed	males	attractive	simply	because	the	additions	presumably	stimulated	the	female’s	senses6.	This	may	explain	the	highly	elaborate	aesthetics	that	males	embody	and	create	in	the	attempt	to	persuade	females,	varieties	of	which	are	particularly	stunning	in	birds.	Peacocks	are	a	well-known	example	of	how	the	elaborate	display	of	males	comes	at	the	potential	expense	of	their	survival,	should	it	be	threatened.		Many	birds,	including	peacocks,	engage	in	elegant	and	complicated	courtship	dances,	gestures,	and	songs.	Male	bowerbirds	are	a	unique	example	of	how	males	may	cater	to	female	sensory	experience,	as	they	create	what	might	be	argued	as	an	architectural-artistic	space	in	which	to	engage	in	their	mating	performance.	
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Bowerbirds	gather	colored	objects	to	decorate	two	courts	on	either	side	of	an	avenue	created	by	two	parallel	walls	“made	of	densely	thatched	sticks,”	even	collecting	discarded	human	plastics	and	waste	if	the	colors	are	attractive.	In	PNAS	(Proceeding	of	the	National	Academy	of	the	Sciences),	behavior	ecologists	Laura	A.	Kelley	and	John	A.	Endler	report	that	in	addition	to	the	remarkable	behavior	of	decorating	pale	“gesso”	courts	created	by	“stones,	bones,	bleached	shells,	and	other	gray-to-white	objects”	with	bright	objects	to	attract	a	female’s	eye,	great	bowerbirds	also	use	a	“complex	geometry”:	The	uncolored	court	objects	are	arranged	in	a	gradient	so	that	object	size	increases	as	distance	from	the	avenue	entrance	increases.	This	size-distance	gradient	creates	a	forced	perspective	illusion	of	an	even	textured	pattern	for	a	female	viewing	the	court	from	within	the	bower.	.	.	The	forced	perspective	may	also	facilitate	other	illusions,	including	those	that	alter	the	apparent	size	
Figure	5.	Photograph	of	the	decorated	court	of	a	Satin	
Bowerbird’s	bower.	Blue	plastic	pieces	are	amongst	the	objects	
collected.	Web.	
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of	the	displayed	ornaments	and	illusions	that	may	hold	the	female’s	attention,	making	mating	more	likely.	(Kelley	and	Endler	20980-20981)		This	perspective	of	illusion—an	animal	geometry	of	persuasion—illustrates	the	complexity	and,	perhaps,	excess	that	accompany	such	a	crucial	process	as	sexual	selection.	In	What	is	Philosophy,	Deleuze	and	Guattari	describe	the	bowerbird	as	“a	complete	artist”:	“This	is	not	a	synaesthesia	of	the	flesh	but	blocs	of	sensations	in	the	territory—colors,	postures,	and	sounds	that	sketch	out	a	total	work	of	art.	.	.	.	In	this	respect	art	is	continually	haunted	by	the	animal”	(184).	Art,	and,	I	would	argue,	rhetoric—a	Humanimal	rhetorics	of	biological	becoming—is	haunted	by	the	animal7.	In	the	evolutionary	becomings	of	sexual	reproduction,	bodies	and	behavior	are	mutually	enfolded	in	a	rhetorical	dance,	just	as	they	are	in	other	movements	of	biological	evolution.	Rather	than	simply	relying	on	observable	behaviors	of	creatures	that	typically	come	to	mind(/body)	with	the	all-encompassing	label	“Animal”	in	order	to	make	a	decisive	cut	between	beings	and	abilities,	it	is	important	to	examine	the	strange,	cryptic	corridors	of	embodied	becomings	in	places	humanimals	may	not	typically	look8.	But	even	the	observable	displays	of	sexual	performativity	illustrate	the	complexities	that	make	mind	and	body,	human	and	animal,	intentional	rhetoric	and	unintentional	behavior	endlessly	impossible	to	separate	for	the	purposes	of	definition.				
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Symbiosis	We	are	not	organisms	but	superorganisms,	and	understanding	our	behavior	ultimately	requires	an	understanding	of	the	network	of	selfish	entities	that	inhabit	our	bodies	and	actively	interact	with	it.		Peter	Kramer	and	Paola	Bressan	“Humans	as	Superorganisms”	475		I	am	large,	I	contain	multitudes.	 Walt	Whitman	Song	of	Myself	Delicate	lacey	patterns	of	greens,	whites,	and	yellows	decorate	the	bark	of	trees	in	our	front	yard	where	foliose,	fructicose,	and	crustose	varieties	of	lichens	thrive	in	the	sunlight.	Here	a	type	of	mutualism	has	been	established	between	algae	and	fungi	in	which	algae	gain	protection	and	structure	from	the	fungi,	and	fungi	gain	nutrients	from	the	algae’s	photosynthesis.	Each	organism	benefits	from	this	intimate	ontological	entanglement,	each	alternating	in	layers	of	skin	and	flesh.	Fungi	not	only	give	life	to	the	extraordinary	processes	of	fermentation—something	that	changed	human	diet	and	even	human	culture	as	agriculture	became	the	focus	of	humanimal	efforts—but	they	also	form	extensive	underground	networks	of	complex	symbiosis	that	sustain	and	“unite	forests	of	different	plant	species,”	creating	a	kind	of	forest	“nervous	system.”	This	fungal	nervous	system	can	deliver	pesticides	to	plants	for	protection	from	insects	as	well	as	nutrients	to	those	that	are	lacking	(Zimmer	“Hypersea”).		In	addition	to	sexual	selection,	symbiosis	vividly	illuminates	the	
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entanglements	of	biological	materiality.	In	fact,	given	the	endosymbiotic	theory	of	the	origin	of	cells,	symbiosis	is	inherent	to	life	itself.			 An	example	even	closer	to	home	than	the	front	yard	exists	in	the	various	bacteria	that	have	taken	up	permanent	residence	in	humanimal	intestines—100	
trillion	microorganisms	to	be	more	precise.	These	barely	acknowledged	internal	residents	outnumber	our	own	cells	in	staggering	numbers	and	contain	“100	times	as	many	genes	as	our	own	genome”	(Kramer	and	Bressan	467).	It	is	not	difficult	to	imagine	that	such	a	large	composition	of	intestinal	others	could	potentially	have	a	significant	effect	on	the	larger	“I.”	These	symbiotic	relationships,	without	which	we	could	not	live,	compose	a	kind	of	“superorganism”	that	makes	referring	to	“I”	as	one	bounded,	known	self	quite	a	bit	more	complicated	(hence	the	appropriate	reference	to	Whitman’s	Song	of	Myself	at	the	beginning	of	this	section:	“I	contain	multitudes”).	Certain	microbes,	known	as	“functional	metagenomics,”	may	have	more	of	an	influence	over	our	health	than	others,	actually	influencing	the	“metabolic	phenotypes”	our	bodies	manifest	(Li	et	al.).	These	microbes	that	influence	digestion	and	metabolism	vary	greatly	across	cultures,	as	they	are	significantly	affected	by	diet,	environment,	genetics,	and	stress	(Li	et	al.,	Turnbaugh	et	al.).	The	significance	of	these	microbes	for	health	has	even	led	to	the	growing	popularity	of	fecal	transplants	for	infections	of	Clostridium	difficile	in	intestinal	lining.	C.	diff.	infections	typically	become	an	issue	after	antibiotics	disrupt	the	normal	ecology	of	gut	microbes.	Further	aggravating	the	problem	is	the	use	of	more	antibiotics	to	treat	the	infection,	which	only	works	in	approximately	20-30%	of	cases—a	poor	prognosis	
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for	sufferers	of	this	infection	who	develop	serious	diarrhea,	nausea,	and	weight-loss	and—in	extreme	cases—may	even	need	to	have	their	colon	removed	(McKenna).	Fecal	transplants,	on	the	other	hand,	introduce	a	healthy	ecology	of	gut	microbes	from	a	healthy	donor,	thus	overthrowing	the	dominance	of	C.	diff.	in	an	infected	person.	This	remarkable	procedure	has	upwards	of	90%	success	rate,	demonstrating	the	massive	role	of	this	meta-self	we	never	see	(McKenna).			 Further	illustrating	the	role	of	culture	and	diet	on	the	life	of	our	internal	microbiomes	is	the	story	of	a	failed	transition	of	two	“wolfgirls”	to	human	society	in	India	in	the	1920s.	In	Bhanu	Kapil’s	Humanimal:	A	Project	for	Future	Children,	Kapil	reveals	in	an	enchanting	mix	of	poetry,	autobiography,	fiction,	and	on-site	reporting	narrating	the	historical	case	of	Kamala	and	Amala,	two	children	literally	raised	by	wolves	until	their	discovery	by	a	local	priest.	After	shooting	and	killing	Amala	and	Kamala’s	(wolf)	mother,	the	priest	attempts	in	various	cruel	and	ignorant	ways	to	make	the	girls	“human”	again.	But	their	young	bodies	are	acclimated	to	the	diet	of	wolves,	and	their	internal	meta-selves	cannot	cope:	“Both	children,	the	wolfgirls,	were	given	a	fine	yellow	powder	to	clean	their	kidneys	but	their	bodies,	having	adapted	to	animal	ways	of	excreting	meat,	could	not	cope	with	this	technology.	Red	worms	came	out	of	their	bodies	and	the	younger	girl	died”	(55).	The	attempt	to	“save”	both	children	fails	disastrously,	and	both	die	in	their	new,	“clean”	human	forms.	This	tragic	narrative	illustrates	how	the	preoccupation	with	clear	divides	between	human	and	animal	blinds	us	to	the	more	complex	ways	in	which	we	are	
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ourselves	a	complex	interplay	of	ontologies—humanimal	condensations	of	the	evolutionary	processes	of	becoming.	We	are	a	multiplicity	of	living	forms.			 Intestinal	microbes	are	not	the	only	internal	others	that	constitute	our	humanimal	ontologies.	In	“Humans	as	Superorganisms:	How	Microbes,	Viruses,	Imprinted	Genes,	and	Other	Selfish	Entities	Shape	Our	Behavior,”	Peter	Kramer	and	Paola	Bressan	illustrate	the	diversity	of	life	within	each	human	“I.”	In	addition	to	our	intestinal	microbial	ecologies,	each	of	us	is	likely	to	consist	of	brain	microbes,	exogenous	and	endogenous	viruses,	“foreign”	human	cells,	and	imprinted	genes.	According	to	the	authors,	brain	microbes,	like	the	particularly	nasty	Toxoplasma	
gandii	that	“is	capable	of	actively	manipulating”	its	host,	are	parasitic	infections	that	influence	humanimal	behavior.	Toxoplasma	in	particular	has	been	associated	with	“depression,	suicides,	changes	in	personality,	and	various	mental	and	neurological	diseases,	including	bipolar	and	obsessive-compulsive	disorders”	(467).	Viruses	can	have	influential	effects	on	behavior	as	well,	and—given	the	way	endogenous	strains	have	integrated	their	DNA	into	humanimal	DNA,	some	of	which	are	present	in	germline	cells	and	are	passed	on	indefinitely	throughout	generations—it	is	unclear	to	what	extent	viruses	shape	the	expression	of	our	genes:	“The	DNA	of	human	endogenous	retroviruses	occupies	at	least	8%	of	our	genome;	genetic	material	of	so-called	jumping	genes,	which	resemble	retroviruses	and	may	also	have	a	viral	origin,	comprises	another	37%”	(370).	Given	all	this	life	within	the	illusory	boundary	of	our	skin	(itself	crawling	with	various	forms	of	microscopic	life	forms),	the	authors	argue:		
		 62	
Whereas	our	cohabitation	with	one	or	another	of	them	may	not	pose	a	strong	challenge	to	the	commonly	shared	assumption	that	humans	are	unitary	individuals,	the	presence	of	a	large	number	and	wide	variety	of	such	entities—and	the	power	they	have	on	us—renders	this	assumption	untenable.	.	.	.	It	is	time	to	change	the	very	concept	we	have	of	ourselves	and	to	realize	that	one	human	individual	is	neither	just	human	nor	just	one	individual.	(475)	The	behavioral	influence	that	many	of	these	internal	residents	of	our	humanimal	superorganisms	exert	indicates	the	problems	with	drawing	any	discrete	line	between	mind	and	body	and,	furthermore,	in	determining	exclusive	abilities	based	on	behavior.	If	only	certain	animals	are	capable	of	intentional	rhetorical	behavior,	then	this	must	additionally	be	attributed	to	their	internal	constituents.		 Parasites	like	the	brain	microbes	Kramer	and	Bressan	describe	have	the	worst	reputation	amongst	symbiotes,	as	they	manifest	the	only	type	of	symbiotic	relationship	in	which	one	species	benefits	from	the	clear	detriment	of	an	other.	The	thought	of	something	like	a	worm	taking	up	residence	inside	the	protective	boundary	of	our	skin	and	burrowing	into	deep	internal	recesses	we	cannot	see	ourselves	is	truly	horrifying,	but	this	complex	dependability	on	other	organisms	to	survive	and	flourish	illustrates	the	entangled	movement	of	life.	Perhaps	the	most	notorious	of	parasites	in	humanimals	(and	to	which	ancient	religious	texts	may	also	refer)	is	the	guinea	worm.	The	guinea	worm	is	even	thought	to	have	inspired	the	caduceus	symbol	for	medicine	of	“two	serpents	wound	around	a	staff,”	as	the	only	
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way	to	get	a	guinea	worm	out	of	the	leg	(where	the	mother	begins	to	emerge	with	a	bursting	uterus	of	little	worms	seeking	water)	is	to	“rest	for	a	week,	slowly	winding	the	worm	turn	by	turn	onto	a	stick	to	keep	it	alive	until	it	.	.	.	crawl[s]	free”	(Zimmer	
Parasite	2).	Parasites	have	an	uncanny	ability	to	survive	in	hostile	bodily	interiors	where	they	can	“turn	just	about	every	organ	in	the	body	.	.	.	into	their	home,”	even	“rebuild[ing]	parts	of	the	host’s	body	to	suit	their	own	comfort”	(24).	Parasites	can	also	“feed	on	almost	anything:	blood,	gut	lining,	liver,	snot,”	and,	if	that	does	not	suit,	they	can	influence	their	hosts	to	find	them	food	(24).		 One	example	of	the	sophistication	inherent	to	many	parasites	is	Sacculina,	a	barnacle	that	sheds	most	of	its	barnacle	body	to	invade	crabs	and	essentially	turn	them	into	zombies	doing	nothing	but	the	parasite’s	bidding.	Once	a	female	Sacculina	has	successfully	deployed	her	finger-like	projections	throughout	a	crab	body	to	drink	nutrients	from	its	blood,	she	can	remain	in	this	parasitic	relationship	with	the	crab	forever:	“[a	crab]	can	go	on	with	its	life	with	the	parasite	filling	its	entire	body,	the	roots	even	wrapping	around	its	eyestalks”	(80).	However,	if	a	crab	becomes	inhabited	both	by	the	dominant,	controlling	female	form	of	the	parasite	and	the	smaller	male	Sacculina	(a	Sacculina	infection	begins	with	the	female	form	of	the	parasite,	who	provides	the	ability	for	a	male	to	further	infect	the	crab),	the	male	begins	fertilizing	the	female	Sacculina’s	eggs	and	sets	off	a	reaction	in	which	the	crab	eventually	loses	the	ability	to	harness	any	energy	for	itself.	It	can	no	longer	regenerate	a	limb	if	it	is	lost,	“it	stops	molting	and	growing	.	.	.	and	while	other	crabs	mate	and	produce	a	new	generation,	parasitized	crabs	simply	go	on	eating	and	
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eating”	(81).	The	female	Sacculina	so	controls	her	crab	host	that	the	crab	treats	the	growing	pouch	of	Sacculina	larvae	as	if	they	were	its	own.	In	fact,	infected	male	crabs	behave	as	if	they	were	pregnant	females:	“She	strokes	[the	growing	pouch]	clean	as	the	larvae	grow,	and	when	they	are	ready	to	emerge,	she	forces	them	out	in	pulses,	shooting	out	heavy	clouds	of	parasites.	As	they	come	spraying	from	her	body	she	waves	her	claws	to	help	them	on	their	way”	(82).		 The	horror	of	parasites	turning	their	hosts	into	zombie-like	reservoirs	for	survival	may	prompt	us	to	want	to	eradicate	parasites,	but	according	to	many	parasitologists,	this	would	be	a	mistake	that	could	create	significant	detrimental	effects	on	the	ecosystems	where	parasites	play	a	critical	role.	In	“Save	the	Parasites	(Seriously),”	Ed	Young	explains	the	need	for	parasite	conservation,	as	parasites	often	“direct	the	flow	of	energy”	and	“keep	populations	of	pests	under	control.”	Insects	driven	to	suicide	by	“mind-controlling	worms”	have	even	been	found	to	supply	trout	with	over	half	their	diet.	When	you	remove	one	critical	element	in	a	complex	ecological	entanglement,	it	is	hard	to	anticipate	the	extent	to	which	an	entire	ecosystem	will	be	affected.	Ecosystems	are	complex	systems	of	entangled	life,	of	which	no	linear,	hierarchal	origination	exists9.	 				
Origins	
Before	it	is	drinking	water,	amniotic	fluid	is	the	creeks	and	rivers	that	fill	reservoirs.	It	
is	the	underground	water	that	fills	wells.	And	before	it	is	creeks	and	rivers	and	
groundwater,	amniotic	fluid	is	rain.	.	.	.	When	I	look	at	amniotic	fluid,	I	am	looking	at	
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rain	falling	on	orange	groves.	I	am	looking	at	melon	fields,	potatoes	in	wet	earth,	frost	
on	pasture	grasses.	The	blood	of	cows	and	chickens	.	.	.	The	nectar	gathered	by	bees	
and	hummingbirds	.	.	.	Whatever	is	inside	hummingbird	eggs	is	also	inside	my	womb.	
Whatever	is	in	the	world’s	water	is	here	in	my	hands.	Sandra	Steingraber	Having	Faith:	An	Ecologist’s	Journey	to	Motherhood	66-67	Sex	and	symbiosis	both	implicate	the	various	entangled	origins	of	our	material	ontologies	and	hopefully	illustrate	how	difficult	it	might	be	to	pin	down	life’s	origins.	Where	and	how	did/does	life	begin?	Life	has	many	“origins”	(and	many	theories	of	origins)	depending	upon	where	one	chooses	to	look.	Since	my	argument	for	a	HumAnimal	rhetorics	is	one	for	rhetoric	“in”	evolution—in	this	process	and	enactment	of	life	of	which	organisms	and	characteristics	are	condensations	of	ontological	persuasion—a	look	at	the	question	of	origins	is	necessary	(even	if	no	single,	definitive	answer	can	be	given—and	perhaps	this	itself	is	telling).			 The	above	quote	from	ecologist	Sandra	Steingraber	traces	water	throughout	its	journey	enfolded	in	the	earth’s	banks,	in	plants	and	animals,	and	finally	in	the	amniotic	fluid	that	embraces	her	daughter’s	unfolding	development	in	the	womb.	The	ontological	status	of	mother	and	fetus10	is	one	of	intimate	entanglement.	A	developing	fetus	not	only	consists	of	the	biological	material	of	its	parents,	it	is	suffused	with	maternal	chemical	communication,	nourishment,	and	protection.	The	contours	of	a	fetus	unfold	and	invaginate	as	nascent	life	emerges:	budding	limbs	and	tail,	dark	eye	spots,	folds	of	skin,	the	circulation	of	blood	separate	from	maternal	blood.	In	humanimal	pregnancy	and	birth,	a	woman’s	placenta	is	the	material	
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threshold	of	becoming	that	separates	as	well	as	joins.	The	placenta	transfers	critical	compounds	from	the	mother’s	blood	that	feed	and	promote	this	flourishing	of	life	within.	The	placenta	is	an	ontological	embrace.			 A	developing	fetus	is	in	a	dynamic	relation	with	the	mother	as	well,	rather	than	simply	passive	precious	cargo.	An	embryo	helps	initiate	its	own	implantation	in	the	mother’s	uterine	wall,	blocks	chemicals	that	signal	the	shedding	of	the	nutrient-rich	uterine	lining	that	is	prepared	throughout	each	menstrual	cycle,	creates	chemical	compounds	that	signal	for	continued	production	of	the	uterine	lining,	suppresses	maternal	immune	reaction,	and	even	“contributes	signals	that	promote	the	onset	of	labor”	(Dileo).	Following	birth,	this	emerged	life	continues	biochemical	dances	within	its	tissues,	as	in	the	downregulation	of	his	or	her	own	immune	system	to	welcome	in	a	vast	array	of	the	world’s	microbiota,	beginning	a	lifelong	symbiotic	relationality	in	what	Kramer	and	Bressan	call	“an	ancient,	stable,	fundamental	component	of	the	human	superorganism”11	(468).		The	elegant	maneuvering	of	these	chemical	processes	has	emerged	prior	to	“human”—just	as	with	sex	and	symbiosis,	the	ability	to	create	another	life	from	one’s	own	materiality	in	a	dynamic	biological	relation	connects	us	to,	entangles	us	with,	makes	us	animal:	humanimal.	We	can	examine	life’s	complex	family	history	in	the	Mobius	strips	of	DNA	and	RNA,	chart	divergences	and	convergences,	map	and	name	life;	but	nothing	makes	the	reality	sink	in	quite	like	the	successful	transplantation	of	that	biological	materiality	across	the	human-animal	abyss.	Many	examples	of	such	transplantation	come	to	mind12.	One	transphenomenon	in	relation	
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to	our	material,	maternal	origins	is	an	early	method	of	identifying	humanimal	pregnancy.	As	Steingraber	explains,	the	“Aschheim-Zondek	method”	developed	in	Berlin	in	the	early	1900s	entailed	“injecting	a	virgin	mouse	(later	a	rabbit	or	a	toad)	with	the	urine	of	a	possibly	pregnant	woman	and	then	dissecting	the	animal	to	see	whether	it	had	ovulated”	(6).	Ovulation	in	this	now	dead,	dissected	animal	was	positive	indication	of	humanimal	pregnancy.	Such	a	becoming,	signaled	by	animal	death,	vividly	illustrates	the	persistent	pattern	of	a	directed	entanglement	of	human	(birth)	and	animal	(death)	that	always	benefits	the	human.		Steingraber’s	tracing	of	the	movement	of	water	that	eventually	becomes	amniotic	fluid	also	illustrates	a	theory	that	we	are	not	only	animal,	we	are	ocean.	It	is	not	a	new	idea	that	life	originated	in	the	ocean;	certainly	most	of	us	are	familiar	with	the	theory	of	a	“primordial	soup,”	thick	with	life-giving	compounds,	from	which	life	arose.	What	may	sound	new	is	what	paleontologists	Mark	and	Dianna	McMenamin	call	a	theory	of	hypersea.	The	hypersea	is	essentially	a	current	of	water	that	flows	on	land,	through	all	terrestrial	tissues,	providing	them	with	life-giving	and	life-sustaining	abilities.	The	way	this	theory	of	hypersea	explains	the	origins	of	terrestrial	life	and	diversification	is	in	how	it	illustrates	the	benefits	of	gaining	more	ability	to	photosynthesize	on	land	while	maintaining	a	link	to	the	“up-welling”	of	nutrients	in	the	ocean.	The	McMenamins	believe	that	this	mediation	between	ocean	and	land	occurred	with	the	establishment	of	a	“protofungus”	and	“protoplant”	symbiotic	relationship	when	both	were	scrounging	for	nutrients	along	the	ocean’s	shore.	Like	all	remarkable	beginnings,	this	crucial	symbiotic	relationship	occurred	
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in	a	failed-death	event	when	one	(the	fungus,	as	fungi	characteristically	emit	enzymes	that	aid	in	consumption)	attempted	to	eat	the	other	(the	plant)	(Zimmer	“Hypersea”).	The	protoplant	and	protofungus	are	now	able	to	“seize	control	of	the	flow,”	creating	a	positive	feedback	loop	in	which	more	and	more	growth	is	possible.		Hypersea	is	not	the	first	time	symbiosis	is	theorized	as	creating	the	means	for	life	(whether	its	origin	or	flourishing	of	diversification).	Endosymbiosis,	the	theory	of	our	eukaryotic	origins,	is	essentially	this	failed	act	of	eating	an	other.	In	
The	Whole	Creature:	Complexity	Science,	Biosemiotics,	and	the	Evolution	of	Culture,	Wendy	Wheeler	describes	this	process	as	an	ingestion	of	difference—the	difference	that	remains	within.	If	we	take	the	origins	of	life	as	the	cell,	one	necessary	condition	for	this	origin	is	a	border—a	membrane—marking	an	interior	off	from	the	environment.	What	life	needs	is	a	body.	A	body	created	by	membrane	provides	a	gradient	for	inclusion	and	exclusion,	for	protection	and	the	taking	in	of	nutrients,	and	it	also	allows	for	an	increase	in	complexity.	This	other-within,	this	feeling-with13,	is	perhaps	the	first	creative	act.	It	is	an	embodied	negotiation—an	entanglement	and	attunement	that	initiates	a	becoming	of	life.		A	very	recent	alternative	theory	to	the	origins	of	life	proposes	that	the	necessary	body	for	life’s	emergence	began,	strangely	enough,	within	rocks,	and	an	increasingly	complex	life	emerged	within	their	microscopic	interior	compartments.	Geologist	Mike	Russel	stumbled	across	this	unusual	rock	of	“hollow	tubes,”	which	he	believes	was	created	in	the	disturbance	of	hydrothermal	vents	on	the	ocean	floor.	Such	a	rock	would	have	existed	at	a	time	when	the	then-acidic	oceanic	water	met	
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with	alkaline	water	shooting	from	the	vents,	thus	creating	a	proton	cascade	and	the	“chemical	garden”	Russell	imagines,	with	“an	abundant	flux	of	matter	and	energy	in	the	same	place—a	setting	conducive	for	self-replicating	reactions,	and	also	a	free	lunch	for	fledgling	creatures”	(Requarth).	This	type	of	rock	would	have	provided	a	gradient	across	which	energy	could	eventually	be	harvested,	forming	the	primordial	chemical	reactions	that	cells	use	today.	Energy,	as	the	compound	adenosine	triphosphate	(ATP),	is	what	drives	living	processes.	Without	this	most	fundamental	of	components	and	its	constituents,	genetic	material	like	DNA	would	be	dead-in-the-water,	so	to	speak.	The	concentration	and	movement	of	energy	across	thresholds	is	what	brought	the	precursors	of	life	together,	bundling	and	folding	materiality	that	attracted	and	repelled,	gradually	forming	more	and	more	complex	systems.	These	chemical	gardens	of	narrow	rocks	have	been	found,	and	they	support	Russel’s	theory:		a	cluster	of	otherworldly	pinnacles	rising	from	the	ocean	floor,	as	tall	as	20-storey	buildings	.	.	.	This	strange	landscape	turned	out	to	host	an	exotic	ecosystem	of	snails,	crabs,	worms	and	shellfish,	sustained	by	microbes	that	convert	raw	elements	from	the	inner	Earth	into	life	without	any	help	from	the	Sun.	(Requarth)	Life:	born	in	the	darkest	depths	between	shores.			 What	remains	curious	about	any	theory	of	life’s	origins	(or,	perhaps	more	appropriately,	emergences)	is	the	entropy-order	paradox	of	life.	Life’s	very	coming	into	existence	works	against	the	second	law	of	thermodynamics	that	explains	how	
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the	universe	moves	toward	entropy,	or	disorder.	The	complexity	of	life	somehow	emerged	in	the	midst	of	such	a	universe.	In	What	is	Life?,	Erwin	Schrödinger	explains	how	life	increases	order	“locally”—in	the	living	system—by	increasing	entropy	“globally”	in	the	universe,	thus	maintaining	the	second	law.	Russell’s	chemical	gardens	illuminate	a	scenario	in	which	an	energy	gradient	could	be	utilized	to	do	just	that.	In	At	Home	in	the	Universe:	The	Search	for	the	Laws	of	Self-
Organization	and	Complexity,	Stuart	Kauffman	unites	this	question	about	the	entropy-order	paradox	with	biology	by	turning	to	complexity	science.	In	contrast	to	the	predominant	focus	in	evolutionary	biology	on	selection	and	the	accidental-life	that	apparently	arises	in	the	most	unlikely	of	circumstances,	Kauffman	suggests	that	the	laws	of	complexity	and	self-organization	make	the	emergence	of	life,	as	“expressions	of	deeper	natural	laws,”	a	given	(8).	Kauffman’s	argument	for	self-organization,	called	“order	for	free,”	suggests	that	“whenever	a	collection	of	chemicals	contains	enough	different	kinds	of	molecules,”	rather	than	those	molecules	being	arranged	in	the	correct	order	one-by-one	to	create	a	complex	living	organism,	“a	metabolism	will	crystallize	from	the	broth”	(45).	In	other	words,	given	the	right	conditions,	“metabolic	networks	.	.	.	can	spring	full-grown	from	a	primordial	soup”	(45).	This	is	difficult	to	imagine,	but	there	is	support	for	such	extraordinary	emergence	(or,	according	to	Kauffman,	completely	ordinary	and	expected	emergence),	and	the	requisite	accumulation	of	“a	sufficiently	diverse	mix	of	molecules”	is	available	in	Russell’s	chemical	gardens	(50).	
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	 According	to	Mark	C.	Taylor	in	The	Moment	of	Complexity:	Emerging	Network	
Culture,	the	“complex	adaptive	systems”	of	life	“always	emerge	at	the	edge	of	chaos	far	from	equilibrium”	and	“are	not	static	but	are	in	a	state	of	continual	evolution”	(16).	To	remain	pliable	enough	to	be	open	to	change	and	yet	stable	enough	to	maintain	order,	life	must	be	poised	“on	the	edge	of	chaos”	(Kauffman	86).	Poised	in	such	a	way	(one	can	imagine,	about	to	tumble),	the	right	saturation	of	order	vs.	disorder	exists	for	the	creation	of	what	Kauffman	calls	a	“combinatorial	explosion”	(185).	Taylor	describes	this	explosion	as	the	“critical	transition	.	.	.	where	quantitative	change	suddenly	leads	to	qualitative	change	(Taylor	148).	The	phenomenon	of	life’s	ever-emerging	complexity	is	characterized	by	several	crucial	points	for	further	understanding	the	rhetorical,	evolutionary	entanglement	of	life:	the	“nonlinear	events”	that	result	in	the	further	emergent	complexity	“have	effects	disproportionate	to	their	causes”;	these	entanglements,	or	“dynamic	interactions	among	individual	elements	of	the	system	generate	global	events	that	require	a	holistic	description,	which	cannot	be	reduced	to	an	account	of	their	individual	elements”;	and	each	emergent	event,	though	predictable,	has	unpredictable	effects	(148-149).		 The	position	of	life	poised	on	the	edge	of	chaos,	within	range	of	another	cascade	of	increasing	complexity,	suggests	a	threshold	across	which	the	(self)organization	of	life	and	the	entropy	of	the	universe	embrace—a	placental	embrace	across	which	new	complexity	arises.	Just	as	the	skin	that	acts	in	dynamic	relation	between	inside	and	outside,	this	threshold—in	the	moment	of	becoming—
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is	mediated	by	sensation.	In	Chaos,	Territory,	Art,	Grosz	explains	how	Deleuze	and	Guattari	articulate	this	movement	of	becoming	in	terms	of	a	musical	refrain,	which	has	“three	basic	components	.	.	.	a	home,	a	yard,	and	a	way	out”	(52).	This	“way	out”	is	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	“line	of	flight	to	the	outside,	a	movement	of	migration,	transformation	.	.	.	”	from	order	to	chaos	(52).	Grosz	describes	this	movement	as	an	“extraction”	from	chaos,	a	way	of	framing	chaos	and	either	containing	or	unleashing	its	vibratory	force	with	art:	Sensation	contracts	the	vibratory	waves	of	matter,	of	the	earth	and	ultimately	of	chaotic	cosmic	forces,	into	sensory	forms	that	are	capable	of	functioning	as	a	stimulus	to	the	nervous	system.	Art	transmits	vibratory	force	through	its	successful	transformations	from	energy	to	sensation	to	stimulation.	Art	contracts,	which	is	to	say	it	synthesizes	and	compresses	the	materiality	that	composes	it,	transmitting	the	force	of	materiality,	its	vibratory	resonance,	from	a	work	to	a	body.	(62)	The	way	I	understand	this	self-organization,	which	Kauffman	argues	as	the	most	fundamental	movement	that	creates	life	and	perpetuates	evolutionary	change	(or	movement	within	life),	is	not	in	extraction	from	chaos,	but	in	a	sudden	tunneling	of	bodies	into	alignment—a	critical,	cascading	moment	of	entanglement.	And	yes,	sensation—the	feeling-with	of	life—is	that	movement,	that	relationality,	that	is	an	“unfolding	of	the	one	for	the	other	through	a	body	created	at	their	interface”	(72).	Sensation	connects	bodies	to	this	preoriginary	becoming.	While	Grosz’s	focus	is	on	the	role	of	art	in	our	body’s	relation	to	the	universe	and	to	chaos,	I	argue	it	is	in	this	
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critical	cascading	moment	of	becoming-entanglement	that	rhetoric	suffuses	these	ontological	alignments	and	negotiations	of	bodies	in	dynamic	relationality.	This	relationality	is	being	and	its	becoming	as	we	have	seen	in	this	chapter,	and	its	continual	surmounting	of	critical	thresholds	drives	evolutionary	change.	The	many	theories	of	life’s	origins	often	mistake	such	a	retracing	as	a	gradual,	linear	progression	of	chance;	but	life	emerges	suddenly,	in	fits	of	rhetorical	alignment.	Russell	hesitates	to	define	the	life	he	imagines	emerging	from	hollow	compartments	of	rock	deep	in	the	ocean’s	abyss,	but	what	he	articulates	is	this:	“life	isn’t	a	thing	so	much	as	a	manner	of	being,	a	restless	fit	of	destruction	and	creation.	If	it	can	be	defined	at	all,	it	is	this:	life	is	a	self-sustaining,	highly	organized	flux,	a	natural	way	that	matter	and	energy	express	themselves	under	certain	conditions”	(qtd.	in	Requarth).	Life	is	this	process,	this	movement	of	relationality	in	which	we	are	composed	in	births	and	origins,	recomposed	in	the	dynamic	process	of	our	changing	and	entangling	materialities,	and	decomposed	in	death.	Perhaps	we	will	never	know	the	true	origin	of	life,	but—based	on	what	we	know	of	these	processes	now—we	might	say	that,	rather	than	life	ending,	it	is	punctuated	by	births	and	deaths	in	cascades	of	difference.			 	
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CHAPTER	THREE	THE	ABYSS	
	
	The	animal	looks	at	us,	and	we	are	naked	before	it.	Thinking	perhaps	begins	there.	 Jacques	Derrida	The	Animal	That	Therefore	I	Am	29	
	In	the	accompanying	ideology,	animals	are	always	the	observed.	The	fact	that	they	can	observe	us	has	lost	all	significance.		 John	Berger	About	Looking	16	Given	our	current	information	economy	and	the	increasing	proliferation	of	visual	media,	images	in	visual	culture	are	especially	important	to	consider	regarding	our	material	multispecies	entanglements.	What,	for	example,	are	we	to	make	of	the	
Figure	6.	Eadweard	Muybridge’s	“Animal	
Locomotion	Plate	503.”	Eadweard	Muybridge	
Online	Archive;	Web.	
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widespread	fascination	with	cat	memes?	Why	do	images	of	animals	balancing	different	objects	on	their	bodies	go	viral?	Looking	at	animals	may	have	begun	in	earnest	with	the	zoos	of	colonialism,	but	it	seems	to	have	reached	new	(often	strange)	heights	with	increasing	technological	sophistication.	The	visibility	of	these	digital	animals	(and	the	simultaneous	invisibility	of	others)	recalls	John	Berger’s	contemplations	from	nearly	four	decades	ago:	what	does	it	mean	to	look	at	animals	today?	And,	perhaps	more	importantly,	what	does	it	mean	that	we	no	longer	offer	animals	the	opportunity	to	look	back?	In	Ecosee:	Image,	Rhetoric,	Nature,	editors	Sid	Dobrin	and	Sean	Morey	consider	anew	the	“dilemma	of	representation”	in	creating	and	looking	at	animal	and	environmental	images	(3).	As	Dobrin	and	Morey	point	out,	previous	rhetoricians	engaging	with	environmental	discourses	have	overlooked	the	importance	of	images	in	shaping	meaning,	but	images	now	constitute	so	much	of	that	discourse	that	they	are	in	need	of	critical	attention.	In	“A	Rhetorical	Look	at	Ecosee,”	Morey	explains	how	“our	culture	is	moving	increasingly	toward	a	rhetoric	of	images,	where	most	communicative	acts	occur	through	visual	media”	(41).	Indeed,	digital	media	now	allow	for	“viral”	communication—a	metaphor	that	implies	a	pandemic	infection	of	our	biological	beings.	The	types	of	images	“going	viral”	are	symptomatic	of	the	systemic	perceptions	in	our	local	and	global	societies.	Irmgard	Emmelhainz	refers	to	this	virility	as	a	“circulation	of	visibilities”	that	are	actually	making	it	more	difficult	to	see	the	pervasive	ecological	detriment	that	characterizes	our	Anthropocene	era	(Emmelhainz).	Understanding	these	viral	
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infections	as	constructed	within	a	representational	framework	may	help	aid	the	development	of	an	alternative	pharmakon—one	that	illuminates	its	own	material	processes	at	work	within	us	and	makes	us	aware	of	our	breached,	porous	bodily	frontiers.		The	issue	with	representation	and	its	use	of	reflection	as	a	metaphor	for	constructing	knowledge	is	the	presumed	distance	it	creates	between	an	image	and	an	observer.	As	Barad	explains	in	Meeting	the	Universe	Halfway,	there	is	no	such	
distance.	And	there	are	no	discrete,	individual	bodies	with	characteristics	that	exist	prior	to	entanglement	with	other	bodies.	By	looking	at	animals,	whether	in	film,	sculpture,	Internet	memes,	photography,	drawings,	etc.,	we	are	constructing	specific	entangled	realities	with	those	animals.	As	Barad	explains,	these	are	material-discursive	practices	that	create	agential	cuts	in	the	world,	carving	out	the	phenomena	in	which	we,	the	observers,	are	an	entangled	part:	.	.	.	a	different	material-discursive	apparatus	of	bodily	production	materializes	a	different	configuration	of	the	world,	not	merely	a	different	description	of	a	fixed	and	independent	reality.	We	are	responsible	for	the	world	of	which	we	are	a	part,	not	because	it	is	an	arbitrary	construction	of	our	choosing	but	because	reality	is	sedimented	out	of	particular	practices	that	we	have	a	role	in	shaping	and	through	which	we	are	shaped.	(390,	my	emphasis)		
Description	of	the	world	is	not	just	the	concern	here;	it	is	the	actual	configuration	of	the	world	created	by	our	practices	that	we	seek	to	address.	Despite	increasing	
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scientific	evidence	to	trouble	the	human/animal	distinction,	the	ontoepistemological	abyss	between	these	two	categories	continues	to	simultaneously	be	symptomatic	of	and	justification	for	everyday	animal	exploitations.	And	this	abyss	is	evident	in	visual	culture.	These	images,	with	their	grasping,	objectifying	ways	of	looking,	create	very	real	consequences	for	humanimal-animal	entanglements.	If	awareness	of	our	rhetorically	entangled	beings	is	to	occur,	these	visual	engagements	with	animals	are	crucial	to	examine.		The	examples	of	animal	images	within	this	chapter	do	not	include	those	which	are	overtly	cruel	or	exploitive	in	their	depiction	of	animal	suffering	and	death.	Leaked	footage	of	mistreatment	in	corporate	farming	practices	and	visual	documentation	of	animal	abuse	make	most	people	look	away.	These	are	the	images	that	we	cannot	bear	to	witness.	They	are	too	real,	too	cruel.	Berger	describes	such	arresting	images	as	“printed	on	the	black	curtain	which	is	drawn	across	what	we	choose	to	forget	or	refuse	to	know”	(42).	They	are	“an	eye	we	cannot	shut”;	they	“accuse	nobody	and	everybody”	(42,	44).	The	innocent	subtlety	of	a	“cute”	or	“funny”	image,	on	the	other	hand,	allows	this	black	curtain	to	stay	drawn	without	revealing	the	indecency	of	our	everyday	lives.	Yet	these	innocent	photos	create	the	very	fabric	of	the	curtain.	They	are	where	these	perceptions	of	“us”	and	“them”	take	root,	growing	into	the	open	secrets	of	larger	exploitations.	Therefore,	to	avoid	the	urge	to	look	away	from	those	overt	exploitations	and	cruelties	and	end	up	ignoring	the	issue	of	the	black	curtain	of	animal	representation	all	together,	this	chapter	
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investigates	the	subtler	abyssal	cuts	created	by	the	seemingly	innocuous	images	we	see	everyday.			
Abyssal	Looking	The	animal	scrutinises	him	across	a	narrow	abyss	of	non-comprehension.	.	.	The	man	too	is	looking	across	a	similar,	but	not	identical,	abyss	of	non-comprehension.	And	this	is	so	wherever	he	looks.	He	is	always	looking	across	ignorance	and	fear.	And	so,	when	he	is	being	seen	by	the	animal,	he	is	being	seen	as	his	surroundings	are	seen	by	him.	His	recognition	of	this	is	what	makes	the	look	of	the	animal	familiar.	And	yet	the	animal	is	distinct,	and	can	never	be	confused	with	man.	 —John	Berger	About	Looking	5		 Boundaries	do	not	sit	still.		 —Karen	Barad	Meeting	the	Universe	Halfway	171	In	studying	Barad’s	agential	realist	account	of	quantum	mechanics,	one	of	the	things	that	becomes	remarkably	and	beautifully	apparent	about	“the	nature	of	nature”	is	that	there	is	no	ontological	abyss	between	discrete	things	or	beings	(29).	(Indeed,	there	are	no	“things,”	as	the	smallest	unit	enacted	in	any	agential	cut	is	the	entangled	phenomenon	itself	[56]).	Whatever	perception	of	an	ontological	abyss	may	exist	within	a	representation	framework,	it	is	just	that:	a	flawed	perception	using	an	inadequate	optical	metaphor	for	understanding	phenomena.	In	fact,	there	
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can	be	no	discrete,	determinate	characteristics	that	separate	subject	and	object	in	advance.	Furthermore,	any	perceived	abyss	is	never	settled	but	rather	moves	with	every	agential	cut	created.		This	is	strikingly	similar	to	Derrida’s	discussion	of	the	apparent	abyss	between	“Human”	and	“Animal”	in	The	Animal	that	Therefore	I	Am,	which	I	refer	to	in	Chapter	1.	While	Derrida’s	stance	is	that	the	question	of	whether	an	“abyss”	exists	between	the	so-called	Human	and	Animal	is	not	debatable,	he	troubles	this	discussion	significantly	by	arguing	that	humans	and	animals	exist	instead	as	“relations…	at	once	intertwined	and	abyssal,	and	they	can	never	be	totally	objectified”	(31,	my	emphasis).	Any	line	plunging	into	an	unseen,	untraceable	abyss	between	categories	is,	in	fact,	no	line	at	all.	Rather	it	is	an	unknowable,	enfolding	ontological	relation.	And,	according	to	Barad,	it	is	a	relation	that	changes	with	every	measurement	or	apparatus	that	makes	a	cut,	which	includes	every	photograph,	every	video,	and	every	performance	of	the	animal.	These	visual	cuts	organize	the	messiness	of	the	world—the	dirt,	if	you	will,	that	falls	out	of	place—and,	in	the	case	of	representation,	reinforce	the	humanist	stance	as	center,	objective,	and	outside.	With	every	visual	cut	between	human	and	animal	enacted	within	a	representational	framework,	we	are	reassuring	ourselves	that	everything	does	belong	within	these	tidy	frames,	that	we	are	in	control	of	the	swirling	unknown	and	unknowable	that	is	this	universe,	and	that	ultimately—in	containing	the	dirt	and	fluids	and	messy,	moveable	relations—we	may	actually	escape	the	death	that	awaits	all	animals.	But	as	we	will	see	in	the	following	chapter,	this	visual	framework	is	haunted	by	the	
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inevitable	liminalities	and	undecidabilities	that	threaten	its	clean	borders	of	representation.				 The	often	troubling	way	animals	are	framed	within	visual	media	has	become	an	increasing	topic	of	study	within	the	arts	and	humanities.	In	An	Introduction	to	
Animals	and	Visual	Culture,	Randy	Malamud	considers	animal	representations	in	a	wide	range	of	media,	including:	film,	photography,	fashion,	Internet	memes,	and	everyday	speech.	For	Malamud,	the	act	of	framing	animals	within	cultural	screens	of	these	kinds	is	a	crime	humans	have	been	guilty	of	since	the	beginning	of	human	culture.	The	crime—animal	representation	itself—displaces	real	animals	from	their	natural	habitats.	According	to	Malamud,	“first	principles”	of	visual	representations	include	animals	being	“made	visible”	and	“acculturated”	by	this	displacement	or	extraction	of	animals	(6).	He	suggests	it	is	in	this	framing	that	people	colonize	animal	habitats	(36).	
Figure	7.	Eadweard	Muybridge’s	“A	Horse	in	Motion.”	Animal	Locomotion	Volume	9.	
Philadelphia:	University	of	Pennsylvania,	1887;	Web.	
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	 Since	rhetoric	as	an	evolutionary	movement	and	relationality	that	enfolds	and	entangles	is	emphasized	in	previous	chapters,	perhaps	the	best	place	to	begin	looking	at	the	abyssal	cuts	of	animal	representations	is	precisely	where	this	movement	is	cut	and	broken	down	into	discrete,	discernable	parts.	Eadweard	Muybridge’s	Animal	Locomotion	series	is	precisely	this	place.		As	Malamud	explains,	Muybridge’s	revolutionary	stop-motion	photography	in	the	late	1800s	inspired	the	creation	of	film.	With	his	“zoopraxiscope,”	Muybridge	captured	moving	animal	bodies	in	discrete	frames	(occasionally	including	the	gendered	human	form1).	“The	Horse	in	Motion”	was	especially	popular	for	its	ability	to	break	down	the	movement	of	a	horse’s	gallop,	which	could	not	otherwise	be	discerned	with	the	naked	eye.	Malamud	likens	this	to	what	Malek	Alloula	in	The	
Colonial	Harem	calls	the	colonizer’s—or	vivisector’s—gaze:	“It	is	this	same	gaze	that	animates	the	photographer,	that	filters	through	the	lens	to	catch	in	its	aperture	a	reality	that	he	[sic]	has	already	begun	to	decompose”	(Alloula	92).	Alloula	continues:	“Photography	is	a	stealer	of	souls.	.	.”	(92).	Malamud	finds	“similar	incursions”	in	Muybridge’s	stop	motion	photography,	“which	violate	the	secrets	so	essential	to	animals’	survival”	(Malamud	63).		Muybridge	performed	hundreds	of	animal	motion	studies	with	his	zoopraxiscope,	creating	eleven	volumes	published	by	the	University	of	Pennsylvania	from	1872-1885	(Muybridge	Animal).	Each	animal	is	framed	“against	a	backdrop	of	numbered	scales	and	grids,	the	more	convenient	to	chart	and	graph	them”	(Malamud	66).	Malamud	continues:	
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The	animals	are	curiously	reduced,	caught	in	the	mechanics,	the	physics,	of	photography.	They	are	comprised	not	of	flesh	and	blood	and	hair,	but	of	silver	albumen	and	paper.	There	are	so	many	of	them.	.	.	that	after	a	while,	we	cannot	really	see	them	at	all.	We	certainly	cannot	hear	them	or	smell	them,	or	feel	(as	we	do	in	proximity	to	a	real	horse)	awesomely	dwarfed	by	them.	Broken	down	by	Muybridge	and	his	apparati,	they	do	nothing	but	run	and	run.	Their	force	and	motion	no	longer	seem	their	own,	but	Muybridge’s,	and	ours.	.	.	I	believe	the	horses	themselves	lose	something	in	this	transaction.	(66)	In	this	description	of	Muybridge’s	photos,	Malamud	shows	how	stark	a	line	is	drawn	between	the	human	observer	and	the	animal	object.	The	complex	entanglements	of	humanimal	and	animal	beings	are	cleanly	severed	by	this	precise	pinning	and	dissection	of	movements.	This	calculating,	violent	grid-like	organization	is	the	very	figure	of	Modernism,	as	Mark	C.	Taylor	explains	in	The	Moment	of	Complexity.	During	this	time,	the	clean	formalism	of	the	grid	echoes	a	common	assumption:	“people	are	distinguished	from	animals	by	their	ability	to	follow	a	straight-and-narrow	line”	(26).	It	is	not	surprising	that	the	grid	becomes	a	way	of	mapping	and	segmenting	the	messy	biological	movements	of	animal	bodies	in	order	to	more	fully	grasp	them.	Indeed,	as	Berger	notes,	“[animals]	are	the	objects	of	our	ever-extending	knowledge.	What	we	know	about	them	is	an	index	of	our	power,	and	thus	an	index	of	what	separates	us	from	them.	The	more	we	know,	the	further	away	they	are”	(16).		
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Malamud	seems	to	also	echo	Irmgard	Emmelhainz	in	his	concern	over	the	sheer	number	of	images	in	Muybridge’s	form	studies:	“There	are	so	many	of	them.	.	.	that	after	a	while,	we	cannot	really	see	them	at	all”	(Malamud	66).	We	can	no	longer	see	the	real,	embodied	animals	and	their	fluid	movements,	since	pictures	in	this	series	are	flat,	frozen,	and	distorted.	Berger	notes	this	tendency	of	photography	toward	distortion	in	About	Looking:	“The	image	seized	by	the	camera	is	doubly	violent	and	both	violences	reinforce	the	same	contrast:	the	contrast	between	the	photographed	moment	and	all	others”	(43).	Yet	there	is	no	answer	to	this	inherently	violent	representational	framework	within	Malamud’s	critique,	because	he	still	seeks	the	real,	individual	animal	and	its	return	to	a	natural	habitat	out	“there”	somewhere,	divorced	from	our	observation.	As	Malamud	states:	“It	is	difficult,	if	not	impossible,	to	find	in	these	human	representations	an	objectively	true	account	of	who	animals	are”	(6).		The	inability	for	Malamud	to	get	out	of	this	representational	framework	is	understandable;	at	the	foundation	of	his	critique	is	a	system	of	familiar	binaries:	human/animal,	nature/culture,	subject/object,	representation/real.	This	conundrum	becomes	interesting	once	domestic	animals	enter	the	scene,	given	that	domestic	animals	significantly	trouble	these	binaries.	Cats	and	dogs	for	example,	so	often	featured	as	the	actors	in	viral	images	and	memes	with	“LOLspeak”	and	“doge,”	have	no	natural	habitat	to	return	to.	What	crime	is	committed	by	the	viral	“Happycat”	meme	and	its	accompanying	text:	“I	can	has	cheezburger”?	How	are	real	human-cat	relationships	affected	by	the	8-bit	animated	Pop-Tart/feline	bouncing	
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through	space	on	a	rainbow?2	It	is	difficult	to	imagine	how	these	silly	images	could	be	harmful	on	any	level.	Clearly	people	love	their	cats	and	the	goofy	images	of	them.		Under	further	scrutiny,	the	amusement	that	prompts	these	seemingly	innocuous	images	proves	to	be	symptomatic	of	a	more	insidious	stance	toward	animals,	even	in	the	domestic	sphere.	Malamud	argues	that	the	fascination	with	all	this	cute	is	a	derogatory	feminization	in	which	animals	become	the	“dumb	blondes”	for	the	desiring	male	(or	in	this	case	human)	gaze	(74-75).	“LOLspeak,”	“doge,”	and	“moon	moon”	clearly	evoke	this	dumb	animal	perspective.	Doge	is	constructed	with	a	series	of	two-word	“dog	phrases”	that	are	created	from	a	small	list	of	modifiers,	including	“so,	such,	many,	much,	and	very,”	which	are	then	mismatched	with	nouns	or	verbs	not	typically	paired	in	normal	speech	(McCulloch).	After	a	few	of	these	two-word	dog	phrases,	the	doge	meme	typically	ends	with	one	word	in	its	simplest	form,	like	“wow,	amaze,	or	excite.”	For	example,	a	spoof	ad	for	“Fifty	Shades	of	Doge”	reads:	“such	kink.	very	sex.	wow”	(McCulloch).	LOLcat,	on	the	other	hand,	relies	on	a	variety	of	spelling,	typographical,	and	grammatical	errors	to	form	its	recognizable	language	play3.	These	languages	are	interesting	in	their	linguistic	construction	and	(surprising)	“rules”,	but	to	anthropomorphize	animals	with	infant-directed	or	
Figure	8.	Photograph	of	the	original	
“Happy	Cat”	meme	with	characteristic	
“LOLcat”	language;	Web.	
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diminutive	human	language	certainly	does	the	animal	image	no	favors.	Animals	are	“dumb”	when	set	to	anthropocentric	standards,	and	this	makes	them	cute	and	entertaining	for	our	colonizing	human	gaze.		Further	evidence	of	“dumb	animals”	in	visual	culture	is	another	pet:	a	domestic	rabbit	named	Oolong.	Oolong	became	famous	with	a	series	of	“head	performances”	in	which	random	objects	are	balanced	on	his	head,	including	(but	not	limited	to):	“tea	cups,	an	apple,	an	orange,	a	carrot,	a	piece	of	dried	seaweed,	a	sesame	bun,	a	book,	a	compact	disc,	a	tea	kettle,	a	lit	candle”	and	“even	a	rabbit	skull”	(Malamud	34).	Beginning	in	1999,	Oolong’s	owner	posted	hundreds	of	these	images	on	a	daily	blog,	the	most	famous	of	which	earned	Oolong	the	nickname	“Pancake	Bunny.”	After	Oolong’s	death	in	2003,	the	meme	“I	don’t	know	what	you’re	talking	about.	.	.		so	here’s	a	bunny	with	a	pancake	on	its	head”	began	circulating	online,	and	as	recently	as	2010,	two	Facebook	fan	pages	were	created	honoring	the	bunny	(“Pancake	Bunny”).		
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	 Flipping	through	a	photo	gallery	of	Oolong	on	The	Telegraph’s	website,	one	is	offered	links	to	similar	memes,	including	“cat	sandwiches”	and	a	blog	called	“Food	on	My	Dog”	that,	predictably,	features	a	dog	balancing	various	food	items	on	her	head	(“Food”).	One	image	of	“Food	on	My	Dog”	has	a	Staffordshire	Terrier	named	Tiger	sitting	patiently	with	cooked	spaghetti	covering	half	of	her	face.	In	the	image’s	caption,	her	owner	reassures	The	Telegraph	viewers,	“I	wouldn’t	do	it	without	giving	her	a	reward.”	Apparently	this	Tumblr	blog	has	become	popular	enough	that	Tiger’s	owner	“is	now	getting	requests	on	what	Tiger	should	balance	next”	(“Food”).		We	are	not	able	to	return	domestic	animals	to	a	natural	habitat,	because	their	natural	habitat	is	our	habitat.	What	are	we	to	then	make	of	these	animal	images?	What	does	it	mean	that	we	find	these	images	“cute”	or	amusing?	How	does	that	translate	into	our	perceptions	of	pets	and	animals	more	broadly?	Images	of	domestic	animals	are	foregrounded	with	an	inherent	ontological	entanglement	in	human	lives.	One	would	think	it	would	be	easier	to	see	this	entanglement,	but	the	treatment	of	domestic	animals	as	amusing	or	cute	props	can	seem	especially	objectifying.	Images	of	pets	balancing,	draped	with,	or	adorned	with	objects	are	
Figure	9.	Photograph	of	“Cold	Spaghetti”	from	
Andrew	J.	Small’s	Food	on	My	Dog	blog;	Web.	
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rampant	on	social	media	sites	like	Instagram.	For	example,	during	one	holiday	season,	a	black	and	white	photo	of	a	dog	wrapped	in	brightly	lit	Christmas	lights	appeared	in	my	Instagram	feed.	The	animal	can	still	be	found	posing,	forever	frozen	in	this	image,	with	a	tilted	head	as	if	in	response	to	a	vocal	cue.	The	only	caption	accompanying	the	photo	is	a	string	of	24	hashtags	to	maximize	visibility,	including	#dogsofinstagram,	#healthypet,	and	#pets_perfection	(Culp).	This	photo	is	couched	within	a	typical	amateur	Instagram	account,	amongst	photos	of	family	and	everyday	happenings	(in	other	words,	it	is	not	an	account	devoted	to	a	pet	covered	in	objects).	There	is	no	overt	indication	that	the	pet	owner	feels	anything	but	adoration	for	this	dog,	who	is	featured	regularly	in	her	everyday	dog-ness:	on	a	leash	in	the	park,	cuddling	in	bed,	watching	a	grasshopper.	The	context	in	which	this	one	unsettling	image	is	found	further	highlights	the	complexity	of	pet-owner	entanglements.	What	are	we	doing	wrapping	pets	in	lights—an	arguably	dangerous	activity—and	posting	pictures	of	this	on	social	media?		If	we	assume	the	most	critical	stance	in	regard	to	these	animal-object	images,	the	pets	within	are	rendered	silent,	marginal,	and—as	Malamud	argues—subaltern	(40).	Animals	are	physically	surmounted	by	a	pancake,	limp	spaghetti,	Christmas	lights	.	.	.	the	particular	object	itself	matters	little.	What	does	matter	is	the	ellipsis	following	a	seemingly	endless	list	of	objects	that	can	be	made	to	surmount	an	animal.	Animals	multiply	in	these	memes	as	part	of	the	décor	of	our	everyday	lives,	and	yet	they	are	rendered	amusing	by	the	tacit	acknowledgment	that	they	have	no	more	being	than	the	mute	objects	we	make	them	carry.	According	to	Malamud,	this	
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framed	animal	is	“a	prop,	the	sideshow	star	who	is	completely	unaware	of	how	funny	he	[sic]	is,	and	that	makes	it	even	funnier.	He	is	at	the	same	time	the	center	of	visual	attention,	and	wholly	absent”	(39).		Considering	the	audience	for	these	various	memes	is	most	likely	composed	of	pet	owners,	it	is	curious	that	what	seems	to	be	communicated	is	a	prevailing	disinterest	in	animals	as	beings.	It	would	seem	that	pet	ownership	is	a	wholly	anthropocentric,	selfish	pursuit.	Berger	describes	the	unique	phenomenon	of	pets	in	a	similar	way:		The	pet	is	either	sterilised	or	sexually	isolated,	extremely	limited	in	its	exercise,	deprived	of	almost	all	other	animal	contact,	and	fed	with	artificial	foods.	This	is	the	material	process	which	lies	behind	the	truism	that	pets	come	to	resemble	their	masters	or	mistresses.	They	are	creatures	of	their	owner’s	way	of	life.	.	.	.	Equally	important	is	the	way	the	average	owner	regards	his	[sic]	pet.	.	.	.	The	pet	completes	him,	offering	responses	to	aspects	of	his	character	which	would	otherwise	remain	unconfirmed.	(14,	his	emphasis)	The	unique	relationship	between	humanimals	and	their	pets,	animals	who	share	our	intimate	spaces	and	who	are	also—in	more	unfortunate	cases—abandoned	to	shelters	or	wandering	ill-suited	in	“the	wilds”	outside	our	private	homes,	creates	additional	complexity	in	these	entangled	visual	becomings.			 “Cute”	and	funny	animals,	even	in	the	domestic	space,	find	themselves	ripe	for	commodification—the	ultimate	abyssal	cut	between	two	categories.	Most	of	the	
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memes	I	have	mentioned	so	far	offer	merchandise	for	sale;	links	on	websites	scream:	“Visit	the	nyan	cat	store!”;	“Foodonmydog	Shirts!”	Becoming	commodities	is	dangerous	for	animals,	which	manifested	most	explicitly	with	the	zoos	of	colonialism.	Some	of	us	may	find	it	surprising	that	the	first	stuffed	animals	for	children,	which	were	inspired	by	exotic	zoo	animals	newly	available	to	the	19th-century	human	gaze,	were	covered	with	“the	skin	of	still-born	calves”	(Berger	23).	If	any	practice	makes	clear	the	certainty	that	looking	at	cute	animals	has	nothing	to	do	with	real	animal	lives,	it	is	this:	stripping	newly	born	animals—cute	when	animated	with	life—of	their	intimate	materiality,	their	skin,	in	order	for	this	materiality	to	package	children’s	toys.	With	the	proliferation	of	screens	on	which	we	can	display	more	and	more	cute	animal	packages	seeking	attention,	the	danger	of	cute	is	just	as	real	today.		
Figure	10.	Photograph	of	the	posed	“Rodeo	Frog”	taken	by	Henry	Mp.	The	frog’s	mouth	
is	open,	which	is	an	indication	of	distress.	Daily	Mail;	13	Feb	2015;	Web.		
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In	an	article	titled	“The	Cruel	Cost	of	Cute,”	zoologist	Rob	Sullivan	explains	how	common	it	is	for	photographers	to	stage	cute	animal	images	for	a	profit.	Cute	and	amusing	images	are	an	industry,	and	one	way	of	ensuring	these	qualities	is	to	depict	animals	engaged	in	anthropomorphic	behavior.	An	image	went	viral	in	February	of	2015	depicting	a	frog	riding	a	Rhinoceros	beetle.	One	of	the	frog’s	arms	was	raised	in	the	air	much	like	a	bull-rider’s	arm	would	be.	Its	mouth	also	hung	open	in	apparent	excitement.	You	can	almost	hear	the	frog	squeal	“yee-haw!”	It	is	truly	a	stunning	photograph.	According	to	an	online	article	in	Daily	Mail,	the	photographer	says	he	just	happened	to	stumble	across	this	unlikely	pair	near	his	house	in	Indonesia	(Rahman).	Since	this	photo	went	viral,	Sullivan	and	others	familiar	with	amphibian	behavior	have	pointed	out	that	frogs	only	open	their	mouths	in	such	a	way	“in	times	of	extreme	distress,”	like	when	they	are	literally	within	the	clutches	of	death	(Sullivan).		Photographer	Jenn	Wei	has	documented	on	his	blog	this	surge	of	amazing	photographs	taking	place	in	Indonesia,	which	includes	images	of	“a	fire	ant	standing	on	one	leg,”	a	number	of	tree	frogs	holding	leaf	“umbrellas”	to	shield	themselves	from	rain,	African	land	snails	(not	native	to	Indonesia)	crossing	rivers	while	admiring	their	reflections,	a	red-eyed	tree	frog	(also	not	native	to	Indonesia)	giving	“the	fingers”	[sic],	and	a	number	of	other	extraordinarily	human-like	poses	typically	alien	to	(and	often	times	physically	impossible	for)	these	species	(Wei).	Even	chimps,	so	similar	to	humans	in	many	ways,	only	smile	when	they	are	nervous	(Sullivan).	Yet,	despite	the	fact	that	“these	photos	have	almost	certainly	been	staged,	
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and	have	almost	certainly	resulted	in	the	animal	being	distressed,	injured,	or	worse,”	the	images	sell	and	social	media	shares	climb	(Sullivan).		Another	result	of	this	economy	of	cute	is	what	Sullivan	refers	to	as	photography	farms.	These	farms	and	roadside	zoos	operate	solely	for	the	purpose	of	breeding	large	exotic	animals	like	bears	and	lions	for	commercial	photographers	who	require	images	of	“cute”	cubs	for	various	products	(Sullivan).	As	one	can	imagine,	the	animals	in	these	establishments	are	kept	as	cheaply	as	possible,	confined	to	small	cages	and	denied	adequate	medical	care.	When	photographers	do	request	these	animals	for	shoots,	the	photos	are	staged	to	make	it	appear	as	though	the	cubs	are	in	a	natural	environment.	But	cubs	do	not	stay	little	and	cute	forever.	Once	they	outgrow	their	commercial	purpose	in	photography,	the	adult	animals	often	find	themselves	as	a	new	type	of	commodity	in	places	like	the	lucrative	industry	of	canned	hunting	(Sullivan).	This	kind	of	“trophy	hunting”	of	exotic	animals	in	enclosed	areas	has	been	steadily	growing	in	places	like	South	Africa,	where	wealthy	Americans	and	Europeans	will	pay	a	hefty	price	(5-25	thousand	euros)	if	it	means	a	guaranteed	success	(Barkham).	In	the	case	of	photography	farms,	the	camera’s	metaphoric	“trigger”	used	to	“shoot”	its	subjects	eventually	becomes	a	reality.	In	Camera	Lucida,	Barthes	contemplates	the	palpable	death	within	photographic	frames:	“I	observe	with	horror	an	anterior	future	of	which	death	is	the	stake.	.	.	.	Whether	or	not	the	subject	is	already	dead,	every	photograph	is	this	catastrophe”	(96).	But	there	are	likely	no	punctums	to	be	found	in	the	staged	
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images	of	cute	baby	animals	printed	on	calendars	and	mugs.	The	real	“catastrophe”	entangled	in	these	photos	goes	unnoticed.		When	people	began	posing	for	“selfies”	with	starving	sea	lion	pups	on	the	California	coast	in	early	2015,	the	social	capital	of	cute	wild	animals	once	again	illuminated	our	ignorance	of	real	animal	lives.	The	New	York	Times	reports	on	this	desperate	situation	in	which	thousands	of	starving	sea	lion	pups	began	appearing	on	beaches,	wandering	from	their	homes	on	the	Channel	Islands	in	search	of	food.	While	2015	is	not	the	first	year	starving	pups	found	themselves	on	California	beaches,	the	number	has	significantly	escalated	with	rescuers	reporting	“five	times	more	sea	lion	rescues”	than	in	previous	years	(Healy).	Predictably,	this	results	in	more	encounters	with	humans	who	often	see	them	as	simply	cute	baby	animals:	“Some	people	offer	misguided	help	such	as	dousing	the	pups	with	water	or	trying	to	drag	them	back	into	the	ocean.	Others	take	selfies	with	the	stranded	animals,	pet	them	or	let	their	children	pretend	to	ride	them”	(Healy).	Family	pictures	of	children	riding	starving	sea	lion	pups	is	yet	another	case	of	animals	physically	surmounted	in	images.	As	reported	by	the	local	Los	Angeles	news	station	KTLA	5	News,	teenagers	were	also	seen	posing	with	the	dying	pups	for	prom	photos.	The	selfies,	however,	seem	to	be	nothing	compared	to	other	cruel	and	abusive	behaviors	rescuers	have	reportedly	witnessed	(Montoya).		Selfies	as	a	medium	through	which	we	depict	our	relationships	with	animals	is	an	interesting	phenomenon.	While	the	rhetoric	of	selfies	has	gotten	much	attention,	with	opinions	of	them	ranging	from	illustrations	of	systemic	narcissism	to	
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displays	of	self-confidence	in	young	girls	to	more	complex	assemblages	of	“the	intimate	self,	public	spaces,	locative	technology,	and	digital	social	networks”	(Hess	1630),	at	least	one	thing	would	seem	certain:	selfies	are	posed,	visual	performances	of	the	“I.”	The	spaces	and	people	captured	in	physical	relation	to	this	“I”	tell	a	shareable,	digital	story.	In	this	sense,	selfies	constitute	a	kind	of	visual	autobiography	in	which	our	worlds	and	perspectives	are	revealed.	In	the	case	of	the	dying	sea	lion	pups,	the	physical	proximity	of	these	animals	to	the	“I”	illustrates—rather	than	closeness	and	intimacy—a	distinct	self-distancing;	the	human	and	sea	lion	could	not	be	further	apart.	In	such	selfies,	the	“I”	is	completely	severed	from	Animal.		In	“Autozoography:	Notes	Toward	a	Rhetoricity	of	the	Living,”	Diane	Davis	explains	how	“autodeixis,	the	self-reflexive	power	of	the	‘I,’”	the	use	of	which	characterizes	the	selfie	genre,	is	yet	another	ability	that	has	been	presumed	to	cleanly	sever	human	from	animal,	especially	in	rhetorical	studies	(535).	Of	course,	this	self-reflexivity	presumes	an	ability	for	the	human	to	detach	herself	from	“nature,”	reflecting	as	an	ostensibly	objective	onlooker,	while	the	animal	is	entangled	in	an	inescapable	relationship	with	its	world.	Davis	uses	Bataille’s	metaphor	from	Theory	of	Religion	of	animals	as	being	“in	the	world	like	water	in	water”	to	illustrate	this	(Bataille	24).	This	human	objectivity	and	distancing	from	the	world	is	precisely	what	Barad	argues	against	with	examples	of	quantum	entanglement,	and	Davis	poses	a	similar	objection	from	within	continental	philosophy.	An	autobiography—the	writing	of	the	“I	am”—relies,	after	all,	on	a	
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representation	of	the	self	to	the	self:	“The	I	is	generated,	each	time,	in	the	gap	between	me	and	myself,	between	the	one	recognizing	and	the	one	recognized,	where	an	extrahuman	rhetorical	relation	plays	out”	(Davis	537).	The	argument	arises	from	Derrida:	“what	this	animal	is,	what	it	will	have	been,	what	it	would,	would	like	to,	or	could	be	is	perhaps	what	I	am	(following)”	(Derrida	33).	In	selfie	autobiographies,	an	instant	of	this	following	is	sedimented	in	the	photograph,	frozen	always	as	an	“I”	that	I	will	never	be	again:	the	animal	I	am	following	which	is	exposed	in	the	materiality	of	the	image.	Barthes	refers	to	this	paradoxical	capture	as	“an	anterior	future”	(96).	While	on	the	one	hand	these	sea	lion	selfies	reveal	the	stark	contrast	between	human	and	animal	so	palpable	in	visual	culture,	on	the	other,	they	also	reveal	the	human	as	the	rhetorically	entangled	humanimal,	despite	all	apparent	ignorance.	Sea	lion	selfies	also	reveal	a	sense	of	what	Emmelhainz	argues;	the	deluge	of	images	(of	which	selfies	are	an	unquestionable	part,	so	easily	taken	and	then	forgotten	or	discarded)	actually	makes	it	more	difficult	to	see	the	reality	of	our	detrimental	practices.	Assuming	most	sea	lion	selfie	photographers	are	simply	after	a	“cute”	picture	with	a	unique	and	wild	animal,	this	ignorance	of	our	hazardous	actions	is	implicitly	displayed	on	at	least	two	levels:	1)	ignorance	of	the	climate	change	that	causes	sea	lion	mothers	to	spend	prolonged	periods	of	time	searching	for	food,	during	which	time	starving	pups	wander	away	in	their	own	desperate	search,	and	2)	ignorance	of	the	distress	human	contact	and	physical	manipulation	can	cause	on	the	already	imperiled	pup	bodies.	The	overt	abuse	also	mentioned	in	
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news	stories,	in	which	“people	throw	rocks	at	the	sea	lions,	throw	soda	on	them,	poke	them	with	their	surfboards”	and	even	kick	them,	is	alarming	on	an	entirely	different	scale	(Morrison).	These	actions	are	arguably	what	arise	from	the	willful	ignorance	of	the	unique	and	separate	“I”	displayed	in	practices	like	sea	lion	selfie	photography.	These	selfies	are	the	images	printed	on	Berger’s	black	curtain.	Since	animals	are	constructed	within	a	representational	framework	as	wholly	other,	any	latent	desire	to	inflict	abuse	or	cruelty	on	someone	finds	a	more	acceptable	outlet	in	animals.	As	Akira	Lippit	suggests	in	Electric	Animal:	Toward	a	Rhetoric	of	Wildlife,	“Animals,	or	rather	images	of	animals,	mediate	the	violent	act.	.	.	Violating	the	image	of	the	animal	allows	one	to	exceed	the	permissible	limits	of	human	violence”	(181).		So	what	do	all	these	images—these	strange	ways	of	visualizing	animals—ultimately	amount	to?	How	do	we	move	forward?	Malamud’s	answer	to	whether	or	
how	humans	should	look	at	animals	is	that	“we	keep	our	‘ethical	caps’	always	on,	despite	the	certainty	that	our	perspectives	and	our	insights	are	incomplete”	(6).	These	“ethical	caps”	prompt	the	“simple	ethical	question”	for	Malamud:	“do	[cultural	representations]	do	more	good	than	harm?”	(6).	This	sounds	like	a	reasonable	question,	but	the	kind	of	utilitarian	accounting	therein	poses	undeniable	issues.	Some	examples	of	animals	in	visual	culture	offer	easy	answers,	as	when	Malamud	discusses	specific	animals	in	film:	the	horse	“forced	to	leap	to	his	death	from	the	top	of	a	cliff”	in	the	1939	film	Jesse	James	(71)	and	Topsy	the	circus	elephant	who	was	executed	via	electrocution	in	a	short	film	by	Thomas	Edison	(25).	Even	the	staged	commercial	photographs	of	animals	behaving	in	extraordinary	ways,	the	
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photography	farms	created	to	cater	to	exotic	animal	photographers,	and	the	sea	lion	selfies	offer	persuasive	examples	of	practices	that	cause	more	harm	than	good.	But	in	the	case	of	Muybridge’s	stop-motion	photography,	the	nyan	cat	bouncing	on	a	rainbow,	the	playful	languages	of	LOLcat	and	doge,	and	the	pets	posing	under	random	objects,	how	exactly	does	one	count	harm	vs.	good?	And	how	are	these	terms	defined?	Even	dead	animal	bodies—permanently	frozen	in	motion	by	the	art	of	taxidermy,	pinned	beneath	glass	on	an	entomologist’s	board,	posed	with	a	trophy	hunter—bring	to	the	fore	complicated	issues	in	our	relationships	with	animals,	issues	that	require	careful	and	nuanced	consideration.	Malamud’s	ethical	question	is	not	so	simple.	Without	a	nuanced	analysis	or	an	accounting	for	these	practices,	the	only	answer	to	our	humanimal-animal	dilemma	in	visual	culture	seems	to	be	to	not	
look	at	animals	at	all.	But	if	this	crime	of	representation	is	something	humans	have	been	committing	since	the	beginning	of	culture,	as	Malamud	suggests,	it	is	unlikely	to	cease	in	our	highly	visual	information	economy.	We	would	appear	to	be	at	an	impasse.	Malamud	does	find	examples	of	animals	that	seem	to	elude	representation	by	escaping	the	visual	frame,	receding	into	darkness,	and	becoming	blurred	in	movement.	These	examples,	including	photography	by	Britta	Jaschinski,	will	be	given	closer	attention	in	the	following	chapters	on	how	we	can	more	responsibly	engage	in	looking	with	animals	and,	by	doing	so,	even	extend	an	opportunity	for	animals	to	look	back.	Barad	and	other	new	materialists	have	also	inspired	
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performative	practices	with	animals	in	contemporary	art,	and	it	is	here	we	turn	next.		
What	Can	Contemporary	Art	Add?	Can	art	then	contribute	to	the	defining	of	new	and	multi-focal	perspectives	on	nature	and	the	animal	in	order	to	move	us	beyond	ourselves?		—Giovanni	Aloi	Art	&	Animals	xxi		Our	art-making	process	is	concerned	with	a	collaborative,	mutual	response	to	nature	at	its	most	primitive	and	wild.	.	.	When	possible	we	incorporate	the	track,	print,	spoor	or	bite	of	the	animal	in	our	work,	documenting	the	habitat	or	the	passing	of	a	creature	that	is	here	now	but	may	not	be	for	much	longer.	This	interaction	can	be	viewed	as	evidence	to	an	event,	a	form	of	primal	investigation;	a	physical	performance	of	the	senses.	—Olly	and	Suzi	“Artist’s	Statement”	In	the	preface	to	Giovanni	Aloi’s	Art	&	Animals,	Aloi	discusses	an	“unlearning”	that	must	take	place	in	order	for	us	to	undo	“old	habits”	of	how	we	regard	animals,	such	as	the	habits	of	looking	discussed	above.	Echoing	Barad’s	agential	realism,	Aloi	reflects	on	the	exigency	of	this	unlearning	of	“Animal”:	“.	.	.	now	more	than	ever	before,	finding	new	perspectives	from	which	to	understand	life	may	radically	change	who	we	are,	where	we	are	going	and	who	we	are	going	there	with,	for	global	warming,	environmental	decay	and	mass	extinction	are	all	clear	indices	of	the	
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wrongness	of	our	approaches”	(xxi).	Aloi	believes	contemporary	art	offers	examples	of	how	this	unlearning	can	move	forward	to	alternative	understandings	and	practices.	Media	theorist	and	Professor	Jussi	Parikka	seems	to	agree	and	suggests	that,	rather	than	simply	critical	analyses	of	current	practices,	“we	need	accounts	of	‘weird	materialities’	that	haunt	technical	media	culture,”	that	haunt	the	impossibilities	created	by	the	old	habits	of	looking	with	a	representational	framework	(Parikka).			 The	work	of	contemporary	artists	may	seem	an	unlikely	place	to	find	more	responsible	visual	animal	encounters.	Malamud	critiques	many	of	these	works	in	his	book,	including	the	“transgenic	art”	of	Eduardo	Kac’s	GFP	Bunny;	Nathalia	Edenmont’s	taxidermied	animal	heads;	and	several	of	Damien	Hirst’s	works,	including	his	well-known	“shark	floating	in	formaldehyde”	formally	titled	The	
Physical	Impossibility	of	Death	in	the	Mind	of	Someone	Living	(131).	There	are	a	number	of	other	unsettling	artworks	involving	animals,	the	most	unsettling	of	which	are	works	involving	real	animal	bodies.	Two	particularly	controversial	works	include	Marco	Evaristti’s	Helena—an	installation	piece	of	ten	goldfish	within	blenders,	fates	suspended	and	left	for	exhibition	visitors	to	decide—and	Kim	Jones’s	
Rat	Piece	(Baker	4-13).	Rat	Piece	was	a	one-time,	on-stage	performance	Jones	created	in	1976	in	which	he	ultimately	lit	three	caged	rats	on	fire	and	let	them	gradually	burn	to	death	in	front	of	an	audience.	He	stated	many	years	later	that	his	motivation	was	wanting	the	audience	to	“experience	the	smell	of	death”	(qtd.	in	Baker	5).		
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While	these	artworks	are	gruesome	and	“undoubtedly	paid	insufficient	attention	to	the	well-being	of	the	animals	they	used.	.	.	primarily	for	symbolic	purposes,”	artist	Steve	Baker	argues	that	these	particular	works	are	the	unfortunate	few	of	an	otherwise	overwhelmingly	insightful	trend	in	contemporary	art	toward	seriously	engaging	real	humanimal-animal	issues	(4).	Baker’s	stance	is	that	it	is	in	contemporary	art	that	we	can	find	the	creators	of	images	thoughtfully	entangled	in	their	media	and	in	the	philosophical	relations	they	wish	to	engage.	This	is	quite	the	contrast	to	the	cute	and	amusing	Internet	memes,	the	ignorantly	posed	selfies,	and	the	mass	exploitive	practices	arising	from	within	a	thoughtless	industry	of	animals	in	popular	visual	culture.	Contemporary	art	allows	one	to	draw	an	alternative	pharmakon	to	the	typical	viral	animal	image.		 Olly	and	Suzi	are	contemporary	artists	who	create	their	animal	paintings	and	drawings	on	location	collaboratively,	as	in	“hand	over	hand	on	the	same	painting	at	the	same	time”	(Olly	and	Suzi	“Artist’s	Statement”).	This	unique	co-performative	technique	subverts	the	creative	genius	of	a	single,	individual	artist.	Rather	than	using	animals	as	symbols	for	an	anthropocentric	meaning,	the	artists’	meaning	in	creating	these	works	is	to	trace	the	co-mingling	of	humanimal	and	animal	tracks	
Figure	11.	Artists	Olly	&	Suzi	seek	a	trace	of	
the	animals	they	witness	on	location.	
“Tiger”;	Web.	
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within	a	lived	time	and	space.	These	are	performances	of	art	that	leave	their	marks	on	the	page—never	to	be	retraced	or	relived:	“When	possible	we	incorporate	the	track,	print,	spoor	or	bite	of	the	animal	in	our	work,	documenting	the	habitat	or	the	passing	of	a	creature	that	is	here	now	but	may	not	be	for	much	longer”	(Olly	and	Suzi	“Artist’s	Statement”).	One	of	their	most	well-known	artworks	is	the	painting	of	a	Great	White	Shark	they	created	underwater	that	was	subsequently	bitten	by	that	same	shark.		As	Baker	points	out,	the	particular	materials	used	by	these	artists	matter	greatly	in	the	work	they	create	(26).	To	paint	sharks	underwater,	the	duo	“mounted	.	.	.	handmade	papers	onto	polystyrene	boards	and	used	non-toxic	water	based	paints,	graphite	and	oil	sticks”	(Olly	and	Suzi	“Ocean	Trip”).	This	illustrates	a	thoughtful	artistic	making	that	is	aware	of	the	particularities	of	lived	animal	beings	and	the	humanimal-animal	entanglements	of	worlds.	Olly	and	Suzi’s	works	also	have	a	primitive	and	unfinished	quality.	These	artists	work	from	the	energy	and	impressions	given	by	the	environment	and	animals	at	the	specific	time	of	the	drawing.	Rather	than	valuing	realism	and	therefore	capturing	the	entirety	of	an	animal’s	image	within	a	given	frame,	Olly	and	Suzi	allow	the	mysterious	and	unknown	animals	to	escape.	As	viewers	we	are	unable	to	completely	know	and	objectify	the	animal	by	looking.	While	Olly	and	Suzi	describe	their	artwork	as	“primarily	about	representation	and	symbolism,”	I	would	have	to	strongly	disagree—particularly	in	light	of	Barad’s	agential	realism	(“Artist’s	Statement”).	
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These	two	artists	epitomize	the	embodied,	material	entanglement	of	co-produced	lives	and	worlds.		Other	contemporary	artists	have	more	consciously	engaged	Barad’s	agential	realism	as	an	alternative	way	of	making	and	intra-acting	with	animals	and	worlds.	Two	special	issues	of	Antennae:	The	Journal	of	Nature	in	Visual	Culture	are	devoted	to	precisely	such	artworks.	In	“Toward	a	Performative	Multispecies	Aesthetics”	within	issue	31	of	this	dedicated	series,	artist	Madeleine	Boyd	discusses	her	2013	exhibition	Intra-action:	Multispecies	Becomings	in	the	Anthropocene,	which	featured	an	aggregate	of	artists	engaging	in	intra-action	artistic	practices:	The	exhibition	process	included	moving	through	scales,	temporalities,	species	and	geo-political	localities	as	well	as	the	agential	forces	of	matter,	the	materiality	of	ideas	and	bodies	merging	and	emerging	in	the	ongoing	process	of	becoming.	.	.	It	provided	a	space	in	which	intra-action	as	an	idea	had	permeated	through	the	boundaries	of	art	practice.	(9-10)	Boyd	marries	the	quantum	physics	of	Barad’s	agential	realism	with	the	“multispecies	ethnography”	of	Stephen	Helmreich	and	Eben	Kirksey—“multispecies”	being	a	term	that	refers	to	“the	breadth	of	life”	rather	than	simply	the	categories	of	human	and	animal	(14).	In	keeping	with	this	inclusive	“breadth	of	life,”	artworks	within	the	exhibition,	and	revisited	in	this	issue	of	Antennae,	include	a	video	installation	of	Australian	Goliath	stick	insects,	live	performative	interruptions	by	Lady	Godiva	and	Her	Horse,	the	live	interactive	assemblage	of	Ass	Milk	Soap,	and	other	multispecies	works	in	a	variety	of	media.	
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The	contemporary	artists	and	artworks	directly	and	performatively	engaging	Barad’s	agential	realism	offer	much	in	the	way	of	an	alternative	engagement	with	all	of	life.	However,	in	“Toward	a	Performative	Multispecies	Aesthetics,”	Boyde	advocates	an	abandonment	of	certain	visual	modes	of	creation,	citing	Cary	Wolfe’s	argument	that	the	visual	is	indiscriminately	anthropocentric	(17).	Boyd	adds	to	this	objection	of	anthropocentrism	“that	popular	visual	aesthetics	of	today	are	particularly	associated	with	visual	marketing	.	.	.	it	follows	then	that	some	forms	of	visual	media	are	also	complicit	with	capitalist	growth	economy	values,	and	so	inherently	undermine	non-human	species	justice”	(17).	Within	“some	forms	of	media”	to	be	excluded,	then,	falls	photography.	Although	I	do	not	disagree	with	the	overarching	argument	concerning	the	problems	with	these	visual	modes	(given	the	problematic	examples	studied	throughout	this	chapter),	it	seems	naïve	to	simply	leave	these	modes	behind,	especially	given	the	desire	of	new	materialism-inspired	artists	to	provoke	real	change	in	our	ontological	entanglements	with	multispecies	life.	If	these	changes	are	to	occur—if	different	configurations	of	the	world	are	to	arise	based	on	our	practices—they	cannot	be	relegated	to	the	purely	artistic	realm,	which	seems	to	be	where	the	primary	audience	for	Boyd’s	argument	resides.	On	the	contrary,	my	argument	is	that	it	is	precisely	because	of	this	popularity	of	modes	like	photography	for	creating	our	everyday	knowledges	and	autobiographical	accounts	of	the	world	that	new	photographic	practices	must	be	theorized	and	performed	by	the	average	person	outside	of	the	gallery	or	exhibition	space.	And	this	was	precisely	Wolfe’s	question:	what	does	art	add	to	our	everyday	understanding	of	the	
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detrimental	practices	we	engage	in?	Not:	what	should	art	take	away?	Baker	responds	to	Wolfe’s	question	by	stating	that	“art	doesn’t	bring	answers,	or	certainties,	or	‘information’	in	any	straightforward	sense,”	but	rather,	“art’s	role,	and	art’s	strength”	lies	in	“the	difficult	messy	middle	of	things”	where	these	questions—entangled	between	shores—are	materially	enfolded	(175,	his	emphasis;	179;	177).	Indeed,	what	is	needed	in	a	“Baradian”	sense	of	configuring	the	world	with	our	material-discursive	entanglements	is	an	unsettling	of	borders	and	identities	without	reaching	for	pretty	“certainties”	about	reality.	What	is	needed	is	process,	is	movement,	is	trusting	in	these	unclear	and	“messy”	becomings	that	leave	the	gallery	and	infect	everyday	practices.	What	is	needed	is	a	less	distinct	idea	of	categories	and	a	different	understanding	of	what	it	means	to	look.		 	
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CHAPTER	FOUR		HAUNTINGS		
	To	write	this,	the	memoir	of	your	body,	I	slip	my	arms	into	the	sleeves	of	your	shirt.	I	slip	my	arms	into	yours,	to	become	four-limbed.	Bhanu	Kapil	Humanimal	15		What	is	this	moment	called	when	we	suddenly	recognize	what	we	have	never	seen?	And	which	gives	us	a	joy	like	a	wound?	 Hélène	Cixous	Stigmata	33	Meadow	had	the	smallest	white	hairs	on	her	chin,	barely	perceptible	except	by	touch	or	by	the	seeing	that	comes	with	intimate	moments	of	living	with,	being	and	
Figure	12.	Photograph	of	author’s	dog.	“Memphis”;	print;	2014.	
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feeling-with,	another	being.	She	also	had	a	black	line	around	one	eye,	on	her	white	side,	deep	and	inconsistent	like	ink	that	soaks	into	paper.	This	inking	came	with	age;	when	she	was	a	puppy,	only	her	pink	new	skin	was	visible	around	this	eye—an	eye	that	had	seen	so	little	of	the	world	yet.	I	saw	Meadow,	and—based	on	a	lifetime	of	wordless	yet	seamless	interaction—I	can	only	assume	that	she	saw	me.	I	suppose	the	most	significant	part	of	this	assumption	is	not	that	it	is	true	but	that	I	felt	seen.	This	is	of	course	a	seeing	that	goes	beyond	a	mere	looking.	It	is	a	palpable	knowing	and	acknowledgement.	It	was	an	attunement	to	her	being,	and	these	small	visual	details—the	swirl	of	soft	white	fur	on	her	chest,	the	slender	and	fatty	parts	of	her	legs,	her	delicate	paws—became	especially	significant	following	her	death.	When	I	look	for	Meadow	in	images	now,	I	am	not	so	encumbered	as	Barthes	seeking	his	mother	in	photographs.	These	little	physical	details	exceed	the	flat	vision	I	use	to	see	them,	and	at	once	I	am	overwhelmed	by	her	physical	presence	in	the	room	with	me—her	animal	body—scratching,	turning,	and	eventually	settling	warm	against	my	memories.	They	are	brief,	if	painful,	recollections.			 Following	Chapter	3,	it	becomes	apparent	that	animals	in	visual	culture—while	seen	in	the	ordinary	sense—are	also	simultaneously	and	systematically	not	seen.	In	“A	Rhetorical	Look	at	Ecosee,”	Sean	Morey	points	out	that	“Even	images	that	present	animals	positively	still	portray	them	as	objects”	(42).	What	is	rendered	visible	as	animal,	whether	as	“happy	cat”	or	an	archetypal	“econ”	like	the	World	Wildlife	Fund	for	Nature’s	panda,	does	not	offer	an	authentic	sense	of	animals	as	beings	(Morey	33).	Nor	do	these	crude	animal	depictions	offer	a	sense	of	our	
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entangled	relation	with	them	as	their	onlookers	or	as	the	humanimals	sharing	in	what	Barad	calls	“the	extraordinary	liveliness	of	the	world”	(91).	These	animals	are	but	objects	grasped	by	human	eyes	across	a	staggering	ontological	divide.	In	contrast	to	the	grasping	look	that	apprehends	animals	in	so	much	of	visual	culture,	this	chapter	reaches—with	extended,	offering	hand—for	another	way	of	looking.	This	reaching	implicates	the	enfolding	epistemological	and	ontological	contours	of	the	body,	the	darkness	and	movement	of	these	folds	of	organic	becoming,	and	the	material	death	in	which	we	all	share,	which,	Michelle	Ballif	argues,	is	necessary	for	any	rhetorical	(therefore	ethical)	relation.			 First	I	wish	to	consider	more	closely	the	looking	relation	experienced	in	the	presence	of	physical	manifestations	of	other	beings—as	with	Meadow	living,	breathing	next	to	me—and	also	with	those	traces—those	hauntings,	if	you	will—from	images.	Domestic	animals	are	certainly	an	appropriate	starting	place.	As	Berger	notes	decades	ago:	animals	have	stopped	returning	our	look	in	most	other	relations.	While	wild	animals	and	livestock	are	now	systematically	severed	from	everyday	human	lives	(and	here	I	am	speaking	in	a	very	Western	sense)	domestic	animals	are	unique	in	their	proximity	and	therefore	ability	to	return	the	look.	This	explains	the	proliferation	of	strange	Internet	cat	and	dog	memes	as	well,	as	I	argue	in	Chapter	3.	As	Jacques	Derrida	has	famously	made	apparent	in	his	musings	of	being	naked	in	front	of	his	cat,	domestic	(nonhuman)	animals	are	now	the	animals	that	return	our	look.	It	is	especially	notable,	then,	when	stories	of	wild	animals	looking	back	do	indeed	surface.				
Captain	Paul	Watson	In	the	quest	for	a	more	ontologically	entangled	looking	relation	with	animals—a	looking	that	is	not	the	systemic	grasping,	objectifying	looking	of	visual	culture—Martin	Heidegger’s	Parmenides	offers	an	important	unfolding1.	For	Heidegger,	in	returning	to	the	Greek	translations	of	words	that	structure	our	ways	of	knowing	and	being	in	and	with	the	world,	looking	is	especially	significant	as	one	of	the	ways	of	being	of	Aletheia.	Aletheia,	literally	“not-covered-over-ness,”	is	the	divine	revealing	of	truth	and	being.	Or	rather,	Aletheia	is	truth,	and	looking—as	one	of	Aletheia’s	ways	of	being—unconceals	or	unveils	otherwise	hidden	or	covered	truth	and	being.	This	is	significant	in	our	consideration	of	animals	in	visual	culture	particularly	because	Heidegger’s	project	is	concerned	with	overcoming	the	subject-object	relation	that	structures	“modern”	(that	is	post-	pre-Socratic	Greek)	thinking	and	entails	a	more	profound	phenomenological	consideration	of	being	
Figure	13.	Photograph	of	a	zoo	elephant.	through	looking:	“Thinking	as	moderns	and	 Britta	Jaschinski;	Web.
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Shining-Into	I	could	barely	speak,	the	look	in	that	whale’s	eye	was	haunting.	He	knew,	he	was	aware,	it	was	so	plain	to	see.	.	.	
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therefore	insufficiently,	but	for	us	surely	more	understandably,	we	can	say	in	short:	the	look	is	not	looking	as	activity	and	act	of	the	‘subject’	but	is	sight	as	the	emerging	of	the	‘object’	and	its	coming	to	our	encounter”	(103).	Nothing	short	of	the	very	essence	of	a	person’s	being,	“as	the	sum	of	his	(sic)	existence,”	is	gathered	in	what	Heidegger	calls	this	“encountering,”	“self-showing”	look.		In	“Heidegger,	Captain	Paul	Watson,	and	the	Look	of	Leviathan,”	Luanne	Frank	helps	explain	the	significance	of	looking	and	being	in	Heidegger’s	difficult	articulations	within	his	Parmenides.	Heidegger	makes	it	clear	that	this	profound	looking	relation	does	not	exist	within	a	representational	understanding	of	reality	in	which	“man	experiences	looking	only	in	terms	of	himself	and	understands	looking	precisely	‘out	of	himself’	as	Ego	and	subject”	and	in	which	“man	turns	toward	beings	as	‘objects’	and	grasps	them”	(Heidegger	103).	Thus	does	the	common	phrase,	“looking	at,”	become	an	issue,	as	Frank	explains:	“Looking	at”	carries	with	it	undertones	of	a	subject-object,	rather	than	a	reciprocal,	way	of	relating	to	the	other.	Automatically	objectifying	the	other,	it	registers	a	way	of	Being	by	way	of	which	metaphysics	is	accustomed	to	speaking	of	and	understanding	the	nature	of	its	looking.	Thus	does	one	come	to	understand	and	appreciate	Heidegger’s	much-used	“looking	into”	and	“shining	into”	as	more	adequately	descriptive	locutions,	however	strange	they	might	at	first	seem,	for	a	certain	sort	of	looking.	(595,	her	emphasis)	(To	this	“reciprocal	way	of	relating	to	the	other”	I	would	also	emphasize	Barad’s	entangled	metaphysics,	to	which	we	will	return).	Looking	can	be	the	gift	of	“shining	
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into”	rather	than	the	taking	or	grasping	looking	at,	and	it	is	an	act	performed	by	being	itself:	“Being,	Heidegger	says	here,	by	looking	and	shining	into	beings,	delivers	
itself	to	and	into	them,	gives	them,	or	suffuses	them	with,	Being”	(591,	her	emphasis).	This	giving	of	being	is	performed	by	Greek	deities	as	well	as	humans	in	what	Heidegger	calls	an	“encountering	look,”	or	a	looking	that	encounters	being	as	it	emerges	unconcealed.	As	a	foreshadowing	of	the	potential	importance	this	encountering	look	might	play	in	relation	to	animals,	Frank	closely	examines	the	three	instances	in	which	Heidegger	describes	this	special	human	encountering	look.	In	the	first	instance	Heidegger	describes	the	encountering	look	as:	a	look	that,	not	imposing	itself	on	the	one	looked	at	(the	other),	instead	extends	itself	to	the	other	and	both	awaits	the	other	as	such	(as	it	were,	expectantly	letting	the	other	be)	and	awaits	in	return	a	reciprocal	look	from	the	other—whereupon,	when	that	answering	look	is	extended,	both	parties	“are.”	Receipt	of	the	encountering	look	permits	its	recipient	to	show	up,	and	the	initiator’s	receipt	of	the	reciprocal	look,	in	return,	issues	in	his	[sic]	own	being	uncovered.	(592,	her	emphasis)	This	encountering	look	is	one	that	is	extended	to	rather	than	imposed	upon.	It	is	a	giving,	patient	look—awaiting	a	reciprocity	from	the	other	that	may	not	ever	come—that	simultaneously	allows	the	other	its	ownmost	being:	“Receipt	of	the	encountering	look	permits	its	recipient	to	show	up”	(592).		The	giving	extension	of	the	look	here	is	what	will	become	most	relevant	in	any	animal	encounter—not	necessarily	because	animals	cannot	return	this	look,	but	
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because	we	cannot	know	if	this	reciprocity	is	necessarily	extended	by	animals	and	animals	cannot	extend	a	reciprocal	look	when	their	being	looked	at	takes	place	in	visual	culture	(Can	it?	To	this	I	will	return).	The	importance	of	this	reciprocity	is	itself	questionable.	As	Frank	explains,	in	the	second	instance	in	which	Heidegger	discusses	the	encountering	look,	he	does	so	entirely	from	the	initiator’s	perspective:	“In	this	description,	Heidegger	does	not	specify	the	reciprocating	look	as	necessary	to	the	encountering	person’s,	the	initiator’s,	coming	to	be”	(593).	Indeed,	Heidegger’s	explanation	of	the	initiator’s	looking	as	“self,”	as	“essence,”	and	as	“existence”	seems	profound	and	complete	enough	on	its	own	without	any	reciprocating	look:		Looking	is	self-showing	and	indeed	that	self-showing	in	which	the	essence	of	the	encountering	person	has	gathered	itself	and	in	which	the	encountering	person	“emerges”	in	the	double	sense	that	his	essence	is	collected	in	the	look,	as	the	sum	of	his	existence,	and	that	this	collectedness	and	simple	totality	of	his	essence	opens	itself	to	the	look.	.	.	(Heidegger	103)	What	are	we	then	to	make	of	the	necessity	of	the	reciprocating	look	or	the	weight	of	its	effect	for	either	being’s	being	involved	in	the	(awaited)	exchange?	Frank	questions:	Does	Heidegger	take	the	sending	of	the	reciprocal	look	for	granted	here	in	his	second	languaging	of	the	encountering	look,	or	does	he	rather,	at	least	for	the	moment	of	this	brief	account,	regard	the	encountering	look	that	“awaits	the	other”	(and	in	so	doing	presumably	allows	the	other	its	ownmost	ownness)	
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as	already	enough	to	grant	both	persons	Being?	We	cannot	finally	know.	(593,	my	emphasis)	Heidegger’s	third	account	of	this	encountering	look	suggests	the	importance	he	places	on	this	reciprocity,	though	it	is	still	not	clear	what	we	would	make	of	such	a	look	that	is	not	reciprocated.	As	Frank	notes,	a	look	such	as	this	encountering	look	would	ideally	be	returned	(593).	But	what	of	the	absence	of	such	a	reciprocating	look?	The	encountering	look	is	still	extended,	or	“granted,”	as	a	collection	and	opening	of	the	initiator’s	“totality”	of	existence.	.	.	awaiting	return.	As	one	of	what	will	appear	to	be	many	departures	from	Heidegger,	I	wish	to	suggest	looking	through	another	lens—a	diffractive	lens,	perhaps,	that	“involves	reading	insights	through	one	another	in	ways	that	help	illuminate	differences	as	they	emerge”	and	the	productive	patterns	thus	created	(Barad	30)—to	consider	whether	the	initiating	look	could	be	considered	enough	“to	grant	both	persons	Being”	without	its	reciprocation.	In	this	case,	the	insights	read	across	each	other	in	an	attempt	to	distinguish	potential	superpositions	and	emerging	patterns	that	arise	from	Heidegger,	Frank,	and	Barad.		 As	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	Barad	explains	that	material-discursive	practices	such	as	looking	create	agential	cuts	in	the	world,	constructing	reality	rather	than	simply	describing	it.	In	discussing	the	limits	of	vision	in	determining	bodily	boundaries,	Barad	states	that	“objects	are	not	already	there;	they	emerge	through	specific	practices”	(157).	These	practices	create	what	Barad	refers	to	as	“the	primary	ontological	unit”	of	phenomena.	Phenomena	are	“the	ontological	
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inseparability	of	intra-acting	‘agencies’”—literally	entangled	being	that	makes	separation	of	discrete	bodies,	objects,	or	beings	from	this	phenomenon	or	ontological	unit	impossible	(333).	Indeed,	it	is	only	“through	specific	agential	intra-actions	that	the	boundaries	and	properties	of	the	‘components’	of	phenomena	become	determinate	and	that	particular	material	articulations	of	the	world	become	meaningful”	(333).	Beings	come	to	be	within	phenomena.	Beings	come	to	be	within	agential	cuts	of	reality—within	practices	of	looking,	for	our	purposes.	This	implicates	the	encountering	person,	or	the	one	initiating	the	encountering	look,	as	always	already	entangled	in	the	emergent	being	of	the	other.	Furthermore,	precisely	as	Heidegger	explains	regarding	the	specific	type	of	“shining	into”	of	being,	the	particularities	of	this	looking—the	gathering	together	of	essence	in	the	initiator’s	look—set	the	terms	for	how	this	reality	is	constructed.	This	encountering	look,	is,	in	Barad’s	terms,	the	measuring	apparatus	that	constructs	reality,	which	supports	the	tacit	implication	in	Parmenides	that	the	reciprocated	look	is	a	given	(and,	as	Frank	remarks,	such	a	looking	would	ideally	be	returned),	for	these	actions—the	initiating	and	reciprocating	look—are	not	discrete	nor	linear:	they	are	mutually	entangled	in	space,	time,	and	being.	Therefore,	the	implicit	patience	in	a	look	awaiting	reciprocation	is	lifted	of	significance.	Indeed,	such	a	patience	in	this	looking	would	be	perfect	in	its	formulation.	It	needs	no	reciprocation,	because	it	already	is,	and	in	its	entanglement	with	the	other,	implicates—grants—both	its	own	and	the	other’s	being.	In	existing	as	a	look	that	has	gathered	together	the	totality	of	a	person’s	
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existence,	opened	within	the	looking	gift	for	another	being,	it	always	already	is	its	own	unconcealing	of	being.		As	discussed	in	Chapter	1,	Barad’s	agential	realism	and	the	constitutive	nature	of	practices	like	looking	strongly	implicate	the	ethical	responsibility	such	looking	entails.	To	repeat	a	significant	quote	in	Barad:	Ethicality	is	part	of	the	fabric	of	the	world.	.	.	Questions	of	responsibility	and	accountability	present	themselves	with	every	possibility;	each	moment	is	alive	with	different	possibilities	for	the	world’s	becoming	and	different	reconfigurings	of	what	may	yet	be	possible.	(182)	 	Manifesting	an	encountering	look	for	animals	in	visual	culture	that	grants	them	their	ownmost	being	is	significant,	for	“each	moment	is	alive”	with	the	possibilities	of	becoming.	It	is	not	surprising,	then,	that	Frank	considers	the	profound	looking	described	by	Heidegger	in	relation	to	an	event	of	ethical	concern	for	animals.		In	Frank’s	article,	the	specific	encounter	considered	in	relation	to	Heidegger’s	encountering	look	is	that	of	Greenpeace	co-founder	Paul	Watson	and	a	harpooned	male	sperm	whale.	On	this	day	in	1975	Watson	was	engaged	with	fellow	activists	Bob	Hunter,	George	Korotva,	Rex	Weyler,	and	Fred	Easton	in	an	attempt	to	intercept	a	Soviet	whaling	vessel	off	the	California	coast.	Watson	and	Easton	manage	to	position	themselves	in	the	line	of	fire	while	attempting	photographic	documentation	of	their	confrontation.	While	thusly	engaged,	the	Soviet	fleet	harpooned	a	female	sperm	whale,	causing	her	mate	to	rush	toward	her	and	the	whaling	vessel.	After	being	harpooned	himself,	the	male	sperm	whale	appears	to	aggressively	advance	
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upon	the	Zodiac	carrying	the	two	men—which	would	clearly	not	have	survived	such	an	encounter—when	the	whale	suddenly	pulls	back	and	seems	to	take	notice	of	the	men:	 His	eye	fell	upon	Fred	and	me,	two	tiny	men	in	a	rubber	raft,	and	looked	at	us.	It	was.	.	.	a	gentle,	knowing,	forgiving	gaze.	Slowly.	.	.	he	settled	into	the	quietly	lapping	waves.	I	had	one	more	glimpse	of	that	gazing	eye,	and	then	he	was	gone	from	our	world.	What	had	I	seen?	Was	it	understanding?	We	wept.	(Watson	qtd.	in	Frank	599-600)	Of	particular	importance	in	reading	this	specific	encounter	against	Heidegger’s	encountering	look	are	two	points.	First,	this	experience—this	look	given	and	exchanged—is	described	by	Watson	as	having	a	life-altering	effect	on	his	being	as	well	as	the	trajectory	of	his	life’s	work.	Second,	while	Watson	was	already	engaged	in	environmental	activism,	he	was	similarly	extended	in	several	other	activist	outlets.	It	was	only	after	this	encounter	that	Watson	focused	his	efforts	on	marine	life	(Frank	599).	It	seems	a	profound	unconcealing	is	what	occurred	that	day,	revealing	for	Watson	a	deep	personal	truth:	“What	I	saw	in	his	eye	as	he	looked	at	me	would	change	my	life	forever”	(qtd.	in	Frank	601).		Is	it	important	to	know	here	whether	Watson’s	experience,	his	“showing	up,”	was	somehow	consistent	with	the	whale’s	experience?	We	cannot	know	definitively,	of	course,	what	the	whale	experienced	in	giving	that	seemingly	“forgiving	gaze.”	Frank	reminds	us	of	new	research	on	spindle	neurons	in	whales	that	suggests	complex	social	organization,	language,	and	emotion,	among	other	sophisticated	
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capacities	(584-585).	As	argued	in	Chapter	2	of	this	dissertation,	such	insights	are	significant	in	both	understanding	our	rhetorical	becomings	and	our	perceptions/conceptions	of	animals.	However,	Frank	does	not	believe,	and	I	would	concur,	that	(not)	knowing	what	the	whale	experienced	that	day—whether	he	was	similarly	changed	or	unconcealed	in	some	way—matters	in	terms	of	the	argument	for	this	encountering	look.	Frank	persuasively	argues	for	“a	cross-species	analogue	of	what	Heidegger	describes	as	the	encountering	look	between	humans”	(601).	What	Watson	describes	in	this	looking	relation	is	clearly,	without	any	doubt,	an	event	in	which	his	being	is	unconcealed	in	its	intimate	entanglement	with	this	harpooned	whale.	This	looking	relation,	perhaps	initiated	by	Watson	and	Easton	that	day	when	they	boarded	the	Zodiac	with	a	specific	purpose	of	intercepting	the	whaling	fleet,	created	a	manifestation	of	reality	in	which	the	whale	looked	at/into	them,	shining	into	them	with	perceived	being,	and	now	continues	to	live	enfolded	in	the	life	commitment	Watson	has	made	to	environmental	activism.		Since	establishing	the	Sea	Shepherd	Conservation	Society	in	1977,	Watson	has	now	“been	at	the	helm	of	over	225	ocean-going	expeditions,”	received	a	number	of	awards	for	his	extraordinary	service,	including	Time	Magazine’s	“Heroes	of	the	Planet”	and	“Daily	Points	of	Light”	Award	from	President	George	H.W.	Bush,	and	saved	countless	lives	at	sea	through	direct	action	campaigns	(“Captain”).	Since	the	reciprocating	look	is	arguably	unnecessary	for	the	profound	“Being-uncovering”/“Being-enabling”	phenomenon	to	occur,	I	wish	to	further	argue	that	the	encountering	look	can	be	extended	from	Frank’s	plausible	realm	of	
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human/animal	manifestations—already	radically	divergent	from	Heidegger’s	original	formulation—into	the	even	more	radically	divergent	realm	of	visual	culture.	Given	Barad’s	agential	realist	account	of	how	meaning	and	reality	are	created	with	“specific	material	performances	of	the	world”	(335),	it	is	clear	that	nothing	short	of	real	(hum)animal	beings	are	at	stake	in	the	type	of	looking	extended	to/entangling	with	animals	in	visual	culture.	These	are	not	merely	visual	representations	of	animals	in	question—they	are	very	real	creations	of	meaning	and	manifestations	of	world	that	intimately	entangle	us	and	animals	in	our	co-beings	and	becomings.	
	
The	Dead	and	Dying	Eye	
		 Figure	14.	Photograph	of	three	bucks	who	became	entangled	during	a	mating	competition	and	subsequently	drowned.	Steven	Hill;	“Triple	Tragedy”;	Field	&	Stream;	Web.	
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And	everything	that	we	inscribe	in	the	living	present	of	our	relation	to	others	already	carries,	always,	the	signature	of	memoirs-from-beyond-the-grave.	Jacques	Derrida	Memoires:	For	Paul	de	Man	28		Alive	I	die	piece	by	piece,	I	die	several	deaths	before	my	own	death.	.	.	For	this	is	the	mystery	of	my	body	that	stretches	out	beyond	my	body,	my	body	at	the	mercy	of	your	body.	 Helen	Cixous	Stigmata	81	 	In	moving	the	encountering	look	into	visual	media,	there	are	two	important	points	to	consider/question	that	require	careful	return	to	Frank’s	article	(we	return	here	rather	than	to	Heidegger,	for	Frank	has	granted	us	the	plausibility	of	this	cross-species	exchange):	the	importance	of	visibility	(/invisibility)	and	the	importance	of	death	(/birth).	Each	of	these	terms	is	complex	in	its	own	enfoldings	and	is	mutually	entangled	with	the	other.	It	is	with	this	mutual	entanglement	the	rest	of	this	chapter	will	unfold.			 If	we	return	to	Frank’s	article,	it	becomes	apparent	that	perhaps	the	key	feature	in	this	story’s	significance	and	what	grants	it	the	plausibility	of	Heidegger’s	encountering	look	is	impending	death.	To	be	sure,	the	very	reason	that	Watson	and	Easton	set	out	on	their	voyage,	for	which	Frank	attributes	their	apparent	look	of	Care	toward	the	whale,	is	to	intercept	this	harpooning	on	the	part	of	the	whales’	lives.	This,	according	to	Frank,	is	the	initiating	look	extended	to	the	whales—an	initiating	look	that	apparently	(though	not	necessarily)	“made	the	circuit	Heidegger	
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describes”	(602)	when	the	whale	returns	their	look:	“Cold	salt	water	and	steaming	blood	poured	down	onto	us	as	I	saw	[his]	eye	appear	before	me,	so	close	I	could	see	my	own	reflection	and	it	was	at	that	point	that	something	happened	and	my	life	was	never	the	same	again”	(Watson).	Again,	let	us	take	note,	it	is	not	simply	a	look	from	the	whale	that	allegedly	completes	the	circuit;	it	is,	rather,	the	look	with	which,	and	with	apparent	acknowledgement,	the	whale	pulls	back	and	“saves”	the	men	from	an	otherwise	watery	grave	that	he	cannot	himself	escape:		…	and	suddenly	I	saw	an	incredible	effort	by	the	whale	to	halt	his	assault	on	us	as	his	muscles	clenched	and	the	angle	of	his	body	changed	so	that	he	began	to	sink	back	into	the	sea	alongside	us	rather	than	to	crush	us	beneath	him.	I	saw	his	eye	sink	into	the	deep	blue	of	the	sea	and	disappear	and	I	knew	that	I	was	the	last	thing	he	saw	before	he	died.	(Watson)		The	“shining	into”	and	gift	of	being	exchanged	with	animals,	then,	seems	to	be	this	mutual	acknowledgement	of	the	value	of	life—something	in	which	we	all	share.	Death,	defined	as	it	typically	is	in	the	negative	against	life,	is	what	initiates	the	encountering	look	that	grants	Being	to	both	the	men	and	the	whale	that	day	in	19752.	But	perhaps	it	is	what	happens	between	these	two	terms—life	and	death—that	constitutes	the	entanglement	of	being	in	this	looking	relation.	What	happens	when	we	plunge	into	the	dark,	unseen	depths	of	the	ocean’s	abyss,	an	abyss	that	presumably	delineates	terms	like	life	and	death	as	well	as	human	and	animal?	In	“Whale	Fall,”	Rebecca	Giggs	allows	us	to	imagine	such	a	plunge	by	following	the	death—the	fall—of	a	whale	in	the	ocean.	Giggs	recalls	a	malnourished	
		 119	
humpback	whale	washing	up	on	the	Western	Australian	coast	and	the	inner	conflict	locals	endure	during	its	slow,	impending	death	while	“the	whale’s	billiard-ball	eyes	tumbled	in	its	head	and	its	breathing	sounded	laboured.	.	.	still	intensely	alive	and	tormented.”	This	beached	whale,	arriving	as	a	reminder	of	mysterious	depths,	faces	quite	a	different	death	than	those	that	perish	“very	far	out	to	sea.”	As	Giggs	explains,	whales	that	die	in	the	ocean:	.	.	.simultaneously	decay	as	they	sink;	they	are	continuously	pecked	at	by	fish,	swimming	crabs,	amphipods	and	sharks	attracted	to	the	carcass.	It	takes	a	long	time.	Weeks,	months.	…	It	drifts	past	fish	that	no	longer	look	like	anything	we	might	call	fish,	but	bottled	fireworks,	reticulated	rigging	and	musical	instruments	turned	inside	out.	The	whale	enters	the	abyssopelagic	zone.	No	light	has	ever	shone	here,	for	so	long	as	the	world	has	had	water.	(Giggs)	This	fall	into	the	abyss	is	long,	cold,	and	dark.	The	whale	body	penetrates	where	light	cannot.	This	fall	is	not	something	that	can	be	seen	with	human	eyes,	it	must	be	
felt	with	the	animal	body.	And	with	the	whale	fall	thrives	life:	Then	[the	whale	skeleton]	drops,	falls	quickly	to	the	sea	floor,	into	the	plush	cemetery	of	the	worms.	…	Rat-tails,	devouring	snails	and	more	polychaetes	appear.	The	bones	are	stripped	and	then	fluff	up	with	silver-white	bacteria,	so	that	it	appears	as	if	the	skeleton	is	draped	in	metres	of	downy	towelling.	Years	may	pass,	decades	even,	before	there	is	nothing	left	except	a	dent	that	holds	the	dark	darker.	(Giggs)	
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The	whale	fall	into	abyssal	depths	is	emblematic	of	the	movement	and	entanglement	between	terms	that	have	no	real	grounding.	With	every	encountering	look	of	entangled	“self-showing”	and	“shining	into”	of	being,	initiated,	perhaps,	by	threat	of	death	and	the	tacit	acknowledgment	of	our	mutual	complex	enfoldings,	is	this	whale	fall—this	haunting	trace	of	what	sustains	us	all	with	the	complex,	entangled	matrix	of	life	and	yet	is	otherwise	hidden.			 Giggs’	whale	fall	also	complicates	the	typical	binary	set	up	between	life	and	death.	As	indicated	in	Chapter	2,	there	is	no	simple	relation	between	these	two	terms.	Instead,	we	(do	not)	see	fish,	worms,	snails,	and	other	forms	of	life	depending	upon	and	thriving	from	the	falling	skeletal	remains	of	a	massive	marine	mammal.	Life	and	death	are	not	at	odds	in	this	real	biological	entanglement	in	the	ocean’s	dark	abyss;	rather,	life	encompasses,	feeds	on,	is	manifested	in	death.	Biological	life	does	not	end	in	any	real	sense:	to	talk	of	it	ending	is	to	deny	knowledge	of	the	whale	fall	and	the	porous	outpouring	of	individual	boundaries	into	the	sea	of	being.	Perhaps,	as	we	shall	see	further,	life	is	merely	(both	merely	and	profoundly—
grandly)	punctuated	by	deaths	and	births	as	they	spiral	over	and	enfold	one	another.		 The	dead	or	dying	eye	of	animals	and	visual	culture,	when	death	is	conceived	as	at	odds	with	life,	cannot	return	Heidegger’s	look.	But	when	life	encompasses	and	enfolds,	is	punctuated	by,	death—can	that	life	be	breathed	into	a	look	such	that	it	can	“grant	both	persons	being”—creating	spectres	of	the	dead?	In	addition	to	the	hypothetical	whale	fall	in	the	ocean,	Giggs	describes	with	exquisite,	heart-wrenching	
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beauty	the	slow	death	of	one	whale	on	land.	Although	she	mentions	the	whale’s	eyes	twice,	this	encounter	is	quite	obviously	not	one	that	“completes	Heidegger’s	circuit”	with	a	reciprocating,	granting	look	as	originally	conceived	by	Heidegger	(Frank	605).	The	whale	is	in	far	too	much	agony	to	offer	any	sense	of	inner-awakening,	though	the	author	(and	one	can	imagine	others	in	the	group	sleeping	overnight	on	the	dunes)	seems	profoundly	changed:	“I	hovered	as	near	as	I	was	able	to,	speaking	sometimes	to	the	whale’s	blowhole.	What	felt	important	in	that	moment	was	the	act	of	seeing	this	through	to	the	end,	of	agreeing	not	to	leave	the	whale	alone.	Kinship,	I	guess,	is	what	we	proffered”	(Giggs).	Is	this	less	a	self-showing	or	even	a	being-enabling	look	because	the	whale,	in	its	agony,	cannot	satisfactorily	return	the	look?	On	the	contrary,	it	seems	as	if	the	whale’s	unconcealing,	and	even	the	gathering	together	of	the	totality	of	its	essence	and	existence,	occurs	intensely	over	the	three-day	course	of	its	death,	with	which	many	others	intimately	concern	themselves.	There	is	something	particularly	jarring	about	starving	marine	animals	washing	up	on	land,	bringing	their	abyssal	depths	with	them.	After	all,	our	own	evolution	was	dependent	upon	this	same	journey	out	of	the	ocean	(now	we	keep	this	water	folded	within3).	And	each	of	us,	individually,	is	born	from	unseen	waters—enfolding	and	emerging	as	we	must,	nascent	life-within-life.	So	it	is	that	
life-as-birth	is	expected	to	emerge	from	water	rather	than	this	slow	and	suffering,	apparent	miscarriage	spewed	from	a	mysterious	beyond.	Marine	animals	on	land	are	a	threat	to	the	boundaries	we	create	between	categories	like	human	and	animal,	mother	and	child,	life	and	death	that	are	secured	by	dark,	abyssal	depths	and	the	
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crypts/wombs	within.	When	these	depths	open	to	expose	our	mutual	entanglements,	it	is	as	if	life	were	initiating	its	own	look,	and	in	encountering	the	starving	whales	and	sea	lions	we	are,	in	fact,	encountering	being	in	which	we	are	intimately	a	part.	(That	is,	of	course,	if	we	show	up.	The	selfies	and	exploitations	of	these	deaths	prove	such	an	encountering	look	is	not	one	shared	by	all).		It	would	seem	plausible	then,	given	Giggs’s	account	and	accounts	of	others	who	witness	death	and	dying	and	emerge	forever	transformed	by	the	spectres	thus	created,	that	the	material	entanglement	of	an	initiating	look	might	also	create	the	haunting	trace	of	a	whale	fall	within	visual	culture—in	which	the	dead	or	dying	eye/body	cannot	return	the	look	despite	its	presence—and	grant	the	observer	being.	In	fact,	I	would	suggest	that	such	a	look	is	the	only	hope	for	ethical	entanglements	in	visual	culture:	these	are	the	looks	that	offer	more	than	simply	what	is	visible.	These	are	looks,	rather,	that	hint	at	the	darkness	and	complexity	in	the	whale	fall	below—offering	an	alternative	to	representational	frameworks	of	knowledge4.		Roland	Barthes	suggests	a	similar	underlying	complexity	of	the	visible	in	his	formulation	of	the	punctum	in	photography.	For	Barthes,	the	idea	of	punctum—theorized	in	the	wake	of	his	mother’s	death	and	just	prior	to	his	own—is	quite	a	transformation	from	his	previous	texts	like	Mythologies	and	“Rhetoric	of	the	Image,”	in	which	structural	analysis	is	used,	according	to	Michael	Halley	in	“Argo	Sum,”	as	“an	intermediary	buffer	between	himself	and	the	objects	of	his	attention”	(72).	This	distance	between	the	self	and	objects	looked	upon	in	photography	is	characteristic	
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of	the	ordinary	grasping	we	aim	to	move	beyond.	In	Camera	Lucida	we	see	this	difference	articulated	in	the	studium	and	punctum.	As	Elissa	Marder	points	out	in	
The	Mother	in	the	Age	of	Mechanical	Reproduction:	Psychoanalysis,	Photography,	
Deconstruction,	it	is	noteworthy	that	Barthes	uses	a	“dead”	language	like	Latin	to	derive	the	terms	that	breathe	(his	[mother’s])	life	into	photography	(154).	As	many	are	no	doubt	familiar,	studium	is	that	meaning	that	can	be	culturally	derived	from	a	photograph.	Punctum,	however,	has	a	personal,	intimate	quality	that	pierces	the	observer	in	a	very	physical,	potentially	transformative	way:	“it	is	this	element	which	rises	from	the	scene,	shoots	out	of	it	like	an	arrow,	and	pierces	me”	(Barthes	26).	In	further	investigating	this	physical	effect	achieved	by	the	punctum,	Barthes	attributes	it	to	photography’s	likeness	to	theater	“by	way	of	Death”:	We	know	the	original	relation	of	the	theater	and	the	cult	of	the	Dead:	the	first	actors	separated	themselves	from	the	community	by	playing	the	role	of	the	Dead:	to	make	oneself	up	was	to	designate	oneself	as	a	body	simultaneously	living	and	dead.	.	.	Now	it	is	the	same	relation	which	I	find	in	the	Photograph;	however	“lifelike”	we	strive	to	make	it	(and	this	frenzy	to	be	lifelike	can	only	be	our	mythical	denial	of	the	apprehension	of	death),	Photography	is	a	kind	of	primitive	theater,	a	kind	of	Tableau	Vivant,	a	figuration	of	the	motionless	and	made-up	face	beneath	which	we	see	the	dead.	(31-32)	In	Barthes’s	hands,	photography	becomes	a	passage	for	bodies	“simultaneously	living	and	dead.”	Photographs	are	hauntings:	a	medium	through	which	to	conjure:	Cixous’s	“tomb-cradle”	(Stigmata	xiv).	John	Berger	likewise	notes	this	mysterious	
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conjuring	ability	of	photography	in	which	beings	“rub	through	the	materialism	of	the	image”	(50).		In	Three	Steps	on	the	Ladder	of	Writing,	Cixous	similarly	locates	this	passage	within	the	visual	when	she	insists	every	great	writer—that	is,	writers	that	teach	us	how	to	die,	that	take	us	to	the	depths	of	an	abyss—has	an	inaugural	scene	of	death:	“First	there	is	the	picture,	which	we	either	enter	or	don’t	enter.	The	duel—death—and	the	picture	form	a	door,	a	window,	an	opening”	(9).	The	birth-death	of	the	writer	are	entangled	in	an	image—a	passageway.	Cixous	further	explores	this	essential	entangled	relation	of	death,	birth,	and	images	when	she	turns	to	look	into	drawings	in	Stigmata	(to	which	we	shall	return).		 The	complexity	of	this	personal	encounter—perhaps	a	reciprocating	look	to	a	punctum	that	“rises	from	the	scene,”	apparently	of	its	own	accord,	“and	pierces	me”—is	further	illustrated	in	Barthes’s	repeated	return	to,	not	just	death	and	the	seemingly	violent	toll	of	the	punctum’s	piercing	sting,	but	the	maternal	body.	Landscape	photography	“carr[ies]	me	back	to	somewhere	in	myself.	.	.	awakening	in	me	the	Mother”	(40).	Barthes’s	relation	to	photography	becomes	one	in	which	“a	sort	of	umbilical	cord	links	the	body	of	the	photographed	thing	to	my	gaze:	light,	though	impalpable,	is	here	a	carnal	medium,	a	skin	I	share	with	anyone	who	has	been	photographed”	(81).		Barthes	further	illustrates	this	real,	material	entanglement	and	potential	for	an	encountering	look	much	like	Heidegger’s	when	he	describes	the	movement	and	emergence	of	being	that	the	punctum	allows	within	an	otherwise	“motionless	image.	
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.	.anesthetized	and	fastened	down,	like	butterflies”	(57).	When	Barthes	“recognize[s],	with	[his]	whole	body”	a	punctum,	suddenly	he	is	standing	there	with	the	photographer,	whose	“‘second	sight’	does	not	consist	in	‘seeing’	but	in	being	
there”	(45,	47,	my	emphasis).	“Here,”	says	Barthes,	“the	photograph	really	transcends	itself:	is	this	not	the	sole	proof	of	its	art?	To	annihilate	itself	as	medium,	to	be	no	longer	a	sign	but	the	thing	itself?”	(45).		The	encountering	look	is	most	clearly	articulated	when	Barthes	finally	“finds”	his	mother	in	a	photograph	and	breathtakingly	describes	just	what	it	is	he	sees	there.	Her	very	being	seems	to	extend	a	look	to	him	through	their	mutual	material	entanglement	in	this	one	photograph,	and	he	sees	her.	He	also	encounters	himself	in	this	visual	trace	of	his	mother’s	history	that	preexisted	his	own	being	but	already	was	the	condition	of	its	possibility.	This	contributes	to	the	very	definition	of	quantum	entanglement	and	“weirdness”:	that	phenomenon	that	exceeds	and	transforms	ordinary	notions	of	time,	space,	and	distance.	Barthes:	I	studied	the	little	girl	and	at	last	rediscovered	my	mother.	The	distinctness	of	her	face,	the	naïve	attitude	of	her	hands,	the	place	she	had	docilely	taken	without	either	showing	or	hiding	herself,	and	finally	her	expression,	which	distinguished	her.	.	.	all	this	had	transformed	the	photographic	pose	into	that	untenable	paradox	which	she	had	nonetheless	maintained	all	her	life:	the	assertion	of	gentleness.	In	this	little	girl’s	image	I	saw	the	kindness	which	had	formed	her	being	immediately	and	forever.	.	.	(69).	
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Barthes’s	overwhelming	emotion	at	“rediscovering”	his	mother	in	this	photograph	is	palpable	upon	reading,	and	it	is	why	he	never	presents	this	photo—perhaps	the	most	important	image	in	Camera	Lucida—to	our	view.	We	would	not	experience	this	look,	this	wound,	as	he	does.	It	is	a	sacred	haunting	that	pierces	him	through	with	“the	impossible	science	of	the	unique	being”—his	mother’s	being,	unconcealed	to	him	(71,	his	emphasis).	In	The	Work	of	Mourning,	Derrida	refers	to	this	absence	of	the	Winter	Garden	Photograph	in	Camera	Lucida	as	the	“radiant	invisibility	of	a	look	that	[Barthes]	describes	to	us	only	as	clear,	so	clear”	(36).	We	do	not	see	the	look,	but	we	share	in	the	trauma	it	inflicts.	We	feel	the	fall—the	passage	into	a	darkness	that	simultaneously	brings	life.	Resistance	to	Barthes’s	corporeal	dimension	of	photography	and	the	very	real	attunement	to	being	and	being	itself	that	is	given	through	photographs	is	understandable,	given	how	anesthetized	we	are	to	the	representationalist	thought	that	guides	us.	Such	resistance	is	expressed	by	Marder	when	she	refers	to	this	entangled	materiality	as	“at	bottom,	resolutely	unthinkable	and	hence	almost	unreadable,”	“outrageous,”	and	“crazy”	(151).	It	is	not	logical,	after	all,	for	the	physical	body	of	the	referent	to	adhere	to	the	materiality	of	the	photograph,	for	the	photograph	is	a	representation,	a	reflection	of	the	true	object	of	study,	which	is	not	present.	According	to	Marder,	Barthes’s	attachment	to	his	mother	and	desire	to	find	her	within	these	photos	is	instead	a	fetishistic	perversion.	Barthes’s	“rhetorical	excesses	and	logical	inconsistencies”	do	not	obey	the	staggering	divide	between	what	is	lost	through	death	and	what	stands	as	the	living	observer	of	the	image	
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(152).	Marder	further	says	that	there	is	no	trace	of	the	dead	body	in	photography.	Barthes’s	life	and	the	liveliness	of	his	look	cannot	breathe	life	into	the	flat	materiality	of	his	mother’s	dead	image.	In	“Regarding	the	Dead,”	Michelle	Ballif	conjures	Derrida	to	speak	of	this	“traditional”	scholarly	perspective:	“To	suggest	that	there	is	no	easy	distinction	between	the	living	and	the	dead,	between	the	(living)	human	and	the	(dead)	specter,	would	engender—Derrida	notes—‘snickers	from	all	those.	.	.	who	never	believe	anything,	of	course,	because	they	are	so	sure	that	they	see	what	is	seen,	everything	that	is	seen,	only	what	is	seen’”	(Ballif	455-456).	Quite	to	the	contrary,	the	staggering	abyssal	divide	separating	living/dead	and	human/animal	opens	a	space	in	photographs	for	such	hauntings	of	différance,	indeed	necessitates	these	hauntings	as	prior	to	any	ethical	rhetorical	address—for	it	is	the	hauntings	that	signal	the	true	depths	of	our	interconnectedness—the	ethicality	with	which	we	are	all	mutually	interwoven.	In	photography	we	find	traces	of	our	entangled	materiality;	photographs	exist	in	the	folds	of	being	as	passages	between	impossible	distances.	Within	this	abyssal	space,	“this	plural	and	repeatedly	folding	frontier”	(Derrida	The	Animal	30),	life	flourishes,	unseen.	In	“Argo	Sum,”	Halley	suggests	Barthes’s	underlying	desire	to	find	his	deceased	mother	in	photographs	is	the	same	playful	movement	as	that	of	Freud’s	grandson’s	famous	“fort/da”	game	outlined	in	Beyond	the	Pleasure	Principle.	Such	a	seeking,	says	Halley,	patterned	in	Barthes’s	finger	and	nail	punctums,	is	practice	in	mastering	his	mother’s	absence:	“Not	until	her	death	can	he	write	Camera	Lucida	in	a	room,	a	space,	finally	cleared	of	his	mother’s	real	presence,	can	he	then	play	with	
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the	presence	of	her	absence,	just	as	Freud’s	grandson	plays	with	his	reel	in	the	privacy	of	his	own	room,	in	the	real	absence	of	his	mother”	(76).	Such	a	game	of	re-presentation	is	certainly	not	the	encountering	look	we	are	reaching	for.	This	is	because	Halley	fails	to	see	the	palpable	being	that	emerges	in	these	traces	of	the	finger.	Thinking	simply	in	terms	of	representation	and	the	absence	and	presence	of	a	subject/object	pair	is	to	miss	the	depth	of	significance	of	the	maternal	in	Camera	
Lucida.		The	maternal	significance	in	Camera	Lucida	is	illuminated	with	Heidegger’s	encountering	look:	for,	to	experience	the	encountering	look	as	it	is	given	by	the	initiator	without	necessary	concern	for	reciprocation	(as	we	have	outlined	above,	given	the	nonlinear	entanglement	of	the	phenomenon)—	and,	as	Heidegger	says,	“in	which	the	essence	of	the	encountering	person	has	gathered	itself	and.	.	.	‘emerges’.	.	.	collected	in	the	look,	as	the	sum	of	[her]	existence”—is	perhaps	most	ideally	realized	when	a	mother	first	looks	upon	her	child.	For	many	mothers,	seeing	this	small	creation	that	has	slowly	been	growing	and	enfolding	within,	inseparable	and	indistinguishable	from	the	self,	emerge	for	the	first	time	into	the	world	is	to	experience	the	gathering	of	one’s	essence	and	totality	of	existence	in	this	moment	of	birth.	These	moments	are	captured	in	Kristen	Hedges’s	self-published	collection	of	photos	and	stories	from	mothers:	she	quotes	Kristen	Miller:	“As	soon	as	I	saw	his	face,	as	soon	as	they	placed	him	on	my	now	empty	womb,	I	became	someone	else.	In	that	very	moment,	I	was	transformed,	evolved	reborn.	His	birth	and	my	rebirth	
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happened	simultaneously,	and	only	because	I	carried	him	did	I	get	to	carry	myself”	(Hedges	13).		Immediately	following	this	traumatic	physical	performance	of	moving	another	body	through	one’s	own	and	out	into	the	world,	an	infant	(barring	extenuating	circumstances)	is	again	enveloped	by	the	mother’s	body—this	time	in	her	arms,	against	her	naked	chest—still	attached	by	the	cord	but	now	outside	where	the	mother	sees	her	or	him	for	the	first	time.	Rachel	Henry:		What	I	do	remember	and	will	never	forget	is	when	my	midwife	told	me	to	reach	down	and	pull	my	son	out.	As	I	wrapped	my	hands	around	his	warm,	slippery	body,	his	eyes	opened.	I	pulled	him	up	to	cradle	him	on	my	belly,	the	umbilical	cord	too	short	to	bring	him	up	further,	and	I	felt	the	pain	pour	out	of	my	body	like	water.	[…]	Later	that	night,	while	everyone	else	slept,	my	son	lay	in	my	arms,	wide	awake	for	the	longest	time,	and	just	stared	at	me.	His	eyes	moved	slowly	around	my	face,	memorizing	me,	and	I	memorized	him.	(Henry	qtd	in	Hedges	22)	
This	is	the	primal	scene—this	birth	scene,	which,	like	one’s	own	death,	cannot	be	experienced	as	one’s	own.	And	yet	it	is	here	that	the	originary	being-enabling	look	is	given	by	the	mother	who	grants	it	with	no	need	or	even	thought	of	reciprocation.	For,	as	with	Watson’s	whale	and	all	other	animals,	we	cannot—need	not—know	if	such	an	encountering	look	as	this	is	reciprocated	by	infants.	It	is	also	here	that	every	“shining-into”	ultimately	returns	to	experience	the	gathering	and	totality	of	one’s	
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own	existence	and	acknowledgement	of	this	birth-death	entanglement	with	another:	another	whale	fall.	In	“Accidental	Metaphysics:	What	Animals	Don’t	Think	About,”	Cynthia	Haynes	responds	to	Frank’s	article	by	returning	to	the	first	time	she	sees	her	daughter	on	the	back	of	a	dappled	gray	horse:	Eighteen	years	of	lost	mothering	came	to	a	boil	in	an	uncanny	alchemy	of	wonder	and	weeping	as	I	bore	witness	to	the	intimate	connection	between	Jackie	and	her	horse.	In	that	moment	I	let	go	of	the	lost	years,	I	released	my	stale	laments;	I	surrendered	her	to	her	horse	as	I	surrendered	her	for	adoption	the	day	she	was	born.	Being	with	Others	has	an	inverse:	Being	Without.	I	looked	upon	her	with	an	untethered	heart.	.	.	(347)	Perhaps	it	is	no	accident	that	the	encountering	look	Haynes	recalls	is	not	a	look	exchanged	with	the	horse,	but	with	her	daughter.	This	is	the	first	time	Haynes	encounters	her	daughter	in	this	way,	as	she	explains:	“I	delivered	her,	yes.	But	back	then	we	were	not	allowed	our	look.	One	minute	she	was	with	me,	then	I	woke	up	without”	(347).	Eighteen	years	later	the	force	of	this	look	is	no	less	profound:	“that	day	reciprocity	jumped	a	childhood	trough	and	pierced	me	into	showing	up;	I	was	born	by	Jackie’s	look”	(348).	Echoed	here	is	Kristen	Miller’s	description	of	seeing	her	son	as	the	moment	of	her	own	rebirth:	“In	that	very	moment,	I	was	transformed,	evolved	reborn”	(qtd	in	Hedges	13).	What	Frank	and	Haynes	allow	us	to	see	are	precisely	these	looking	encounters	that	are	so	profoundly	touching	and	
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transformative	in	birth	and	death	and	rebirth—in	life,	as	such—that,	again,	a	reciprocated	look	is	not	necessary.	This	maternal	encountering	look,	while	certainly	not	experienced	by	all,	links	this	gift	of	being	in	a	metaphysical	sense	with	the	(re)emergence	of	physical	being.	Barthes	looks	upon	his	mother’s	image	after	her	death	and	finds	the	essence	of	her	being	in	one	photograph.	From	his	description,	he	would	have	us	believe	her	very	being	moves	through	his	in	this	moment	of	recognition—to	be	born	in	the	room	with	him	just	as	he	was	born	from	her.	.	.	such	are	life	and	death	entangled	in	this	look.	The	maternal	body	is	the	origin	of	embodied	being5—the	creative	biological	becoming	that	defines	rhetoric	in	Chapter	2—and,	following	the	trauma	of	birth,	the	maternal	look	is	the	originary,	if	idealized,	form	of	Heidegger’s	giving,	“shining	into,”	of	being.	It	is	also	with	this	originary,	entangled,	nonlinear	and	therefore	non-reciprocated	look	that	we	can	experience	something	so	profoundly	haunting	in	visual	media	with	animals—with	whom	we	are	no	less	materially,	biologically	entangled	(see	Chapter	2).		
	
The	Unseeing	Eye	Hence,	the	ethical	relation	to	the	wholly	other	necessitates	a	certain	
blindness.	 Michelle	Ballif	“Regarding	the	Dead”	464		
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I	do	not	want	to	see	what	is	shown.	I	want	to	see	what	is	secret.	What	is	hidden	amongst	the	visible.	I	want	to	see	the	skin	of	light.	Hélène	Cixous	Stigmata	184	Barthes’s	punctum	and	the	very	physical	trauma	it	creates,	the	entanglement	of	birth	and	death	in	the	photographic	medium	itself,	offer	reason	to	believe	such	an	emergence	as	that	contained	in	Heidegger’s	encountering	look	can	occur	in	photography	and	other	visual	media.	And	if	the	encountering	look	need	not	be	reciprocated	to	be	enabling,	as	I	argue	above,	if	life,	as	that	which	encompasses	both	birth	and	death	in	their	mutual	entanglement,	can	breathe	itself	through	the	“flat	Death”	of	the	photograph	and	grant	being	to	dead	and	dying	eyes,	then	there	is	also	no	need	for	a	reciprocating	(animal)	eye—whether	seeing	or	unseeing—but	perhaps	simply	the	trace	of	an	animal	or	animal	body.	And	then	what	is	the	necessity	for	or	role	of	the	(hum)animal	eye	in	such	an	encountering	look?	What	is	a	look,	after	all?	These	are	the	questions	explored	below	and	further	expanded	upon	in	the	following	chapter.	One	of	the	biggest	issues	in	arguing	for	a	transformative,	self-showing	and	being-enabling	look	in	the	“flatness”	of	visual	media	like	photography	is	whether	such	a	look	can	be	directed.	How	can	we	set	the	stage,	so-to-speak,	for	such	an	experience	to	emerge	when	its	very	relation	is	predicated	on	a	blindness	from	at	least	one	“side?”	Barthes’s	punctum	in	photography	is	sought	in	images	that	have	already	been	taken.	A	punctum	arises	from	intimate	entanglement	in	a	photo,	yes,	but	it	is	also	an	activity	engaged	after-the-fact	in	which	one	is	seized	by	the	
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photograph	and	its	documented	history—hence	the	punctum’s	incidental	and	relatively	undirected	nature.	But	concerning	ourselves	with	the	directed,	active	practice	of	creating	animals	in	visual	culture	requires	looking	at	visual	culture	and	its	entanglement	from	another	angle.	For	this,	let	us	begin	again	with	Watson	and	Easton’s	encountering	look	as	described	by	Luanne	Frank.		Embarking	upon	the	Zodiac	and	initiating,	for	Frank,	what	may	constitute	an	encountering	look,	a	look	of	Care	for	the	whale,	we	see	Watson	and	Easton	determined	to	actively	create	the	reality	of	the	whales	and	whaling	fleet	that	day	in	1975.	The	images	that	result	and	their	success	in	garnering	media	attention	created	a	formula	for	every	radical	environmental	group	to	follow.	The	black	and	white	photo	captured	by	Rex	Weyler	of	Watson	and	Easton	in	the	Zodiac,	headed	straight	for	the	Soviet	Whaling	fleet,	has	become	an	iconic	image	of	direct	action	environmental	activism,	or	what	in	Image	Politics:	The	New	Rhetoric	of	
Environmental	Activism	Kevin	Deluca	has	dubbed	an	“image	event”	(Deluca	1).	This	physical	intervention	and	documentation	at	a	critical	threatening	event—be	it	whaling,	deforestation,	or	some	other	perceived	wrong—is	tactical,	and	it	is	certainly	directed,	with	the	aim	of	entering	the	public’s	eye	in	what	Greenpeace	co-founder	Robert	Hunter	calls	a	“mind	bomb”6	(Deluca	1).	But	it	does	not	capture	the	encountering	look,	does	not	get	documentation	of	the	whale	charging	the	Zodiac,	of	the	whale	pulling	back,	of	the	whale’s	eye	as	it	begins	its	descent	into	the	sea.	The	image	the	intervention	does	produce	serves	a	very	specific	purpose	for	
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environmental	change,	but	it	also	seems	to	maintain	a	sense	of	objectification.	Morey	articulates	this	well:		Even	images	that	present	animals	positively	still	portray	them	as	objects,	as	animals	that	need	human	protection	and	can	never	obtain	their	own	agency.	While	animal	activists	try	to	help	animals,	they	only	advance	their	own	idea	of	nature,	often	a	patronizing	position	of	humans	as	stewards	of	nature.	(42)		
The	public	may	be	moved	and	outraged	enough	by	these	images	of	human	risk	and	sacrifice	to	create	positive	changes	for	individual	critical	issues,	but	the	general,	systemic	perspective	towards	animals	is	largely	maintained.	This	method	creates	a	kind	of	accounting,	one	in	which	activist	groups	will	always	be	required	at	the	ship’s	helm,	directing	public	viewers	where	to	look—where	to	care—by	deciding	for	us	“which	animals	get	to	count”	(Morey	35).	Animals	are,	however,	still	ontologically	severed	from	their	human	viewers,	and	their	salvation	often	relies	on	whether	they	
look	good—or	cute,	or	regal,	or	familiar.	And	we	have	already	seen	what	making	animals	cute	can	do	to	animals	in	visual	culture	(see	Chapter	3).	Environmental	
Figure	15.	Photograph	of	Watson	and	Easton	on	a	zodiac	confronting	the	Soviet	whaling	
vessel	prior	to	encountering	the	male	sperm	whale.	Photograph	by	Rex	Weyler;	Web.	
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activism	is	important	work,	but	it	is	important	work	because	of	the	representational	framework	that	remains	in	place.		The	reliance	on	image	events	in	visual	culture	to	instigate	a	change	in	perspectives	creates	problems	for	creatures	like	the	nearly	extinct	Lord	Howe	stick	insect,	for	which	no	dramatic	image	event	can	reasonably	be	staged.	As	Robert	Krulwich	reports	for	NPR,	the	Melbourne	Zoo	is	attempting	its	own	intervention	on	behalf	of	the	very	large	exoskeleton-clad	insect	in	the	form	of	a	“public	relations	campaign,”	aimed	at	Lord	Howe	residents,	“to	make	these	insects	more.	.	.	well,	adorable,	or	noble,	or	whatever	it	takes.”	The	video	created	by	the	zoo	to	generate	interest	or	care	manages	to	do	exactly	what	would	be	expected	of	a	zoo:	totally	expose	and	objectify	the	animal	to	human	viewers	in	its	most	vulnerable	state.	The	time-lapse	video	shows	a	nymph	emerging	from	its	pod-like	egg	in	a	brightly	lit	room.	If	anything,	the	video	of	this	birth-hatching	makes	the	insect	look	all	the	more	alien,	as	the	slow	process	seems	to	exaggerate	its	(already	extremely	large)	size.	While	the	ecologically-inclined	may	find	such	a	video	fascinating,	surely	anyone	with	a	fear	of	the	creepy-crawlies	(in	other	words	the	entire	presumed	target	audience	for	which	enormous	insects	in	their	backyards	might	be	an	issue)	would	not	likely	make	a	connection	with	the	translucent	green,	squirming	body	struggling	to	free	all	of	its	six	incredibly	long	legs	from	a	small	and	dark,	pod-like	bulge.	If	animals	have	to	be	“attractive”	in	order	to	be	worthy	of	conservation	and	care,	we	have	not	come	very	far:	humans	remain	at	the	center	of	life	and	the	universe.	The	encountering	look	is	something	else	entirely.	
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The	visual	“documentation”	of	the	encountering	look	fails	in	Watson	and	Easton’s	case,	but	one	can	imagine	in	the	flurry	and	fear	of	being	charged	at	by	the	harpooned	male	sperm	whale,	what	such	a	visual	might	look	like	from	the	rhetorical	vision7	inspired	by	the	men’s	accounts.	A	filming	of	the	event,	in	the	hands	of	Easton,	would	likely	be	jerky	and	unclear,	likely	punctuated	with	sounds	of	panic	from	the	men	and	sounds	of	the	crashing	ocean	waves.	In	terms	of	photographic	stills,	although	we	may	imagine	in	their	retelling	a	scene	that	perfectly	frames	the	whale’s	eye	in	close	proximity	to	Watson’s—perhaps	even	glimpsing	in	it	Watson’s	own	reflection—any	photo	would	likely	be	blurred	in	movement,	dark	and	unclear—certainly	not	the	(com)posed,	formal	photos	Barthes	gives	us	in	Camera	Lucida	nor	the	typical	animal	photos	distributed	as	memes	with	animals	centrally	and	clearly	observed.	That	is,	these	photos	would	speak	with	a	relative	blindness—they	would	witness	without	truly	grasping	the	event.	Instead,	these	photos	would	likely	have	an	aura	of	a	lived	experience	at	the	limit	of	an	abyss.		Responding	to	da	Vinci’s	Vierge	à	l’Enfant,	Picasso’s	Etude	pour	‘La	
Repasseuse’,	and	Rembrandt’s	Décollation	de	Saint	Jean	Baptiste	in	Stigmata,	Cixous	feels	with	the	body	the	abyssal	depths	of	what	is	not	visible.	These	drawings	offer	relatively	little	visual	information	about	what	is	being	made	and	expressed	within—the	people	created	within	this	medium	are	not	fully	“fleshed	out,”	are	largely	left	to	the	imagination—yet	there	is	a	flurry	of	movement	that	nevertheless	seems	to	clearly,	or	blindly,	convey	the	scenes	as	well	as	the	physical	process	and	performance	of	drawing.	There	is	something	fleeting	that	is	yet	mysteriously	
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captured	in	these	violent	thrashings	of	drawing—life—“the	quick	of	life”	(32):	“It’s	not	a	secret	of	drawing	the	contours,	but	of	what	escapes	the	contour,	the	secret	movement,	the	breaking,	the	torment,	the	unexpected”	(30,	her	emphasis).	Rather	than	being	taken-in	simply	by	what	is	seen,	there	is	a	surprising	depth	of	expression	in	what	is	not	seen.	And	Cixous	contemplates	this	from	the	viewpoint	of	the	drawer/writer	(that	is,	creator)	in	how	to	accomplish	this:	“What	are	we	trying	to	grasp	between	the	lines,	in	between	the	strokes,	in	the	net	that	we’re	weaving,	that	we	throw,	and	the	dagger	blows?”	(30).	It	is	essential	to	say	here,	as	concerned	as	this	chapter	and	the	previous	chapter	are	with	photography,	that	Cixous	is	not	a	fan.	In	her	novel	So	Close,	she	insists	that	photography	is	“the	enemy,	my	enemy	exactly,	the	adversary”	(3).	Marder,	writing	on	Cixous’s	stance	on	photography	in	the	novel,	explains:		Photography,	she	tells	herself,	takes	too	much.	Its	capacity	to	‘take’	is	overwhelmingly	powerful—excessively	powerful—as	it	seizes	hold	of	everything	including	even	the	‘untakeable’	itself:	the	very	part	of	‘life’	that	is	truly	vital	and	hence	‘untakeable’	precisely	and	paradoxically	because	it	is	all	too	‘takeable.’	It	imposes	its	powerful	will	on	life	by	stripping	it	of	all	its	movement	and	precious	precariousness.	(“Dark”	254)	Echoed	here	are	the	concerns	of	the	previous	chapter	for	the	animal	memes	and	images	that	clearly	“take	too	much”	and	seem	to	extract	a	certain	vitality	from	the	essence	of	life.	Cixous	detests	the	grasping	nature	of	looking	in	photography.	This	is	all	the	more	reason	to	attempt	to	theorize,	especially	for	photography,	an	
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encountering,	being-enabling	look	in	visual	culture.	How	can	photography	gift	unto	animals	the	two	things	that	Cixous	claims	it	takes:	movement	and	precariousness?	How	can	we	make	photography	more	like	the	da	Vinci,	Picasso,	and	Rembrandt	drawings	Cixous	connects	with	so	deeply?	For	starters,	the	process	of	writing	and	drawing	as	described	by	Cixous	is	inescapably	enfolded	with	all	the	senses:	Cixous	“tastes”	her	words	for	the	effect	she	seeks.	Vision	has	a	material	body:	“You	will	recognize	the	true	drawing,	the	live	one:	it’s	still	running.	Look	at	the	legs”	(28);	“I	submit	myself	to	the	invisible	truth	of	my	vision,	I	obey	the	strange	and	foreign	voice	in	my	body”	(29).	The	dark,	haunting	scribbles	of	movement	in	Picasso’s	woman	ironing,	the	broken	posture	of	her	body,	her	tucked	head	and	unseen	expression,	this	drawing,	says	Cixous,	is	“a	tragedy”	(33).	It	severely	wounds	us	like	the	punctum	with	which	Barthes	is	stricken	in	photography:	I	don’t	want	to	draw	the	idea,	I	don’t	want	to	write	being,	I	want	what	happens	in	the	Woman	Ironing,	I	want	the	nerve,	I	want	the	Revelation	of	the	
Figure	16.	An	early	sketch	of	The	Woman	
Ironing.		Pablo	Picasso;	Web.	
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broken	Woman	Ironing.	And	I	want	to	write	what	passes	between	us	and	the	Woman	Ironing,	the	electric	current.	The	emotion.	Because	as	a	result	of	drawing	her	with	my	eyes,	I	felt:	it’s	death	that	is	passing	through	the	Woman	Ironing,	our	mortality	in	person.	I	want	to	draw	our	mortality,	this	quiver.	(34,	my	emphasis	and	hers)	Expressed	here	is	a	becoming,	a	creation,	of	life	enfolded	in	dark	corners	between	categories	like	birth	and	death.	Cixous	finds	this	abyssal	enfolding	within	herself	as	well,	as	creator:	“We	want	to	write	the	torment,	and	we	write	the	joy.	At	the	same	time.	At	each	moment	I	am	another	myself.	The	one	in	and	on	the	other”	(36).		This	space	between	the	I	of	the	writer	and	the	self	in	the	movement	of	the	hand,	in	the	blind	drawing/writing/photographing,	allows	such	hauntings	and	spectres	to	appear,	alerting	us	to	the	otherwise	invisible	complexities	of	ontological,	epistemological,	ethical	entanglement	of	self/other,	living/dead,	human/animal.	Diane	Davis	refers	to	this	self-haunting	in	“Autozoography”:	“The	I	is	generated,	each	time,	in	the	gap	between	me	and	myself,	between	the	one	recognizing	and	the	one	recognized,	where	an	extrahuman	rhetorical	relation	plays	out”	(537).	This	abyssal	space,	like	the	whale	fall,	is	one	that	we	cannot	visually	arrest.	Rather,	I	am	following	my	own	(animal)	tracks	when	attempting	to	locate	myself	in	time,	and,	“At	the	level	of	these	(undead)	traces,	an	irreducible	but	never	simply	innate	rhetoricity	is	responsible	for	the	perpetual	(re)animation	of	the	life	of	the	living,	for	‘my’	life,	the	experience	of	which	can	only	be	both	spectral	and	bereaved”	(548).		
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Michelle	Ballif,	whom	I	quote	briefly	above,	similarly	argues	for	the	preoriginary	rhetorical	address	between	the	living	and	dead:	“and	that	mourning,	the	impossible	work	of	mourning,	haunts	the	possibility	of	the	address,	constituting	the	ethical	relation	between	the	self	and	the	other,	the	otherness	of	the	self,	and	the	otherness	of	the	other”	(456).	This	preoriginary	rhetorical	regard	of	the	dead	other	also	challenges	the	limit	between	the	visible/invisible	with	the	look	from	the	specter.	Ballif	explains	this	spectral	look	as	“the	primordial	ethical	relation:	we	do	not	see	who	looks	at	us,	but	we	respond	to	the	look.	.	.	Hence,	the	ethical	relation	to	the	wholly	other	necessitates	a	certain	blindness”	(464,	her	emphasis).	Looking	then,	says	Derrida,	is	done	with	a	“haptic	eye,”	or	an	eye	that	touches—that	“press[es]	together	like	lips”	(qtd	in	Ballif	465).	The	move	away	from	a	methodology	of	reflection	to	that	of	diffraction	is	echoed	in	the	haptic	eye,	as	well.	Looking	then,	as	is	conveyed	by	Cixous,	is	irreducible	from	our	embodied	sensory	experiences.	Looking	is	touching,	feeling	with	the	skin—the	body.	As	in	the	brittlestar	species	discussed	in	Chapter	1,	vision	is	at	once	an	activity	of	the	body.	Eleanor	Morgan	echoes	this	in	“Connecting	with	Animals”	when	she	describes	the	experience	of	seeing	a	female	“dreamer	fish,”	Oneirodes	acanthias,	preserved	in	a	jar.	This	particular	species	typically	lives	at	depths	unseen	by	humans	and	impenetrable	by	sunlight,	so	it	is	not	exactly	attractive	by	our	standards:	“Visually.	.	.	the	dreamer	fish	is	very	unappetizing;	it	has	large	sharp	teeth,	black	wrinkled	skin,	and	a	thin	lure	coming	out	of	its	head.	I	would	not	want	it	in	my	mouth”	(175,	my	emphasis).	Morgan	
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suggests	a	scientific-artistic	way	of	“connecting”	with	animals	that	we	will	return	to	in	the	following	chapter.	As	a	preoriginary	ethical	address,	according	to	Ballif,	looking	hinges	upon	the	touch	of	the	invisible	specter—on	blindness:	the	dying,	falling	whale;	the	deceased	mother;	the	dreamer	fish.	Barthes’s	punctum	and	Cixous’s	stigmata	realize	this	touch	with	the	physical	trauma	ignited	by	select	images:	images	that	entangle	us	in	their	movement	and	creation.	These	are,	according	to	Cixous,	“forms	of	art	that	lacerate	the	eyelids”	(Stigmata	xi).	She	further	elaborates:	“Each	Stigmatext	is	the	portrait	of	a	story	attacked	from	all	sides,	that	attacks	itself	and	in	the	end	gets	away”	(xvi).	And	its	traces	are	our	wounds	to	bear—excavating	our	flesh	and	uncovering	pathways	all	the	way	down	to	the	dead	and	dying,	the	depths	of	the	invisible	crypts	of	the	self-as-other	and	human-as-animal	within.	This	role	of	the	gravedigger	is	that	to	which	the	following	chapter	returns.				 	
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CHAPTER	FIVE	DEEPENING	
	
This	project	is	about	distances	between.	You	and	me.	Human	and	animal.	Life	and	
death.	Right	now	I	am	folding	that	distance	(it	has	a	skin).	Folding,	tucking,	creating	
darkness,	creating	a	feeling-with	of	darkness	and	flesh.	Who	are	you?	I	wonder	where	
you	might	be	while	reading	these	black	words	currently	spilling	over	my	fingers.	They	
stumble.	(I	am	a	slow	writer.	I	have	to	feel	each	one,	roll	it	around	in	my	mouth,	taste	it	
before	letting	go).	I	wonder	if	the	words	linger	as	they	entangle	us	in	their	folds.	
Perhaps	they	seem	like	dead	weights	on	a	page,	and	if	this	page	were	to	manifest	itself	
as	paper—woven	of	tree	flesh—they	would	keep	it	from	taking	flight	and	seeking	
chaos.	I	imagine	paper	leaves	scraping	dry	against	a	glittering	pavement,	scuttling	like	
crabs	for	the	ocean,	seeking	to	bury	themselves	in	its	womb	and	shed	their	words.	In	
the	water	they	would	turn	again	to	soft	flesh	and	bleed	words	into	the	ocean.	I	am	
waiting	for	a	tide	to	take	them	under	with	the	whales.		
Figure	17.	Photograph	of	Catherine	Chalmer’s	“Gas	Chamber”	from	
her	series	American	Cockroach.	Web.	
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	 There	are	two	ways	of	clambering	downward—by	plunging	into	the	earth	and	going	deep	into	the	sea—and	neither	is	easy.	Hélène	Cixous	Three	Steps	on	the	Ladder	of	Writing	5	 	In	Three	Steps	on	the	Ladder	of	Writing,	Cixous	takes	us	to	the	school	of	writing—to	three	schools	of	writing,	to	be	exact—which	is	approached	by	descending	(or	rather,	by	an	“ascent	downward”	to	indicate	its	difficulty)1.	This	ladder	begins	with	the	drawing	of	an	“H”:	“This	is	what	writing	is:	I	one	language,	I	another	language,	and	between	the	two,	the	line	that	makes	them	vibrate;	writing	forms	a	passageway	between	two	shores”	(3).	A	pedagogical	approach	to	a	HumAnimal	rhetorics	entails	a	vibration	between	these	two	selves,	or	shores,	as	well:	between	a	human	“I”	and	an	animal	“I.”	How	do	we	make	them	vibrate?	How	do	we	reveal	their	humanimal	folds?	It	is	not	a	journey	in	which	we	can	go,	straightaway,	from	one	side	to	the	other.	There	is	no	bridge.	Rather,	as	seen	in	the	previous	chapter	and	as	suggested	by	Cixous,	it	requires	exploring	the	enfolding	depths	of	dark	contours.		The	pedagogical	HumAnimal	rhetorics	theorized	here	requires	a	two-part,	or	double,	movement,	the	first	part	of	which	concerns	the	humanimal.	Sketching	the	humanimal	requires	a	new	way	of	approaching	autobiography,	perhaps	with	an	understanding	of	what	Diane	Davis	explains	in	“Autozoography”:	“The	presumption	of	self-knowledge	is	not	an	innate	quality	of	‘the	human’	but	the	already	relational	condition	for	any	living	being	that	must	repeat	itself	to	be	itself”	(533).	That	is,	the	“I”	that	allows	us	the	supposed	unique	ability	of	representing	the	self	to	the	self,	
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which	is	“generated,	each	time,	in	the	gap	between	me	and	myself,	between	the	one	recognizing	and	the	one	recognized”	(536-537),	must	be	examined—the	skin	of	this	“gap”	folded	and	felt	for	evidence	of	its	“extrahuman	relationality”—through	novel	autobiographical	forms	(537).	Who	are	we,	as	humanimals?	What,	in	each	of	us,	haunts	the	very	idea	of	an	“I”	to	which	we	presume	to	point	and	speak?	Such	fault	lines	dividing	the	self	release	spectres,	and	these	spectres	are	the	focus	of	an	autobiography	that	descends	into	the	earth’s	organic	matter	in	search	of	what	lies	buried	within.		The	second	movement	of	a	pedagogical	HumAnimal	rhetorics	is	concerned	with	animals	in	visual	media	as	theorized	in	the	previous	chapter.	This	movement	seeks	to	extend	an	encountering	look	that	entangles	as	it	enfolds,	offering	being	to	animals	by	breathing	life	into	the	flat	materiality	of	photography.	These	animal	visuals	created	fail	to	grasp	animals	as	objects,	but	instead	allow	them	movement,	darkness,	and	escape.	This	movement	of	a	HumAnimal	rhetorics	descends	with	the	whale	fall	into	a	vast	sea	of	being.	Both	movements	of	a	HumAnimal	rhetorics	are	achieved	by	an	entanglement	with	the	senses	of	bodies	and	with	the	dynamic	interplay	of	materiality	more	generally	as	sensation,	which,	according	to	Grosz,	“contracts	the	vibratory	waves	of	matter”	through	art	and	artistic	invention	(Chaos	62).	Art,	and	specifically	photography	for	this	project,	“synthesizes	and	compresses	the	materiality	that	composes	it,	transmitting	the	force	of	materiality,	its	vibratory	resonance,	from	a	
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work	to	a	body”	(62).	Artistic	media	are	unique	in	their	ability	to	bring	the	“vibratory	waves	of	matter”	into	contact	with	the	body:		Sensation	is	the	zone	of	indeterminacy	between	subject	and	object,	the	bloc	that	erupts	from	the	encounter	of	the	one	with	the	other.	Sensation	impacts	the	body,	not	through	the	brain,	not	through	representations,	signs,	images,	or	fantasies,	but	directly,	on	the	body’s	own	internal	forces,	on	cells,	organs,	the	nervous	system.	(73)	These	artistic	media	that	erupt	as	sensation	within	the	body	itself,	and	in	which	an	encountering	look	can	be	extended,	are	the	entangled	passageways	of	a	HumAnimal	rhetorics	seeking	a	lived	experience	at	the	edge	of	an	abyss.	To	approach	this	kind	of	revelatory	experience,	we	will	begin	by	deepening—first	into	the	earth	as	gravediggers	and	then	into	the	sea.	
	
Earth	 The	edge	of	the	jungle	is	not	the	place	where	the	line	shifts	the	most.	That	is	deeper	in	where	the	caves	are,	pink	with	bones.	 Bhanu	Kapil	Humanimal	62		.	.	.	what	was	I	afraid	of?	Being	imund?	With	what?	Being	imund	with	joy.	Clarice	Lispector	The	Passion	According	to	G.H.	65	
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In	Three	Steps	on	the	Ladder	of	Writing,	Cixous	describes	the	third	step	or	moment	in	an	apprenticeship	of	writing,	which	is	“the	most	advanced,	the	highest,	the	deepest”	(7):	 Writing	.	.	.	does	not	come	from	outside.	On	the	contrary,	it	comes	from	deep	inside.	.	.	.	It	is	deep	in	my	body,	further	down,	behind	thought.	.	.	.	Somewhere	in	my	stomach,	my	womb,	and	if	you	have	not	got	a	womb—then	it	is	somewhere	“else.”	You	must	climb	down	in	order	to	go	in	the	direction	of	that	place.	(118)	This	is	the	“School	of	Roots”	(7).	As	the	“most	advanced,”	it	follows	the	school	of	death,	the	first	moment	of	her	writing	apprenticeship,	which	teaches	us	that	“writing	is	learning	to	die	.	.	.	learning	not	to	be	afraid,	in	other	words	to	live	at	the	extremity	of	life,	which	is	what	the	dead,	death,	give	us”	(10).	We	learn	how	to	die	in	writing,	and	then,	before	dying,	we	descend	with	great	effort	towards	the	roots,	our	vegetal	stage,	toward	the	elements	that	promise	to	decompose	our	tissues	and	make	us	detritus.	Cixous	suggests:	“Perhaps	flowers	are	our	last	human	stage”	(Cixous	
Three	151).	Roots	reach	down	below	what	we	have	fashioned	as	a	level,	grounded	floor.	These	grounds	of	existence	upon	which	we	stand	tall,	walk	forward,	build	upon,	are	also	the	grounds	upon	which	we	fall.	Here	is	where	the	dust	collects,	where	the	bugs	and	pests	crawl,	where	the	fissures	begin.	Our	grounds	are	marked	by	dirt	from	our	own	travels	as	we	pass	and	by	the	unclean	fluids	created	by	our	own	living	bodies,	which—upon	escaping—remind	us	of	our	vulnerable	materiality.	We	busy	ourselves	cleaning	these	floors:	erasing	their	presence,	and	in	doing	so,	
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erasing	ourselves.	We	sweep	the	seams	between	order	and	disorder,	between	the	life	and	death	that	these	fluids	surely	threaten—between	“I”	human	and	“I”	animal.	As	a	solid	plane	the	floor	is	the	site	of	the	uncanny;	like	photographs,	whose	flatness	betrays	the	life	they	catch	and	contain.	Being	level	with	that	ground,	or	burrowing	into	it,	alters	one’s	perception	of	the	world.	
As	children,	are	we	not	so	much	closer	to	the	earth?	I	remember	being	
fascinated	by	grasshoppers	in	my	front	yard.	I	would	sit	in	the	grass	and	feel	the	soft	
blades	against	my	skin,	tracing	each	separate	blade	to	its	tip,	examining	each	side	(I	
can	still	feel	the	texture	of	Midwestern	grass	haunting	my	fingers).	I	would	lie	in	this	
nest	of	earth,	looking	into	the	infinite	sky	until	my	mom	inevitably	called	out	in	
warning	of	the	“chiggers”	below.	What	are	these	mysterious	animals	that	live	in	the	
ground,	threatening	to	bury	themselves	in	my	skin?	Now	I	am	a	mother,	and	now	I	
stand	upright.	I	call	out	to	my	children,	dirt	under	their	nails	(so	much	dirt!	from	
where?):	“look	out	for	fire	ants!”	But	always	they	desire	to	be	close	to	the	ground,	
crawling	along	its	surface,	learning	its	contours,	feeling	its	life.	In	Volatile	Bodies,	Grosz	explains	the	“danger”	posed	by	our	leaking	bodily	fluids:	“they	flow,	they	seep,	they	infiltrate.	.	.	they	force	megalomaniacal	aspirations	to	earth,	refusing	consciousness	its	supremacy”	(194).	Grosz	turns	to	Kristeva’s	
Powers	of	Horror	in	which	the	clean	and	proper	“I”	is	achieved	by	expelling	and	denying	these	fluids	that	become	abject,	threatening	death	and	defilement:	These	body	fluids,	this	defilement,	this	shit	are	what	life	withstands,	hardly	and	with	difficulty,	on	the	part	of	death.	There,	I	am	at	the	border	of	my	
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condition	as	a	living	being.	My	body	extricates	itself,	as	being	alive,	from	that	border.	Such	wastes	drop	so	that	I	might	live,	until,	from	loss	to	loss,	nothing	remains	in	me	and	my	entire	body	falls	beyond	the	limit—cadere,	cadaver.	(Kristeva	3)	Falling	on	the	solid	plane	of	our	architectural	frames,	these	fluids	are	at	once	a	liability.	But	when	these	fluids	spill	on	the	earth,	they	are	absorbed,	and	perhaps	it	is	here—towards	the	roots—that	we	should	follow.	To	get	to	the	unclean	roots,	to	reach	for	their	poetry,	we	must	follow	death.		
These	are	the	things	my	hands	and	eyes	remember:	She	was	born	on	the	floor	of	
our	neighbor’s	closet	in	a	pink,	fleshy	membrane.	Her	mother	ripped	the	membrane	
open	delicately	with	her	teeth	and	licked	her	all	over,	her	whole	body	moving	with	
each	rough	pass.	A	gentle,	violent	love.	She	became	enfolded	in	our	world—this	very	
personal	world	called	home,	called	family,	which	we	construct	with	walls	and	doors	
and	rooms	and	routines.	She	became	Meadow.	One	October	twelve	years	later,	I	was	on	
the	floor	with	her	again,	this	time	with	her	black	vomit	and	blood.	Saliva	in	my	hair.	
She	died	on	the	floor.	The	vet	injected	pink	fluid	into	her	vein,	and	she	drifted	away	in	
my	arms.	All	I	could	say	was,	“I’m	so	sorry.”	They	returned	her	ashes	to	me	in	a	wooden	
box	engraved	with	flowers.		Cixous	talks	of	“the	element,”	quoting	Marina	Tsvetaeva’s	Russian	“stikhia,”	which	translates	as	“both	the	element—matter—and	the	element—poetic	verse”	(Cixous	5,	her	emphasis).	Cixous	says,	“the	element	resists,”	which	is	what	makes	the	reaching	for	this	humanimal	truth	so	difficult	(5,	her	emphasis).	The	earth,	the	
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verse,	resists.	But	we	must	dig;	we	are	gravediggers.	Perhaps	the	flat	planes	of	our	houses	and	buildings,	these	containers	for	“culture,”	are	what	need	to	be	excavated	in	seeking	novel	autobiographical	form	for	the	humanimal.		Cixous	turns	to	Clarice	Lispector’s	The	Passion	According	to	G.H.	as	an	example	of	writing	into	death,	of	digging	and	reaching	for	the	roots	where	death	takes	us,	and	thus	embracing	“our	own	marshes,	our	own	mud”	(119).	Lispector’s	G.H.,	“a	woman	reduced	to	her	initials,”	contemplates	a	dying	barata	(Portuguese	for	“cockroach”)	she	has	shut	in	a	door	(Cixous	114).	The	barata	is	unclean,	or	imund.	It	is	not	of	the	“so-called	clean”	mundus;	it	is	not	of	the	clean	world	(117).	A	thick	white	discharge	is	expelled	from	the	barata,	threatening	its	borders	and	threatening	G.H.’s	own	identity.	This	contemplation	of	the	barata,	with	its	overflowing	life	(and	impending	death),	becomes	the	opportunity	for	“a	type	of	fantastic,	total,	emotional,	spiritual,	and	intellectual	revolution,	which,	in	short,	is	a	crime”	(112).	The	cockroach	threatens	to	take	us	to	the	roots,	to	the	deepest	point	of	writing	“where	those	who	are	excluded	live”	(116).	Catherine	Chalmers	probes	similar	depths	of	the	humanimal	via	the	cockroach	in	her	artwork,	imagining	“that	early	Homo	sapiens	living	in	caves	probably	did	not	find	the	cockroach	as	abominable	as	we	do	now	.	.	.	our	hatred	of	the	roach	has	perhaps	grown	in	proportion	to	the	boundaries	we	have	erected	between	ourselves	and	the	natural	world”	(Chalmers).	(Chalmers	discusses	the	cockroach	at	length,	and	I	will	turn	to	her	artwork	below).	Lispector’s	G.H.	goes	into	such	a	cave	when	she	really	sees	the	cockroach	she	has	attempted	to	kill:	“what	I	was	seeing	with	an	embarrassment	so	painful	and	so	frightened	and	so	innocent,	
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what	I	was	seeing	was	life	looking	back	at	me.	.	.	.	I’d	looked	at	the	living	roach	and	was	discovering	inside	it	the	identity	of	my	deepest	life”	(Lispector	51-52).	By	embracing	“the	best	part	of	ourselves	that	is	called	imund,”	we	may	attain	a	similar	seeing	and	revolution	of	the	“I”	(Cixous	118).	This	process	of	seeing	the	roach,	of	seeing	the	fissures	between	“I”	human	and	“I”	animal	and	the	deep	life	that	resonates	and	haunts	these	two	selves,	is	a	process	of	becoming	imund—an	imund	that	is	humanimal—with	joy.		
One	year	after	Meadow’s	death,	it	was	October	again	and	I	was	nauseous	and	
far	enough	along	to	have	seen	and	heard	a	little	heartbeat.	We	planned,	afraid	and	
excited,	but	two	weeks	later	an	empty	white	circle	was	all	that	remained	on	the	
ultrasound	screen.	For	days	I	walked	around	as	this	cradle-crypt.	On	a	blank	sheet	of	
paper,	I	wrote	“I	am	a	haunting.”	Then	I	was	on	the	floor	again,	but	this	time	the	blood	
was	mine.	On	the	floor,	looking	again	into	eyes	black	with	death,	cradling	a	body	in	my	
hands.		Roots	do	not	simply	go	down	and	stop.	They	spread	out,	reaching	for	others,	forming	a	complex,	organic	lace	of	filaments.	Perhaps	our	feeling-with,	which	begins	underground	and	before	birth,	when	we	are	enfolded	in	the	earth	of	our	mother’s	shared	materiality,	forms	a	similar	kind	of	organic,	interlacing	web	of	images	that	can	transport	us	back	to	our	imund,	this	most	primary	of	relations.	Bhanu	Kapil’s	
Humanimal:	A	Project	for	Future	Children	is	an	excellent	example	of	the	type	of	organic	web	of	autobiography,	choragraphy,	and	field	work	a	HumAnimal	pedagogy	seeks,	for	it	is	imund	with	joy.	Kapil	asks,	“What	are	your	primal	images?”	(59)	
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Presumably	these	primal	images	can	be	known,	for	they	ignite	in	us	a	familiar	sensation—a	sensation,	perhaps,	without	words.	Kapil’s	lyrical	writing	interlaced	with	the	brief	“snapshots”	of	her	life,	the	poetic	voice	she	gives	the	“wolfgirls”—conjuring	a	humanimal	haunting—linger	with	the	body	as	such	images	do:	“I	substitute	images	for	events,	my	humanimal	prerogative”	(25).		As	I	describe	in	Chapter	2,	Kapil’s	book	traces	the	historical	events	of	two	girls,	Kamala	and	Amala,	who	were	found	living	amongst	wolves	in	Bengal,	India.	The	girls	were	rescued	by	an	Indian	missionary	who	then	brought	them	to	his	orphanage.	Fragments	of	Kapil’s	own	story	entangle	with	a	poetic	“blue	sky	fiction”	and	the	“source	text”	of	the	missionary’s	diary,	creating	vibrations	between	human	and	animal	that	wound	the	reader	(1,	ix).	These	vibrations	are	particularly	palpable	in	the	haunting	fictional	embodiment	of	the	girls,	torn	as	they	were	between	these	two	shores:	 I	want	to	stand	up	but	I	can’t	do	that	here.	They	would	know	I	am	a	wolf	by	my	sore	hips,	the	look	in	my	eyes.	At	the	edge	of	the	garden	was	a	line	of	blue	chalk.	My	mother	was	crouching	there,	waiting	for	me	in	her	dark	coat.	In	the	dream,	I	walk	towards	her	and	she	stands	up.	She	opens	up	her	coat	like	two	wings	and	I	step	into	her	cloth	heart,	her	cleft	of	matted	fur.	(11)	 With	nets	and	sheets,	they	made	a	canopy	over	my	body,	and	I	curled	up	inside	the	air.	With	teeth	and	earth,	they	made	a	net	around	my	body,	and	I	curled	up	inside	my	hair.	(31)	
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In	conjuring	these	voices,	Kapil	attains	what	Cixous	describes	in	Stigmata	as	an	“electric	current,”	a	“quiver”	of	death	and	mortality	in	writing	(34).	Kapil	describes	her	text	as	“A	matrix	of	fluid	digits.	Images	of	children	in	the	under-world.	An	alphabet	to	O,	a	kind	of	mouth”	(7).	Humanimal	is	a	matrix,	a	womb,	in	which	the	girls’	spectres	are	invited	to	haunt	us.	This	haunting	proceeds	in	lettered	sections	of	the	text	that	stop	at	“O.”	In	fact,	“O”	is	repeated	three	times,	the	first	of	which	has	no	companion	text.	The	haunting	voices	have	disappeared,	as	if	the	wolfgirls	have	died	in	a	human	alphabet	all	over	again.	Kapil’s	own	voice	breaks	through	into	the	two	“O”	entries	that	follow,	where	a	girl	attempts	to	emerge	from	the	jungle	but	remains	“fused	forever	with	the	trees	of	the	perimeter”	(58).	Between	this	entry	and	the	last	entry	for	“O,”	Kapil	runs	across	beginnings	and	endings	of	her	Humanimal	journey,	which	has	become	a	story	of	interwoven	fictional,	historical,	and	autobiographical	threads:	she	finds	the	missionary’s	diary	in	a	library;	the	newborn	girls	are	left	at	the	jungle’s	perimeter	in	the	roots	of	a	tree;	Kapil	visits	caves	in	search	of	humanimal	faces;	and,	the	final	“O”	entry:	“I’ve	exhausted	the	alphabet.	But	I’m	not	writing	this	for	you”	(63).	Kapil’s	book	wounds	her	to	write	it,	and	we	feel	this	trauma	while	reading.	“I	wanted	to	write	until	they	were	real,”	she	says,	“When	they	began	to	breathe,	opening	their	mouths	in	the	space	next	to	writing,	I	stopped	writing”	(41).	This	humanimal	haunting	arises	by	digging,	by	following	death,	by	following	the	imund	that	leads	to	death’s	roots,	which	then	spread	out	in	interlacing	filaments	of	flourishing	life.		
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I	was	a	womb	again,	carrying	the	enfolding	unknown.	Each	day,	each	moment,	
I	saw	an	infinite	death	spread	out	before	me.	Mourning	that	death,	with	no	beginning	
or	end,	was	my	constant	impossibility.	There	is	no	joy	in	the	“if”	that	replaces	the	
“when.”	There	is	no	writing,	either.	The	last	two	entries	of	Humanimal,	numbered	“59.ii”	and	“60,”	go	to	the	roots:	“This	is	revision,	a	re-telling	of	planar	space.	In	the	enchanted	forest,	a	finger	strokes	the	forearm	of	the	reader	reading	of	a	tree	in	flower.	He	opens	the	flower	to	see	a	human	eye”	(64).	Cixous	describes	this	root	or	flower	stage	as	emerging	“at	the	moment	of	dying”:	These	flowers	are	not	signs	of	death,	they	are	alive.	In	these	moments	of	extremity,	perhaps	we	do	admit	to	having	a	relationship	with	the	vegetal,	which	is	as	intense,	as	embodied,	as	fleshly.	.	.	.	Perhaps	it	is	because	we	discover	at	this	point	that	flowers	lead	.	.	.	by	way	of	getting	through	the	earth,	with	their	roots,	to	the	core	of	the	matter.	They	lead	where	we	are	going:	we	need	them	as	guides.	(154)	A	pedagogical	HumAnimal	rhetorics	is	imund	with	joy	like	Lispector’s	G.H.	and	Kapil’s	Humanimal,	and	as	such,	strives	for	“reintegrating	the	earthly,	the	earth,	and	the	earth’s	composition	in	one’s	body,	imagination,	and	thought”	(Cixous	150).	This	kind	of	imund	writing	“drops	the	self,	the	speculating	self,	the	speculating	clever	‘I’”	and	instead	follows	the	body	“with	the	hand	running	.	.	.	the	hand	leads	to	the	flowers”	(156).			
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In	October	of	2015,	two	years	after	Meadow’s	death	and	exactly	one	year	and	
one	day	after	I	was	on	the	floor	with	a	second	small	death	in	my	hands,	I	gave	birth	to	
a	healthy	baby	girl.	We	named	her	Iris	Meadow.	
	
Digging	
		The	I	am	is	given	its	time	in	which	to	reflect	on	the	past	and	to	anticipate	its	future:	the	exposure	time	does	no	violence	to	the	time	of	the	I	am:	on	the	
Figure	18.	Portrait	from	photographer	Catherine	Just’s	series	
Chasing	the	Fog.	Web.	
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contrary,	one	has	the	strange	impression	that	the	exposure	time	is	the	lifetime.		 John	Berger	About	Looking	51		 	Were	my	snapshots	the	only	things	that	photographed	an	abyss?	Clarice	Lispector	The	Passion	According	to	G.H.	18	Perhaps	it	is	time	to	consider	how	a	pedagogical	HumAnimal	rhetorics	may	be	applied	with	what	I	have	referred	to	as	novel	autobiographical	forms.	Given	the	theoretical	focus	on	making	the	distance	between	shores	of	the	Human	and	the	Animal	vibrate	with	artistic	media,	projects	created	for	coursework	should	reach	for	the	same.	Students	are	encouraged	to	become	gravediggers,	seeking	to	uncover	interstices	and	fault	lines	in	their	own	lives,	whether	between	human	and	animal,	life	and	death,	male	and	female,	truth	and	falsity,	or	other	planar	shores	that	loom	heavy	in	culture	and	deny	the	foliated	nature	of	our	intra-actions.	Going	to	Cixous’s	school	of	roots	unleashes	spectres,	gives	these	spectres	voice,	and	challenges	“proper,”	established	identities	while	illustrating	our	material	entanglements	with	the	world.		Given	a	HumAnimal	rhetoric’s	focus	on	the	entanglement	of	materiality,	student	projects	are	best	performed	across	a	range	of	media.	Depending	upon	a	given	student’s	process	of	discovery,	these	autobiographical	projects	could	take	a	variety	of	forms;	they	may	include	compositions	that	incorporate	“objects”	of	everyday	life	similar	to	examples	given	in	Jody	Shipka’s	Toward	a	Composition	Made	
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Whole,	which	emphasizes	composition’s	“complex,	ongoing	processes	that	are	shaped	by,	and	provide	shape	for,	living”	(17).	I	would	further	argue	that	such	compositions	arise	from	rhetorical	entanglements	that	provide	shape	for	life	itself,	which—while	composed	within	one	biological	medium—has	many	expressions.	Such	projects	are	attempts	at	tracing	this	very	complex,	interwoven	becoming	of	natureculture,	bodymind,	and	humanimal,	the	resulting	artifacts	of	which	exhibit	a	condensation	of	this	fluid	process.		Gregory	Ulmer’s	electracy	provides	an	exceptionally	useful	methodology	for	a	HumAnimal	pedagogy,	particularly	given	his	emphasis	on	images,	autobiography,	and	heuretics	as	“a	mode	of	research	and	teaching”	inspired	by	avant-garde	artists	(“The	Heuretics”	103).	All	of	these	pedagogical	elements	are	important	to	Ulmer’s	unique	methodologies	(and	to	a	pedagogical	HumAnimal	rhetorics	as	well),	but	heuretics	is	especially	crucial	to	how	all	projects	and	materials	are	enacted.	Ulmer	describes	heuretics	as	“an	alternative	to	.	.	.	hermeneutics	and	critique”	that	“is	synonymous	with	thinking	as	discovery	rather	than	as	interpretation”	(106).	What	is	more,	heuretics	works	by	“creat[ing]	gaps,	gaps	in	understanding”	while	also	“provid[ing]	some	tools,	devices,	a	rhetoric	as	guides	for	filling	those	gaps”	(107).	Therefore,	heuretics	lends	itself	well	to	exploring	abyssal	divides	like	human	and	animal	and	inventing	ways	of	complicating	these	distances,	as	by	folding	and	entanglement	in	HumAnimal	rhetorics.	The	tools	for	exploring	(and	filling)	these	gaps	rely	upon	personal	exploration	and	invention,	which	Ulmer	illustrates	when	explaining	his	reaction	to	a	sculpture	by	Martin	Kippenberger:		
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The	gap	that	works	for	me	is	the	one	between	the	cardboard	box	and	its	name	or	namesake,	Rameau’s	Nephew.	I	think	at	once	of	Diderot,	of	his	hybrid	essay/fiction	the	title	borrowed	by	Kippenberger,	and	experience	a	pleasure	
of	recognition.	Nothing	is	communicated	to	me,	no	message	in	any	case,	but	I	
am	oriented	in	a	certain	direction.	(110,	my	emphasis)	The	process	of	discovering	the	“gap	that	works”	for	each	student	and	then	filling	this	gap	proceeds	by	Ulmer’s	logic	of	invention,	conduction,	which	operates	much	like	Freud’s	“dream	work”	(110).	Seemingly	random	connections	can	be	followed	and	previously	abandoned	trajectories	revisited	in	something	like	a	purposeful	wandering	of	meaning-making.	As	such,	one	similarly	wanders	away	from	precise,	absolute,	proper	ways	of	knowing.	What	is	created	in	this	gap	resembles	myth—an	allegory	of	the	self	(107).		 Conduction	is	also	the	logic	working	within	Ulmer’s	mystory	genre,	which	seeks	an	“inmixing	of	autobiographical	and	theoretical	speculations”	(“Teletheory”	51).	Invention	becomes	autobiographical	by	a	“living	description	of	[…]	writing”	(51).	Ulmer	quotes	Derrida’s	“Coming	into	One’s	Own,”	to	illustrate	this	peculiar	process:	“It’s	not,	strictly	speaking,	a	matter	of	superposition,	nor	of	parallelism,	nor	of	analogy,	nor	of	coincidence.	The	necessity	that	links	the	two	descriptions	is	of	a	different	sort:	we	shall	not	find	it	easy	to	give	a	name	to	it”	(51).	Derrida’s	description	very	closely	resembles	Barad’s	entanglement	or	methodology	of	diffraction,	diffraction	again	being	the	“differences	that	make	a	difference”	(72).	At	the	very	least,	we	are	here	again	seeing	an	intervention	of	the	otherwise	presumed	
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objective	scientist	or	writer	who	is	thought	of,	particularly	in	Western	philosophy	and	science,	as	separate	from	his	or	her	object	of	study.	Suddenly	the	scientist/theorist/writer	is	inescapably	entangled.	Mystory	is	essentially	this	entanglement	of	oneself	with	knowledge—a	threading-through	of	autobiographical	content	toward	further	production	of	meaning.	In	terms	of	a	HumAnimal	rhetorics,	this	autobiographical	element	of	wandering	through	and	entangling	with	knowledge—questioning	the	“whole	topography	of	the	autos,	the	self”—is	especially	productive	(Derrida	“Coming”	135).	When	this	is	paired	with	images,	as	in	Ulmer’s	“Choramancy:	A	User’s	Guide,”	for	example,	recognition	of	punctums	becomes	a	way	for	seeking	the	foliated	structure	of	the	“I.”	Like	Ulmer’s	choramancy,	the	autobiographical	features	of	a	HumAnimal	pedagogy	incorporate	seemingly	disparate	fragments	that	resonate	when	entangled	in	material-discursive	inventions.	Ulmer	does	this	with	the	Florida	Research	Ensemble	by	seeking	a	repeating	punctum	in	photographs	taken	around	a	problematic	area	of	Miami.	This	particular	project	takes	a	local	issue	as	its	point	of	departure	for	heuretical	consultation.	A	similar	project,	perhaps	more	attuned	to	HumAnimal	rhetorics,	may	take	as	its	departure	any	number	of	conceptual	fault	lines	that	leave	two	shores	in	need	of	entanglement.	Abyssal	frontiers	can	be	uncovered	heuretically—with	images	as	well	as	writing—by	following	death,	by	seeking	recognition	of	wounds,	or	by	following	the	“tug”	of	a	humanimal	tail.	What	unexpectedly	wounds	us	and	why?	These	are	the	wounds	from	which	dormant	spectres	arise	and	patterns	become	apparent,	whether	we	seek	punctums	in	images	
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or	words.	Kapil	does	something	similar	in	Humanimal	by	entangling	herself	in	the	pursuit	of	a	documentary:	Of	the	sixteen	children	who	were	born,	only	seven—six	boys	and	a	girl—survived	into	childhood	proper.	One	of	the	boys	pushed	the	girl	off	the	roof	and	then	there	were	six.	My	father	was	the	second	oldest,	and	though	I	am	not	sure	if	the	image—my	aunt	Subudhra	falling	upside	down	to	her	death,	a	kite’s	slim	rope	still	bound	to	her	wrist	and	wrapped	twice	around	her	knuckles—is	relevant	to	the	story	I	am	telling,	it	accompanies	it.	In	the	quick,	black	take	of	a	body’s	flight,	a	body’s	eviction	or	sudden	loss	of	place,	the	memory	of	descent	functions	as	a	subliminal	flash.	(30)	The	book	trembles	with	this	unexpected	interweaving	of	Kapil’s	family	tragedies	and	the	lyrical,	haunting	voices	given	to	the	wolfgirls.	Upon	discovering	the	depths	of	the	girls’	story	and	the	way	it	affects	her,	Kapil	creates	something	more	than	a	documentary.	She	creates	something	with	flesh	that	wounds	us	and	is	wounded	in	return.	The	project	resonates,	vibrates	with	humanimal	intensities,	when	she	enters	this	poetic	space.		Kapil	writes	in	fragments,	alternating	voice	and	perspective.	Cixous	describes	how	three	of	her	favorite	writers—Jean	Genet,	Kafka,	and	Lispector—all	wrote	on	scraps	of	paper	as	they	were	dying:	“There	is	a	‘style’	of	dying	in	which	we	find	something	economical,	extremely	dense,	compact,	urgent,	and,	at	the	same	time,	very	tender”	(Three	153).	At	one	point	in	his	life,	“economic	need”	forced	Walter	Benjamin	to	write	on	“reverse	sides	of	letters	sent	to	him,	postcards	or	an	invitation	
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to	review,	library	forms,	travel	tickets,	proofs,	an	advertisement	for	‘S.	Pelligrino,’	prescription	pads,”	leaving	behind	“a	wealth	of	compressed	sheets,	notes,	scraps,	on	which	his	great	work	unfolds	richly	detailed”	(Marx	et	al.	31).	Whereas	Cixous	talks	of	writing	on	scraps	as	an	indication	of	death,	Roland	Barthes	writes	in	fragments	for	the	pleasure	of	“beginnings.”	In	his	autobiography	Roland	Barthes,	which	he	narrates	in	the	third	person—outside	of	himself	(a	fragmented	self)—Barthes	writes:	“Liking	to	find,	to	write	beginnings,	he	tends	to	multiply	this	pleasure:	that	is	why	he	writes	in	fragments”	(94,	his	emphasis).	Barthes	discusses	this	fragmented	nature	of	his	autobiography	directly:	“To	write	by	fragments:	the	fragments	are	then	so	many	stones	on	the	perimeter	of	a	circle:	I	spread	myself	around:	my	whole	little	universe	in	crumbs;	at	the	center,	what?”	(92-93).	Scraps	and	fragments	of	writing	seem	to	populate	the	act	of	dying,	the	desire	for	beginnings,	and	the	impoverished	who	have	few	resources.	They	also	fulfill	the	need	for	movement,	for	incompletion.	The	fragmentary	nature	of	these	scraps	of	thoughts	also	makes	them	more	likely	to	be	mistaken	as	refuse,	as	something	left-over,	expelled,	unclean	(or	perhaps	they	are	these	things).	They	must	be	gathered,	attended	to,	and	cherished	by	someone	who	realizes	their	value.	This	writing	from	the	extremities	of	life,	from	its	roots	“where	those	who	are	excluded	live,”	is	also	a	HumAnimal	writing,	for	it	is	a	writing	that	is	entangled	in	the	lived	reality	of	the	world	(Cixous	Three	116).	Scraps	and	fragments	destabilize	wholeness,	delivering	themselves	more	readily	to	the	decomposing	earth	or	to	scattering	like	petals	blown	out	to	sea.	
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The	fragmentary	nature	of	writing	is	abundant	in	contemporary	times	as	well,	with	texting,	tweets,	Facebook	statuses,	snapchat	messages,	and	even	image-based	sharing	like	the	six-second	looping	videos	on	Vine	and	photo	sharing	on	apps	like	Instagram.	Given	that	selfies	are	condensations	of	a	kind	of	naïve	visual	autobiography	(we	have	already	seen	how	damaging	such	naivety	can	be	in	Chapter	3),	we	will	turn	toward	these	visages	on	our	final	descent.		 As	Jill	Walker	Rettberg	explains	in	her	recent	book	Seeing	Ourselves	Through	
Technology:	How	We	Use	Selfies,	Blogs,	and	Wearable	Devices	to	See	and	Shape	
Ourselves,	self-portraits	in	the	photographic	medium	are	not	in	any	way	new.	In	the	early	1900s,	photographers	like	Kate	Matthew	and	Ilse	Bing	took	self-portraits	with	cameras	that	were	often	too	expensive	or	otherwise	encumbering	for	most	people,	so	these	types	of	photo	self-portraits	were	not	common.	From	there,	self-portraiture	in	photography	became	increasingly	experimental.	As	one	example	of	this	experimentation,	Rettberg	cites	Eleanor	Antin’s	Carving:	A	Traditional	Sculpture	from	1972,	which	is	displayed	in	linear	fragments,	depicting	the	author’s	gradual	weight-loss	over	a	period	of	37	days	(8).	Mark	C.	Taylor	also	discusses	self-portraits	in	The	Moment	of	Complexity,	looking	specifically	at	artist	Chuck	Close’s	work.	While	known	for	his	photo-realistic	paintings,	Close	also	creates	self-portraits	of	striking	complexity	by	constructing	them	from	grids	of	individual	painting	fragments.	Taylor	describes	these	works	as	“no	longer	static	images”	but	rather	“dynamic	interactive	processes”	(134).	Although	Close	is	a	painter,	his	artworks	are	an	important	example	of	how	truly	dynamic	and	interactive	the	materiality	of	art	can	be.	Indeed,	
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looking	at	Close’s	Self-Portrait	from	1997,	a	multispecies	or	superorganism	of	interrelated	parts	is	what	first	comes	to	mind	rather	than	an	individual’s	face.			 In	an	online	course	called	“Self-Portraiture	as	Medicine,”	professional	photographer	Catherine	Just	begins	by	asking	her	students	to	consider	the	difference	between	a	“selfie”	and	a	self-portrait.	Most	selfies	look	remarkably	similar;	they	do	not	tend	to	explore	any	kind	of	dynamic	relationality	or	any	complication	of	the	“self”	being	depicted.	And,	taken	together	across	an	Instagram	gallery	or	some	other	social	media	platform,	they	seem	to	maintain	this	type	of	static,	flat	demonstration	of	the	“I.”	Self-portraiture,	on	the	other	hand,	explores	and	complicates	the	self	through	a	variety	of	ways.	The	“I”	in	“I	am”	is	not	taken	as	a	given,	but	rather	is	fractured	and	fragmented	using	different	photographic	effects.	In	terms	of	Just’s	own	self-portraiture,	she	describes	it	primarily	as	a	process	of	discovery:	I	let	myself	take	pictures	that	don’t	work	until	I	take	the	pictures	that	do	work,	and	I	love	the	process.	.	.	.	It’s	really	a	dance	between	my	camera,	myself	and	this	other	energy	that,	when	I’m	not	controlling	so	much,	uh,	allows	that	energy	to	come	in	and	have	some	sort	of	say.	It’s	like	alchemy	.	.	.	letting	the	unknown	or	the	unexpected	to	occur.	.	.	.	and	I	let	it	become	its	own	thing	and	it’s	like	a	dance,	it	becomes	this	living,	breathing	process.	(Just)	Just’s	haunting,	ghost-like	images	are	created	when	she	digs	“into	the	underworld,	into	the	emotion,”	seeking	this	dirt	and	depth	and	movement	(Just).	Movement	is	
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prevalent	in	much	of	her	work;	she	describes	its	significance	as	“explor[ing]	the	space	in	between	the	words”	(Just).	The	emotion	in	her	self-portraits	is	palpable,	perhaps	even	more	so	than	the	photos	Barthes	offers	in	Camera	Lucida2.	But	the	point	of	creating	these	self-portraits	is	not	to	stir	a	reaction	or	emotion	in	others,	at	least	not	in	this	photography	course.	Just’s	course	is	designed	with	an	outcome	of	moving	toward	healing.	The	specific	reasons	why	someone	in	this	course	would	need	healing	are	not	disclosed,	but	it	is	taken	as	a	given	that	every	“student”	is	working	through	something	that	has	do	with	a	fractured	“I.”	In	performing	this	alchemical	process	of	self-portraiture	through	Just’s	daily	prompts,	these	students	seem	to	be	filling	or	folding	this	fractured	space	in	themselves	(much	like	the	dream	
work	of	Ulmer’s	conduction).	The	portraits	do	not	create	answers	so	much	as	they	conjure	ghosts.			
Figure	19.	Self-portrait	from	photographer	
Catherine	Just’s	series	Chasing	the	Fog.	Web.	
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I	too	enrolled	in	Just’s	course	as	a	kind	of	performative	undertaking	for	research.	Barad	emphasizes	performative	enactments	of	entanglement,	so	this	was	my	motivation.	While	Just	seems	to	explain	a	process	that	is	somewhat	loose	and	free	or	freeing,	the	assignment	prompts	were	quite	structural	and	seemed	to	imply	an	easy	translation	between	words	and	images.	The	first	day’s	assignment	read	as	follows:		Please	write	out	a	list	of	words	that	correlate	with	a	relationship	you’re	currently	in.	Adjectives	that	describe	it.	Words	that	help	define	it.	Emotions,	etc.	.	.	.	What	would	those	words	look	like	visually?	What	would	your	feelings	around	this	relationship	look	and	feel	like?	Explore	this	today.	(Just)	What	Just	seems	to	be	prescribing	as	part	of	this	“medicine”	is	to	designate	props	in	an	attempt	to	capture	an	emotion	in	these	images	and	control	the	“creative	process.”	To	me,	these	instructions	come	across	as	more	structural	than	what	I	am	typically	comfortable	with.	But,	it	was	a	performative	undertaking,	so	I	did	it.	What	I	did	not	expect	in	following	these	seemingly	prosaic	directions	was	to	be	transformed	in	any	way,	but—to	my	astonishment—a	cascade	of	emotions	and	energy	arose	as	I	created	and	edited	these	images.	The	relationships	I	chose	to	explore	in	response	to	Just’s	prompt—that	of	mother,	student,	and	academic—emerged	in	a	vivid	way.	When	I	looked	upon	the	my-self	that	emerged	in	these	portraits,	I	saw	all	of	those	relationships	and	none	of	them.	They	were	there,	like	Chuck	Close’s	miniature	grid-like	paintings,	but	what	arose	in	their	dynamic	interplay	was	a	woman	I	both	recognized	and	never	knew.	I	cried.	This	was,	for	me,	an	emergence	of	complexity	I	
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had	not	expected.	Just	is	right:	it	is	like	alchemy.	The	photograph	created	a	wound,	a	vibration,	that	made	me	reconsider	my	own	topos	of	self.		 Given	the	predominance	of	selfies	circulating	on	social	media,	I	see	a	“selfie	vs.	self-portrait”	assignment	especially	appropriate	for	a	course	in	HumAnimal	rhetorics	that	seeks	to	question	our	ability	to	stand	back	and	point	at	a	human	self.	The	medium	in	which	this	is	attempted	also	“meets	students	where	they	are”	in	the	kind	of	technologies	they	are	comfortable	with,	thus	giving	these	technologies	and	social	media	sites	an	increased	importance.	Rather	than	composing	selfie	after	selfie,	each	of	which	looks	identical	to	the	next,	this	process	of	filling	or	folding	the	gaps	that	inevitably	fracture	the	“I”	to	which	we	point	makes	these	technologies	resonate	with	new	meaning;	they	become	a	pathway	through	which	we	seek	an	emergence	and	vibration,	a	sudden	moment	when	we	see	the	quiver	of	life.	The	grid	of	images	on	Instagram,	for	example,	can	ignite	this	more	complex	sensation	of	looking.			In	following	the	hand	to	the	roots	or	flowers,	as	Cixous	advocates,	rather	than	back	to	the	human	self,	we	seek	a	strange	pedagogy	of	the	humanimal	that	is	imund	with	joy.	It	is	out	of	the	clean	and	orderly	world.	It	is	a	haunting	of	the	“I”	we	presume	to	know.	Given	these	roots,	further	assignments	and	projects	will	surely	burgeon	forth	in	a	more	complete	and	complex	flowering.	For	now,	let	us	turn	from	our	terrestrial	roots	to	the	“briny	womb	of	the	sea”	that,	too,	is	enfolded	within	us	all	(Schilthuizen	19).	
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Sea	
	 Yet	it	may	be	possible	to	begin	to	use	photographs	according	to	a	practice	addressed	to	an	alternative	future.	 John	Berger	About	Looking	60		The	whale’s	eye—midnight,	mid-ocean—had	no	eyelashes	and,	according	to	another	wildlife	officer,	no	tear	ducts	(for	what	would	be	the	point	of	crying	in	the	sea?).	 Rebecca	Giggs	“Whale	Fall”	
Figure	20.	Sketch	and	watercolor	of	fin,	Sei,	and	humpback	whales	done	by	
Illustrator	Chris	Wallbank	during	a	marine	mammal	survey	in	the	Barents	Sea.	1	
Jul	2014;	Web.	
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In	“Writing	Offshore:	The	Disappearing	Coastline	of	Composition,”	Cynthia	Haynes	characterizes	composition	pedagogy	as	having	“kept	too	close	to	the	shoreline,	dragging	the	anchor	of	argumentative	writing	(a.k.a.	critical	thinking)	until	it	took	hold	on	the	bedrock	curricula	of	grammar	and	style,	aims	and	modes,	claims,	grounds,	and	warrants,”	and	in	doing	so,	“has	run	aground	like	some	leviathan,	a	beached	whale	that	inexplicably	(and	paradoxically)	crawls	onto	the	shore”	(668).	Haynes	advocates	for	a	pushing	off	from	solid	ground	to	abstraction,	to	detaching	from	the	“why”	that	is	insufficient	for	facing	the	pervasive	violence	and	tragedies	that	defy	reason.	Indeed,	she	is	haunted	in	their	wake	and	in	the	inability	to	respond	with	argument,	with	reason,	to	these	tragedies	(669).	In	response	to	this	“will	to	strand”	of	composition	pedagogy,	Haynes	pushes	off	from	this	shore	“that	compels	us	to	teach	good	writing	as	the	invention	of	good	reasons,”	seeking	instead	“an	idea	that	will	bear	us	(by	indirection)	toward	non-sovereign	outposts	along	transitory	migration	routes”	(670).	With	this	pedagogy	of	writing	offshore,	we	can	imagine	“composition	theory	.	.	.	as	lashed	to	the	hull	of	an	itinerant	aporia—Ahab	at	the	helm,	bearings	lost,	the	image	of	Keats’	[sic]	epitaph,	‘Here	lies	one	whose	name	was	writ	on	water’”	(670-671).	A	HumAnimal	rhetorics	similarly	seeks	to	abandon	this	shoreline	and	the	“will	to	strand,”	(Haynes	“Writing”	668)	for	Rebecca	Giggs	has	already	given	a	vivid	image	of	such	a	terrible	fate:		In	the	morning	a	part	of	the	whale	that	ought	not	be	outside	of	it	was	outside	of	it.	A	digestive	organ,	frilled	and	pale	in	the	foam.	The	whale’s	billiard-ball	
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eyes	tumbled	in	its	head	and	its	breathing	sounded	labored.	The	sharks	slid	into	vapor,	a	squinting	rumour.	No	blood	on	the	tideline.	People	stayed	back	from	the	water	nonetheless.	.	.	.	Seagulls	flew	down	to	peck	avian	hieroglyphs	in	the	whale’s	back.	At	every	nip	it	flinched,	still	intensely	alive	and	tormented.	(Giggs)	Indeed,	“we	need	the	sea”	(Haynes	“Writing”	674).	And	even	more	so,	we	need	the	entanglement	of	the	whale	fall.		 To	proceed	into	these	watery	depths	with	a	pedagogy	of	images,	particularly	images	of	animals	in	our	case,	is	to	leave	this	shoreline	for	“the	fringes”	of	rhetorical	pedagogy,	of	which	Ulmer	is	also	a	part.	This	writing	of	the	whale	fall	in	visual	culture	is	simultaneously	a	writing	of	our	own	hypersea	(see	Chapter	2);	in	these	waters	rhetorical	life	is	enfolded.	“We	are	all	boat	people,”	and	we	are	also	sea	creatures	entangled	in	these	uncanny	depths	with	their	mysterious	ontological	origins	(Haynes	“Writing”	697).	Let	us	attempt	to	write	this	wounding	of	the	whale	fall.		 To	invent	an	image	that	offers	an	encountering	look	to	the	unseeing	animals	within	means	to	write	a	haunting.	Perhaps	the	beginning	of	offering	animals	an	encountering	look	in	visual	media	is	to	acknowledge	their	(individual)	deaths	in	the	first	place.	In	“Indexical	Humans,	Iconic	Animals,”	Stacy	Rule	discusses	animal	death	in	film,	arguing	that	animals	are	typically	visually	depicted	as	iconic,	referring	to	a	vague	group	of	similar	animals,	rather	than	indexical	or	particular.	Rule	suggests	narration	and	editing	as	techniques	for	revealing	these	individual	deaths	in	film.	For	
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example,	narration	of	a	documentary	film	on	seal	clubbing	would	create	a	more	indexical	animal	if	each	seal	were	referred	to	as	an	individual:	“This	is	a	very	young	seal.	This	seal	is	probably	only	two	or	three	weeks	of	age”	(Rule	547,	her	emphasis).	The	use	of	such	pronouns	illuminates	each	animal	as	an	individual	capable	of	death.	However	successful	such	an	approach	may	be	(and	Rule	is	herself	skeptical),	it	is	trapped	within	the	representationalist	framework	for	looking	and	grasping,	hence	the	need	for	a	narrator	to	identify	and	direct	from	the	ship’s	helm:	this	is	who	counts,	this	is	where	to	care.	These	“demonstrative	pronouns”	for	identifying	indexes	may	differentiate	animals	from	one	another,	illuminating	each	death,	but	they	also	maintain	the	abyssal	divide	between	human	and	animal.		Returning	again	to	Catherine	Chalmers,	we	are	faced	with	animal	death	of	the	decidedly	un-cute	kind	in	her	American	Cockroach	video	series.	In	her	video	“Burned	at	the	Stake,”	a	cockroach	is	displayed	up	close	so	that	we	see	her	face	(as	G.H.	saw	the	face	of	her	barata).	In	the	beginning	of	the	video,	the	roach	is	simply	there,	facing	us,	twiddling	her	little	legs.	But	then	we	see	the	leg	movements	speed	up	as	if	suddenly	frantic;	a	dark	smoke	rises.	The	black	curling	smoke	rises	while	we	are	still	face-to-face	with	this	frantic	roach.	The	camera	pans	out	to	show	flames	licking	the	cockroach’s	body,	eventually	lighting	it	on	fire.	While	this	animated	death	features	an	animal	that	(for	many)	embodies	everything	detestable	about	the	nonhuman	and	unclean,	what	is	striking	is	the	discomfort	and	sympathy	(and	anger)	at	witnessing	her	death:		
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We	have	difficulty	looking	something	in	the	eye	as	it	dies—even	if	we	really	want	it	dead.	.	.	.	Humans	are	incredibly	efficient	killers,	yet	remarkably	queasy	at	facing	or	acknowledging	what	we	do.	For	us,	there	is	a	disjuncture	between	mass,	anonymous,	silent	deaths,	and	those	that	have	been	individualized.	We	do	not	feel	the	same	emotion	and	responsibility	for	what	we	do	not	witness,	whether	it	is	behind-the-wall	pesticide	death,	or	the	graver	problem	of	wildlife	loss	from	habitat	destruction.		Thankfully,	Chalmers	explains	how	she	animated	the	filmed	torture	with	“already-dead	bugs.”	Indeed,	it	is	clear	in	reading	her	artist’s	interview	on	the	project	just	how	unlikely	an	actual	death	would	be	at	her	hands.	Chalmers	loves	these	cockroaches,	and	her	artwork	provides	a	compelling	complication	of	our	clean	borders	(and	floors).	Our	clean	deaths.	Perhaps	the	video	has	a	similar	effect	as	the	transformative	experience	in	Lispector’s	novel	when	G.H.	is	riveted	by	the	roach’s	face	and	body,	its	truth	in	the	unclean—poised	in	that	liminal	space	between	life	and	death.		Dead	and	dying	animal	bodies	seem	to	orient	us	toward	a	shared	material	finitude.	What	does	it	matter	whether	one	is	capable	of	being-toward-death?	What	is	
at	stake	in	such	a	distinction?	We	die.	We	all	die;	the	stake	burns.	Spectres	arise.	Chris	Jordan’s	photo	series	of	dead	albatross	bodies	on	the	Midway	Atoll	islands	offer	another	example	of	how	these	hauntings	may	be	initiated	by	an	orientation	toward	animal	death	(see	Chaper	1).	Steve	Baker’s	series	Norfolk	Roadkill,	Mainly	is	similar	to	Jordan’s	in	the	photographic	capture	of	dead	animal	bodies,	though	the	
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roadkill	make	this	less	a	surprising	series	of	deaths	than	Jordan’s	being-with/dying-with	plastic	of	the	albatross.	Roadkill	is	unique	in	that	it	exposes	us	to	deaths	we	are	often	directly	entangled	with	in	everyday	life,	and	yet	these	deaths	remain	invisible	and	largely	unacknowledged.	In	an	interview	with	Susan	McHugh	about	this	series,	Baker	quotes	artist	Angela	Singer	as	an	influence:	“The	animal,	having	no	grave	site,	no	bodily	burial,	becomes	its	own	memorial”	(McHugh).	Baker’s	photos,	captured	with	the	date	and	location,	bear	witness	to	each	particular,	individual	animal	death	and	its	embodied	memorial.	The	animal	bodies	range	in	their	level	of	decomposition,	sometimes	only	eerily	referring	to	what	must	once	have	been	an	organic	body,	now	just	“ghostly	stains	and	remains	of	just	a	few	bits	of	fur,	feather,	bone”	(McHugh).	Each	photo	is	also	juxtaposed	with	an	image	of	medieval	architecture	or	some	other	disparate	fragment	of	artwork	in	order	to	create	a	higher	level	of	complexity	relating	to	a	humanimal	sense	of	art	and	place.	Further,	these	visual	logs	of	dead	animal	bodies	are	encountered	by	Baker	as	a	kind	of	autobiographical	tracing,	or	what	he	refers	to	as	a	“peculiar	kind	of	travelogue”	of	“unwelcome	interruptions”	while	biking	throughout	his	hometown	in	Maine	(McHugh).		Perhaps	while	moving	beyond	this	photographic	witnessing	to/entangling	with	animal	death,	we	can	take	these	hauntings	and	their	wounds	with	us	to	acknowledge	and	enable	a	gift	of	being	to	living	animal	bodies.	But	how	should	we	compose	photos	of	living	animals	to	make	them	vibrate	with	a	sensation	of	the	living	without	grasping	and	objectifying?	In	Memoires	of	the	Blind,	Derrida	reflects	on	a	
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blindness	that	is	“an	essence	of	the	eye”	to	which	we	are	not	typically	attuned:	“The	blindness	that	opens	the	eye	is	not	the	one	that	darkens	vision.	The	revelatory	or	apocalyptic	blindness,	the	blindness	that	reveals	the	very	truth	of	the	eyes,	would	be	the	gaze	veiled	by	tears”	(127).	Britta	Jaschinski’s	animal	photographs	are	excellent	
examples	of	how	this	“apocalyptic	blindness”	might	be	performed	in	visual	media.	Jaschinski	gives	back	to	animals	their	movement	and	darkness	while	giving	us,	the	viewers,	a	veiled	kind	of	looking,	as	if	our	eyes	were	filled	with	tears	in	such	an	attempt.	We	get	a	sense	of	the	haunting	wounds	in	this	humanimal-animal	entanglement,	wounds	that	deepen	and	resonate	with	this	looking.	Animals	in	Jaschinski’s	photos	remain	out	of	focus,	out	of	frame,	blurred	in	movement	and	hidden	in	that	which	exceeds	the	photograph’s	sight.	As	viewers,	we	are	simultaneously	seeing	and	not	seeing:	a	giraffe’s	elegant	silhouette;	the	blurred	
Figure	21.	Photograph	of	a	zoo	giraffe.	Britta	Jaschinski;	Web.	
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stripes	of	a	tiger	bowing	its	head;	the	texture	of	an	elephant’s	trunk	as	it	confronts	the	lens	(behind	this	lens,	our	bodies—and	connecting	them	this	photographic	materiality),	its	face	in	shadow	except	for	one	small	eye.	What	does	this	elephant	see?	In	Jaschinski’s	photographs,	looking	becomes	more	like	an	act	of	feeling-with;	images	come	to	resemble	the	caress	of	ultrasonography,	revealing	a	murky,	mysterious	image	of	inner	enfolding	depths	that	betray	any	discrete	bodies	and	boundaries.	In	Humanimal,	Kapil	writes:		Notes	for	film:	“A	girl	emerges	from	a	darker	space	into	the	upper	rooms	of	the	jungle.	Blurry	photographs/transitions	of	light.”	How	does	this	sentence	go	into	animals?	Notes	for	an	animal-human	mix:	“Reaching	and	touching	were	the	beginning	actions.”	(27)		How	do	we	create	a	photograph	with	flesh—yours	and	mine—made	of	the	skin	of	light,	the	depths	of	an	entire	oceanic	journey	below?	We	seek	its	pulse,	its	vibration.	We	give	it	room	to	breathe.	We	let	it	run	and	hide.	
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Taken	in	a	pedagogical	sense,	amateur	photography	is	an	excellent	medium	in	which	to	attempt	these	conjurings	of	animal	spectres	and	the	entanglements	of	being	that	wound	as	they	recede.	Students	can	engage	in	visual	travelogues	like	Steve	Baker’s	as	a	witnessing	of	animal	death,	composed	in	conjunction	with	their	own	stories,	attunements,	or	everyday	encounters.	Examples	of	this	kind	of	witnessing/entangling	already	exist	on	amateur	platforms.	For	example,	Instagram	user	“jasonistaken”	has	created	a	series	of	such	photos	woven	throughout	his	regular	feed.	We	see	moments	of	tenderness	and	surprise:	a	small	grey	bird	lies	on	an	outstretched	leaf	surrounded	by	four	pink	and	yellow	flower	blooms;	another	bird	is	cradled	in	a	leaf;	yet	another	is	left	on	the	pavement	and	adorned	with	small	flower	buds.	Jason	remembers	them	for	all	of	us	with	his	organic	makeshift	memorials	and	the	hashtag	“#pleaseinventsofterglass.”	And	if	we	look	around	his	gallery,	another	humanimal	pattern	arises:	Jason	collects	fragments	of	broken	things	he	finds	while	walking	on	the	beach.	The	undecidable	shore—where	dead	and	dying	marine	animals	arrive	as	the	living-almost-dead,	where	composition	pedagogy	has	become	anchored—delivers	treasures	that	hint	of	a	deeper	sea	of	
Figure	22.	Instagram	photo	of	pottery	found	on	
a	beach	in	Charleston.	7	Jul	2013;	Web.	
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being.	How	do	we	capture	something	fleeting	like	the	ebbing	tide	or	the	pulse	of	a	life	flitting	by?	How	do	we	taste	its	salt	and	feel	its	quiver?	These	fragments	of	bone,	china,	sea	glass,	teeth	and	pottery	call	us	forth	to	the	sea	and	to	the	whale	fall	below.	A	collection	of	these	disembodied	fragments	drawn	together	into	a	new	patchwork	body	that	tangles	and	vibrates	with	a	sensation	larger	than	itself	is	another	potential	humanimal	project.			This	project	and	the	pedagogy	enfolded	within	offer	a	crucial	deepening	component	to	rhetorical	studies.	Whether	“ascending	downward”	by	earth	or	by	sea,	our	material-discursive	practices	and	the	cuts	they	enact	create	our	shared	quantum,	biological,	material	reality.	To	embrace	the	imund,	to	feel-with	the	whale	fall	in	visual	culture,	these	vibrations	reach	beyond	thresholds	and	seek	alternative	matterings	and,	in	doing	so,	have	ethical	implications.	Barad	emphasizes	these	implications	when	she	describes	how	“a	delicate	tissue	of	ethicality	runs	through	the	marrow	of	being”	(396).	Delicate	tissues	tear.	The	alternate	autobiographies	and	images	I	propose	for	a	HumAnimal	pedagogy	are	performative	intra-actions	that	question	what	we	mean	when	we	say	“human,”	when	we	say	“animal,”	when	we	say	“I.”	These	are	the	“small	cuts”	that	matter.	As	Catherine	Chalmers	reminds	us,	“we	have	been	drawing	lines	in	the	sand	forever,”	perhaps	“now	is	a	good	time	to	reimagine	what’s	on	the	other	side”	(Chalmers).	What	is	on	the	other	side	in	these	shifting	sands	of	being	flows	back	through	our	own	materiality.	What	is	on	the	other	side	is	the	animal	“I,”	the	dead	and	dying	“I,”	the	spectres	of	a	fragmented	“I”	that	we	
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must	attempt	to	conjure	with	each	incoming	tide,	or	we	must	plunge	into	the	ocean	after	them.	I	will	swim	all	the	way	out	and	let	it	take	me	under,	knowing	that	in	that	deep,	I	am	enfolded	in	the	tumultuous	rhetoricity	of	life.	I	echo	Kapil	here,	wanting	to	write	until	these	animal	spectres	begin	to	breathe,	“opening	their	mouths	in	the	space	next	to	writing”	(41).	The	vague,	dark,	haunting	sketch	that	chases	this	breath	is	what	I	am	following:	a	being	imund	with	joy.		
		 	
Figure	23.	Instagram	photo	of	a	makeshift	bird	memorial.	jasonistaken;	14	
Oct	2014;	Web.	
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NOTES		Chapter	One	1.	See	Stacy	Alaimo	Bodily	Natures:	Science,	Environment,	and	the	Material	Self.	2.	Humanimal	has	been	used	as	a	term	elsewhere	and	is	not	of	my	own	creation,	including	the	poetic	account	of	two	real	children	found	living	amongst	wolves:	
Humanimal:	A	Project	for	Future	Children	by	Bhanu	Kapil	(from	which	I	quote	at	length	in	Chapter	5).	In	the	introduction	of	Cary	Wolfe’s	Posthumanism,	W.J.T.	Mitchell	also	suggests	this	term	as	a	new	way	of	referring	to	humans.	I	use	the	term	here	to	avoid	the	awkward	“cutting”	forward	slash	that	I	might	otherwise	use	in	some	form	of	hum/an/imal.	I	also	prefer	it	to	otherwise	labeling	animals	as	“nonhuman	animals,”	which	is	common,	and	which	leaves	the	“human”	perfectly	intact	and	unaffected	by	this	critical	interaction	of	human	and	animal	(as	in:	humans	and	nonhuman	animals).	From	this	point	on,	I	will	capitalize	the	letters	“H”	and	“A”	in	HumAnimal	when	specifically	referring	to	its	use	within	rhetorical	studies.	This	special	case	of	selective	capitalization	illuminates	the	critical	juncture	of	“Human”	and	“Animal”	within	the	field.	In	all	other	cases,	“humanimal”	will	be	used.		3.	See	Karen	Barad	Meeting	the	Universe	Halfway.	4.	See	Elizabeth	Kolbert’s	The	Sixth	Extinction:	An	Unnatural	History.	5.	With	the	demonstrated	concentration	of	580,000	pieces	of	plastic	waste	per	square	kilometer.	
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6.	Benthos	organisms	occupy	the	very	deepest	spaces	in	the	ocean.	They	are	sustained	by	the	death	of	other	organisms	that	often	drift	down	from	a	higher	oceanic	layer	(See	Chapter	4).	7.	A	more	precise	statistic	for	animals	killed	annually	is	difficult	to	determine	with	numbers	ranging	from	nine	billion	“land”	animals	to	56	billion	“farm”	animals	to	150	billion	animals	(total)	slaughtered.	According	to	the	USDA,	nearly	10.2	billion	land	animals	were	killed	in	the	United	States	in	2010.		8.	In	a	2011	issue	of	Philosophy	and	Rhetoric,	Debra	Hawhee,	Diane	Davis,	and	John	Muckelbauer	respond	to	Kennedy’s	article	and	the	possibility	for	reconsidering	this	inclusion	of	animals	within	rhetorical	studies.	9.	Complex:	Byron	Hawk’s	A	Counter-History	of	Composition:	Toward	Methodologies	
of	Complexity;	embodied:	Jack	Selzer	and	Sharon	Crowley’s	edited	collection	
Rhetorical	Bodies	and	Debra	Hawhee’s	Moving	Bodies:	Kenneth	Burke	at	the	Edges	of	
Language;	adaptive:	Alex	Parrish’s	Adaptive	Rhetoric:	Evolution,	Culture,	and	the	Art	
of	Persuasion;	preoriginary:	Diane	Davis’s	“Autozoography:	Notes	Toward	a	Rhetoricity	of	the	Living,”	and	Michelle	Ballif’s	“Regarding	the	Dead”;	ambient:	Thomas	Rickert’s	Ambient	Rhetoric;	strange:	Nathaniel	Rivers’	“Deep	Ambivalence	and	Wild	Objects:	Toward	a	Strange	Environmental	Rhetoric.”	10.	See	diffraction	vs.	reflection	as	a	preferred	optical	metaphor	and	methodology	in	Donna	Haraway’s	Modest_Witness	and	Karen	Barad’s	Meeting	the	Universe	Halfway.	Barad	describes	Haraway’s	genius	in	this	shift	from	“reflexivity,”	which	“remains	caught	up	in	geometries	of	sameness,”	to	diffraction,	which	is	“attuned	to	
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differences—differences	that	our	knowledge-making	practices	make	and	the	effects	they	have	on	the	world”	(72).	There	are	important	resonances	and	patterns	that	make	themselves	apparent	when	reading	evolutionary	biology,	behavioral	ecology,	and	new	material	feminism	across	the	common	gradient	of	rhetorical	studies.	11.	See	Debra	Hawhee’s	“Toward	a	Bestial	Rhetoric”	as	an	example	of	a	commonly	encountered	reception	of	Kennedy’s	general	theory.	12.	See	Cary	Wolfe’s	What	is	Posthumanism?	for	discussion	of	Dennett’s	functionalist	approach	to	questions	of	the	mind	and	consciousness.	Wolfe	clarifies	how	Dennett’s	supposedly	embodied,	materialist	philosophy	of	mind	finds	itself	retrenched	in	the	Cartesian	privilege	of	the	disembodied	subject	(33-47).	Perhaps	most	critically	for	the	present	project	is	that	Dennett	draws	a	distinct	ontological	line	between	humans	and	animals	and	the	significance	of	suffering,	which	results	in	the	ethical	implication	that	“human	consciousness.	.	.	is	a	necessary	condition	for	serious	suffering”	(Dennett	qtd	in	Wolfe	45).	Not	only	does	this	exempt	animals	from	ethical	concern,	it	also	denies	the	ability	of	“serious	suffering”	to	some	humans.		13.	See	Virginia	Morell’s	Animal	Wise:	How	We	Know	Animals	Think	and	Feel	and	Jeffrey	Kluger’s	“Inside	the	Minds	of	Animals.”	14.	For	an	in-depth	discussion	of	the	nuances	of	thought	within	posthumanism,	see	the	Introduction	in	Cary	Wolfe’s	What	is	Posthumanism?	Karen	Barad	explains	her	position	on	posthumanism	similarly:	“Posthumanism,	as	I	intend	it	here,	is	not	calibrated	to	the	human;	on	the	contrary,	it	is	about	taking	issue	with	human	exceptionalism	while	being	accountable	for	the	role	we	play	in	the	differential	
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constitution	and	differential	positioning	of	the	human	among	other	creatures	(both	living	and	nonliving)”	(136).		15.	Representation	and	the	resulting	problem	of	reality	within	Western	philosophy	and	science	can	be	traced	back	through	Descartes	to	Democritus’s	atomic	theory,	where	the	appearance	of	the	real	and	the	“possibility	of	a	gap	between	representations	and	represented”	first	make	an	appearance	(Barad	48).	The	opposing	views	of	scientific	realism	and	social	constructivism	have	both	inherited	this	“common-sense,”	respresentationalist	framework	of	knowledge	by	presuming	that	“scientific	knowledge	(using	multiple	representational	forms	such	as	theoretical	concepts,	graphs,	particle	tracks,	and	photographic	images)	mediates	our	access	to	the	material	world”	(48).	These	two	views	merely	differ	as	to	whether	scientific	study	reveals	natural	states	of	being	or	culturally	constructive	states.		16.	The	academic	journal	Biosemiotics	6.2	is	a	special	issue	on	origins	of	mind.	See	especially	Yoshimi	Kawade	and	Mario	Villalobos.	17.	The	evolution	of	life’s	origins	is	still	a	mystery.	Many	interesting	developments	in	this	theoretical	research	are	currently	underway,	including	geologist	Mike	Russell’s	idea	that	a	natural	proton	gradient	created	near	hydrothermal	vents	in	the	ocean	created	the	originary	scene	of	cellular	chemiosmosis.	See	Tim	Requarth’s	“Our	Chemical	Eden.”		18.	This	indeterminacy	also	gives	rise	to	Barad’s	issue	with	the	metaphysics	of	individualism	reinstated	in	“mainstream	science	studies	approaches”	that	“take	it	as	a	given	that	social	variables	like	gender,	race,	nationality,	class,	and	sexuality	are	
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properties	of	individual	persons”	rather	than	practices	of	entangled	material	agencies	(57).	Such	theories,	and	we	can	include	here	speculative	realisms,	“fail	to	take	account	of	the	constitutive	nature	of	practices”	(57).		Chapter	Two	1.	von	Uexkull’s	umwelt	characterizes	the	entangled	ontologies	of	organisms	and	how	each	umwelt	cuts	differently.	This	is	similar	to	Barad’s	entangled	phenomena.	Grosz	writes	of	Uexkull:	“.	.	.[he]	advocates	an	extreme	perspectivism	in	which	objects	are	not	autonomous	or	independent	sets	of	qualities	and	quantities,	but	opportunities	for	engagement	that	offer	themselves	in	particular	ways	to	particular	organs	and	remain	otherwise	indiscernible”	(Chaos	41).	In	Uexkull’s	words:	“Every	object	becomes	something	completely	different	on	entering	a	different	Umwelt”	(108).		2.	Following	this	trajectory,	it	becomes	increasingly	clear	how	such	psychological	criteria	for	rhetoric	are	themselves	problematic.	Even	in	humans,	it	may	not	be	clear	when	“theory	of	mind”	is	being	enacted.	Such	criteria	would	most	certainly	foreclose	the	possibility	of	ambient	rhetoric,	more	generally,	as	well	as	much	visual	rhetoric.	This	further	illuminates	the	differences	between	an	adaptive	rhetoric	and	a	HumAnimal	rhetorics	that	affirms	persuasion	created	and	received	by	all	the	senses.	3.	The	evolution	of	life’s	origins	is	still	a	mystery.	Many	interesting	developments	in	this	theoretical	research	are	currently	underway,	including	geologist	Mike	Russell’s	idea	that	a	natural	proton	gradient	created	near	hydrothermal	vents	in	the	ocean	
		 182	
created	the	originary	scene	of	cellular	chemiosmosis.	See	Tim	Requarth’s	“Our	Chemical	Eden.”		4.	In	Schilthuizen’s	book,	he	explains	that	there	is	a	vast	array	of	diversity	in	how,	precisely,	DNA	gets	shuffled	around.	Genitalia	are	organs	used	for	the	very	specific	process	of	“internal	fertilization”	(18).		5.	Prior	to	Brennan’s	research,	“generations	of	biologists”	and	researchers	of	duck	reproduction	had	only	focused	on	the	more	observable	and	extraordinary	male	genitalia	(Zimmer).	This	brings	up	an	important	bias	in	scientific	research	(and	all	the	assumptions	that	stem	from	it)	for	focusing	almost	exclusively	on	males.	For	further	discussion	and	research	of	this	phenomenon,	see	Erika	L.	Milam’s	Looking	
for	a	Few	Good	Males:	Female	Choice	in	Evolutionary	Biology.	6.	In	one	study	that	included	a	“unique	combination	of	seven	colored	rings”	on	the	legs	of	male	Australian	zebra	finches	simply	as	a	means	of	identification,	researcher	Nancy	Burley	noticed	that	males	who	did	not	“pair	off”	for	mating	were	exclusively	those	without	red	and	pink	bands	in	their	unique	combination.	After	they	were	given	these	colors,	the	males	“instantly	paired	off”	(Schilthuizen	59).	This	and	other	examples	demonstrate	female	preference	for	certain	very	specific	aesthetic	characteristics	that	they	“normally	never	got	to	exercise”	(52).	7.	Grosz	describes	this	process	further:	“This	calling	to	attention,	this	making	of	one’s	own	body	into	a	spectacle,	this	highly	elaborate	display	of	attractors,	involves	intensification.	Not	only	are	organs	on	display	engorged,	intensified,	puffed	up,	but	the	organs	that	perceive	them—ears,	eyes,	nose—are	also	filled	with	intensity,	
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resonating	with	colors,	sounds,	smells,	shapes,	rhythms”	(Chaos	66).	Sexual	displays	intensify	sensation	in	each	organism’s	entangled	ontological	becoming.		8.	Derrida	comments	at	length	on	the	absurd	singular	of	“Animal”	in	The	Animal	
That	Therefore	I	Am:	“Confined	within	this	catch-all	concept,	within	this	vast	encampment	of	the	animal,	in	this	general	singular,	within	the	strict	enclosure	of	this	definite	article	.	.	.	are	all	the	living	things	that	man	does	not	recognize	as	his	fellows,	his	neighbors	or	his	brothers.	And	that	is	so	despite	the	infinite	space	that	separates	the	lizard	from	the	dog,	the	protozoon	from	the	dolphin,	the	shark	from	the	lamb,	the	parrot	from	the	chimpanzee,	the	camel	from	the	eagle,	the	squirrel	from	the	tiger,	the	elephant	from	the	cat,	the	ant	from	the	silkworm,	or	the	hedgehog	from	the	echidna”	(34).	9.	While	eliminating	parasites	particularly	threatening	to	humanimal	health	is	critical,	it	is	not	so	easy	to	make	a	clear	judgment	about	our	place	in	relation	to	parasites.	10.	In	embryology,	the	developing	humanimal	is	initially	referred	to	as	“embryo”	until	the	eleventh	week,	after	which	it	finally	gains	the	designation	of	fetus.		11.	I	remember	looking	at	the	visiting	home	nurse	in	surprise	as	she	explained	to	us,	“No,	you	do	not	have	to	sterilize	the	bottles	after	each	use.	Your	son	has	to	get	used	to	the	bacteria	in	his	environment.”	Up	until	this	point,	I	had	imagined	my	newborn	son	as	something	like	a	sterile,	fragile	vessel—full	of	a	purity	that	I	had	to	protect.	But	he	was	crawling	with	helpful	germs	and	would	need	more	to	acclimate	to	life	outside	his	amniotic	origins.	
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12.	“Xenotransplantation”	as	a	method	of	crossing	this	human-animal	abyss	is	obviously	not	new.	Animal	testing	is	a	good	example	of	the	issues	that	prompt	this	passage	of	human	and	animal	ontological	borders,	but	it	is	also	a	practice	that	reaffirms	human	privilege	rather	than	questioning	it.	Animal	testing	is	always	done	as	a	means	for	human	progress	and	knowledge.		13.	In	“Individuation,	Relationality,	Affect:	Rethinking	the	Human	in	Relation	to	the	Living,”	Couze	Venn	refers	to	Daniel	Stern’s	“vitality	affect”	of	“non-conscious	communication”—a	“feeling-with”	as	primary	experience	(137-138).	Venn	explains	how	Stern	begins	with	the	individual,	whereas	Venn	would	emphasize	relationality,	from	which	individuals	emerge	afterward.	This	recalls	Barad’s	quantum	entanglement	and	the	rejection	of	discrete,	static	characteristics	and	objects.			Chapter	Three	1.	Studies	of	the	female	form,	for	example,	included	domestic	tasks	like	carrying	a	pail	up	stairs	and	sweeping	the	floor.	Meanwhile,	the	male	form	is	charted	performing	athletic	maneuvers.	2.	“Nyan	Cat”	is	this	animated	feline	phenomenon	to	which	I	refer.	The	Pop-tart	bodied	feline	has	a	website	that	tracks	how	many	seconds	you	have	“nyaned”	to	its	endless	soundtrack,	and	its	video	on	YouTube	has	logged	125	million	views	since	its	upload	in	2011.	It	has	even	won	a	“Webby	Award”	for	“best	meme	of	the	year”	in	2012	(slobs;	“Nyan	Cat”).	
		 185	
3.	See	Lauren	Gawne	and	Jill	Vaughan’s	academic	paper,	“I	can	Haz	Language	Play:	The	Construction	of	Language	and	Identity	in	LOLspeak,”	in	the	Proceedings	of	the	
42nd	Australian	Linguistic	Society	Conference	as	well	as	Gretchen	McCulloch’s	article	“A	Linguist	Explains	the	Grammar	of	Doge.	Wow.”	in	The	Toast.		Chapter	Four	1.	I	choose	the	encountering	look	as	the	mode	of	unconcealment	for	this	project	rather	than	art	or	poetry,	as	the	encountering	look	relies	upon	a	physical	encounter	in	Heidegger’s	formulation.	It	is	my	overall	aim	to	connect	our	looking	relation	to	animals	in	visual	culture	with	the	physical	experience	of	humanimal	and	animal	bodies,	for	it	is	these	physical	entanglements	of	being	that	are	at	stake,	providing	the	exigency	for	theorizing	a	HumAnimal	rhetorics.	I	will	elaborate	on	this	further	as	the	chapter	unfolds.	2.	In	The	Mother	in	the	Age	of	Mechanical	Reproduction:	Psychoanalysis,	Photography,	
Destruction,	Elissa	Marder	reminds	us	of	the	role	animals	play	in	Freud’s	theorization	of	death,	sexual	difference,	and	the	psyche.	Animal	phobias,	taken	from	clinical	examples	like	the	Wolf	Man,	are	substitutions	for	fear	of	death	and	castration.	From	a	psychoanalytic	perspective,	animals	serve	a	complex	function	within	the	human	psyche—they	are	“primal,”	and	they	become	a	passageway	through	which	we	reach	that	special	status	of	human	subjectivity.	It	is	crucial	here	to	point	out	that,	despite	the	complex	intertwinings	of	animals	within	the	psyche,	there	is	no	animal	“as	such”	to	speak	of	in	psychoanalysis.	Marsden:	“one	of	the	
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defining	traits	of	being	human	is	the	incorporation	of	animal	figures	within	the	psyche;	these	internal	animal	figures	are	uncanny	traces	of	our	radical	alterity	and	separation	from	animals”	(60).	Rather	than	tracing	this	radical	alterity	within	the	human	psyche,	which	keeps	us	locked	within	the	human	mind,	this	dissertation	concerns	itself	with	how	these	complex	entanglements	play-out	in	material	encounters	with	real	animals.	3.	See	Mark	McMenamin	and	Dianna	McMenamin’s	Hypersea:	Life	on	Land	for	the	theory	of	“hypersea”	in	which	terrestrial	life	is	reimagined	as	sea	life:	“In	moving	out	of	marine	waters,	complex	life	has	taken	the	sea	beyond	the	sea	and	folded	it	back	inside	of	itself	to	for	Hypersea”	(5).	Also	see	Stacy	Alaimo’s	“Oceanic	Origins,	Plastic	Activism,	New	Materialism	at	Sea”	for	an	enlightening	discussion	of	this	topic.		4.	Of	course,	death	in	photography	or	in	visual	culture	generally	does	not	necessitate	an	encountering,	“Being-enabling”	look.	Susan	Sontag	talks	of	the	potential	negative	consequences	that	can	be	created	by	horror	in	photographs.	Sontag’s	description	of	her	own	transformative	encounter	with	images	of	death	in	the	Holocaust	may	sound	like	the	look	in	visual	culture	we	are	reaching	for:	“Nothing	I	have	seen,	in	photographs	or	in	real	life—ever	cut	me	as	sharply,	deeply,	instantaneously.	Indeed,	it	seems	plausible	to	me	to	divide	my	life	into	two	parts,	before	I	saw	those	photographs	(I	was	twelve)	and	after,	though	it	was	several	years	before	I	understood	fully	what	they	were	about”	(20).	But	Sontag	talks	of	a	deadening,	numbing	desensitization	toward	images	following	this	encounter.	Her	description	recalls	a	physical	experience	more	akin	to	the	violence	and	traumatization	of	rape.	
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While	this	supports	the	very	real,	physical	and	transformative	encounter	that	can	occur	with	images	in	visual	culture,	it	is	obviously	not	the	gift	of	being	we	seek.	5.	This	is	the	case	for	many	animals—sexually	and	asexually	reproducing—though	I	do	not	wish	to	ignore	examples	of	being	that	arise	in	other	ways,	such	as	the	various	theories	for	origins	of	life,	which	I	elaborate	upon	in	Chapter	2.	6.	While	Watson’s	group	did	not	save	the	whales	that	day	in	1975,	this	now	iconic	image	was	a	radical	success	in	gaining	attention	for	their	cause.	With	Marshall	McLuhan	as	their	“greatest	prophet,”	Greenpeace	thus	began	this	strategy	of	“plung[ing]	into	the	vortex	of	electric	technology	in	order	to	understand	it	and	dictate	the	new	environment”	(Deluca	4).	In	the	wake	of	their	success,	other	“radical	environmental	groups”	began	using	the	same	public	staging,	the	same	dramatic	image	events	of	human	lives	risked,	in	order	to	attract	attention	if	not	immediate	change	(5).	Change,	though,	has	also	followed.	Deluca	outlines	a	number	of	significant	wins	resulting	from	the	publicity	created	by	image	events,	such	as	the	end	of	nuclear	testing	at	a	site	in	the	Aleutian	Islands	by	the	U.S.	Atomic	Energy	Commission,	“the	banning	of	commercial	whaling;	harvesting	of	baby	harp	seals;	and	ocean	dumping	of	nuclear	wastes.	.	.	the	requirement	of	turtle	excluder	devices	on	shrimp	nets;	the	banning	of	the	disposal	of	plastics	at	sea	by	the	United	States;	and	much	more”	(3).	The	difference	between	the	creation	of	image	events	for	environmental	purposes	and	what	this	chapter	reaches	for	is	implicit	in	its	choice	to	focus	on	Heidegger’s	Aletheia.	Image	events	may	bring	more	attention	and	even	
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change	to	important	environmental	issues,	but	the	way	these	images	are	staged	continues	to	portray	animals	as	objects,	albeit	objects	that	must	be	saved.		7.	See	Debra	Hawhee’s	theory	of	rhetorical	vision,	as	images	conjured	by	language,	in	“Looking	into	Aristotle’s	Eyes:	Toward	a	Theory	of	Rhetorical	Vision.”			Chapter	Five	1.	Descending	here	does	not	mean	to	indicate	a	descent	into	lower	forms	of	being.	It	does	not	mean	to	imply	a	hierarchal	ladder	of	evolutionary	life.	Rather,	it	is	a	descent	that	reaches	deeper	into	being,	attempting	to	reinclude	that	which	has	been	excluded.	Hopefully	this	meaning	will	come	through	as	the	chapter	unfolds.	2.	The	punctum	is	of	course	a	very	personal	encounter.	Given	that	Barthes	responded	to	photographs	after-the-fact,	his	experience	would	be	quite	a	bit	different	than	a	trauma	or	wounding	experienced	in	the	creation	of	photo	in	which	the	self	features.			 	
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